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The effectiveness of aid is a matter of much controversy. In response, the aid effectiveness 
agenda, developed through numerous conferences and declarations since the 2000s, has been 
promoted as a potential solution to problems identified with previous aid regimes. This 
investigation aims to analyse the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh, a leading aid 
recipient country. Particular emphasis has been given to the development of aid policies, how 
they have been implemented and the contributions they have made to aid effectiveness. The 
study applies the top-down public policy implementation approach to develop the conceptual 
framework. This research adopts qualitative methodology and case study strategy. It opts 
thematic analysis technique to analyse sixty six in-depth interviews and numerous policy 
documents, many of which have not been accessed by previous studies. Key findings include: 
both Government and donors have not shown sufficient commitment to implement the 
agenda; more focus has been given to initiatives with a high visibility at international events 
than to outcomes; most initiatives are project-based and have not been institutionalised; there 
is insufficient understanding (or even awareness) of the aid effectiveness agenda among 
Government officials; donors are reluctant to change their systems and procedures; top-down 
policy implementation approach of both Government and the donors has remained relatively 
unsuccessful. The study shows the shift from aid to development effectiveness agenda has 
negatively impacted country level activities and the implementation of the agenda is currently 
in limbo. The reasons for this are complex, including problems with donors, recipients and 
with the agenda. Problems with donors include political agendas and interests, preference of 
own policies and procedures and a lack of respect for recipient leadership. Issues with 
recipients include poor leadership, weak policy implementation and a fear of losing funding. 
Problems identified with the agenda are the legally non-binding nature and the shift from aid 
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Aid effectiveness is an important issue, due to both the huge amounts of money involved and 
the reliance of many countries on aid for development. However, there remain serious 
concerns as to whether aid works or not. Over many decades, a vast literature has explored 
the effectiveness of aid, but many issues remain unresolved. Key to this debate is the aid 
effectiveness agenda developed through various international conferences and declarations 
over several years. This study aims to investigate further, the aid effectiveness agenda in the 
context of Bangladesh – a leading aid recipient country – yet the subject of limited research 
to date. It undertakes numerous in-depth interviews and analyses a range of official 
documents to examine the extent to which the aid effectiveness agenda has been implemented 
in Bangladesh and to assess whether this has helped to improve outcomes. It is argued that 
the agenda has not been fully implemented and that as a result, improvements in aid 
effectiveness have been limited.  
 
The comprehensive framework for aid effectiveness includes delivery, management and 
development outcomes. The agenda promotes partnership instead of donorship and 
emphasises co-ordinated efforts of donors and Government, upholding ownership and 
leadership of recipients. The aid effectiveness agenda has inspired both donors and recipients 
for policy reforms in implementing its principles and addressing indicator-based, time-bound 
commitments for aid effectiveness. Therefore, the agenda is able to draw significant research 
attention.  
 
This study examines the Bangladesh Government‟s own initiatives as well as its collective 
efforts with development partners to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and its impact 
on aid effectiveness. It is a qualitative study, which combines a critical realism philosophy, 
an abductive approach, a case study strategy and thematic analysis to analyse the data 
collected – both primary and secondary data. The primary data take the form of sixty six 
interviews of Government ministers, secretaries, high-level donor officials and other 
professionals. Additionally, a number of Government documents examined are not known to 




The study has sought to draw new findings for the implementation process of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. Most Government and development partner initiatives are 
project-based and have not been institutionalised. Awareness and understanding of the 
importance of the aid effectiveness agenda among these agents, especially planning and 
implementing agencies are poor or absent. Both Government and development partners are 
more interested in visibility at international forums rather than the outcomes initiatives. The 
study also finds that country level activities related to the aid effectiveness agenda are 
international event centred. Due to a shift of the agenda from aid to development effectiveness, 
activities at international-level have been reduced. Subsequently, country level activities have 
also been reduced significantly. Furthermore, currently the Government of Bangladesh and it‟s 
development partners do not endeavour to implement the “unfinished business” of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The findings presented here, seek to make a contribution to the literature 
by offering an understanding of the implementation and management of aid effectiveness in 
Bangladesh. It also sheds light on the partnership approach.  
 
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions  
 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate policy initiatives of the Government of Bangladesh and its 
joint efforts with development partners, to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and to 
improve aid effectiveness. With this in mind, it attempts to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To identify and analyse the policy initiatives developed by the Government of 
Bangladesh in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda.   
 
2. To assess collaborative efforts between the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners regarding the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
3. To understand the current implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda in 
Bangladesh.  
 
The thesis presents the following questions to underpin the objectives:  
1. What policy initiatives has the Government of Bangladesh developed with regard to 





2. What are the collaborative efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda, how effective have 
they been and why have they often disappointed?  
 
3. What is the current implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda in 
Bangladesh and why do the Government and development partners appear unwilling 
to implement it further?  
 
1.3 The Aid Effectiveness Agenda 
 
A number of foreign aid policy reforms have been enacted through international conferences, 
high-level forums and official declarations since the early 2000s, to improve the effectiveness 
of aid. Their main focus was to co-ordinate donors, partnerships, ownership and leadership by 
recipients. The declarations include the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003), the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. These declarations, their principles and frameworks 
are collectively referred to as the aid effectiveness agenda. The Paris declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, 2005 with its normative framework of five principles; ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation and managing for results along with twelve indicators and a time-bound 
commitment, is considered a building block of the aid effectiveness agenda. The agenda is also 
known as the “Paris Agenda”, the “aid effectiveness paradigm” (Mawdsley et al., 2014) or 
simply the “aid agenda” (Renard, 2007). It was initially driven by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and eventually by the UN and the World Bank. The development community adopted the 
development effectiveness agenda at the Busan High-Level Forum in 2011 and aid 
effectiveness was included as “unfinished business” in the development effectiveness agenda.  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda represents a paradigm shift in foreign aid policymaking due to 
its comprehensive approach of aid management to increase aid effectiveness (Gisselquist and 
Resnick, 2014). It consists of aid delivery, management, implementation of aided projects 
and programmes and achievement of development outcomes (Wood et al., 2011; Abdel-
Malek, 2015). Partnership between donors and recipients is a key underpinning of the 
objectives of the aid effectiveness agenda (Mawdsley, 2014; Sjöstedt and Sundström, 2017). 
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Most importantly, donor co-ordination, recipient ownership and leadership are the 
cornerstones of the agenda (Hayman, 2009; Collins, 2009; Molenaers and Nijs; 2011; 
Swedlund, 2013; Sjöstedt and Sundström, 2017; Minasyan et al., 2017). The agenda does not 
look at aid effectiveness through the old lens of the aid-growth relationship. Therefore, this 
policy discourse influenced both donors and recipient Governments to undertake a range of 
reforms in line with the guidelines and objectives to improve aid effectiveness.  
 
1.4 Relevance and Significance of the Study 
 
The aid effectiveness agenda, with it‟s time-bound commitments and measurable indicators is 
able to highlight several issues and problems which previously did not occur in foreign aid 
policymaking. It also poses a challenge to both donors and recipients for policy 
implementation. Thus, the present-day aid effectiveness debate is dominated by the aid 
effectiveness agenda (Cameron and Low, 2012), which has been studied perhaps for four main 
reasons; i) it emphasises a change of systems and procedures for both donor and recipient, ii) it 
motivates both donor and recipient countries to improve policy, iii) it calls for an end to 
donorship, promoting partnership, recipient ownership and leadership instead, and iv) proposes 
principles and indicators to assess the effectiveness of aid. However, existing scholarly 
contributions have not yet been able to explore all of the pros and cons of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. is one of the leading aid recipient countries of the world with more than 30% of aid 
dependence to implement development budget. This thesis examines the implementation 
exercise of the aid effectiveness agenda by the Government of Bangladesh, and its development 
partners and its impact on aid and the development administration to increase aid effectiveness. 
Therefore, this study is relevant in understanding the reality of implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda and its impact on aid effectiveness.    
 
This study has two-fold significances- theoretical, and policymaking and implementation. A 
number of findings of this research minimise knowledge gap in the area of aid and 
development effectiveness. For example, project-based approach to implement the aid 
effectiveness agenda, lack of institutionalism of the initiatives, visibility tendency than real 
outcomes and  poor understanding of the Government officials and reluctance of the donors to 
change system and procedures. Moreover, few findings of this research will contribute to future 
policymaking and implementation in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda. For instance, the 
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study unveils the impact of the frequent changes in the agenda in country level, provides 
information about current implementation status and unfolds challenges related to top-down 
policy implementation approach. Furthermore, this research contains significant amount of 
information for the aid recipient government, international organisations deal with aid and the 
professionals of social sciences especially development economics.       
 
1.5 Existing Literature on Aid Effectiveness 
 
Some believe aid does not work and is even detrimental to economic development (Collier, 
2006; Easterly, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2012; Nourou, 2014; Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016). Others argue aid works (Sachs, 2005; Alvi and Senbeta, 2012, 2015; 
Larsen, 2016; Mohapatra et al., 2016) and a “big push” should be given so that recipient 
countries can gain sustainability soon (Sachs, 2005). Another viewpoint is that aid is effective 
if the recipient country has a sound policy, strong institutions and good governance (Burnside 
and Dollar, 1997a, 1997b, 2004; World Bank, 1998; Sobhan, 2002; United Nations, 2013; 
Copestake and Williams, 2014; Qayyum et al., 2014; Habtom, 2016). Recent studies are more 
focused to identify factors which undermine the effectiveness of aid than the debate of aid 
works or not (Lim, 2011; Cameron and Low, 2012; Abdul-Malek, 2015; Habraken et al., 
2017). These look at aid effectiveness from a total management perspective rather than a 
narrow aid and growth relationship.  
 
1.6 Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh  
 
This study and those of the Government of Bangladesh argues that in spite of several 
initiatives, aid effectiveness remains a challenge for Bangladesh (AEU, 2010a; AEU, 2011; 
ERD, 2011; ERD, 2016, 2016a). Several issues have been identified that impede aid 
effectiveness in Bangladesh. For example, capacity constraints of Government officials, 
corruption, cumbersome project approval processes, poor project implementation (Quibria, 
2010), poor policy regimes, governance (Khan and Ahmed, 2012), a lack of ownership, client-
patron relationships between Government and development partners (Eyben, 2007; Quibria and 
Islam, 2014), aid fragmentation, proliferation of donors and projects ( AEU, 2010a, 2011; 
Ahmed, 2017), an absence of harmonisation (Rahaman and Khan, 2010) and a weak public 
finance management system (Hossen, 2015). Some studies also suggest the aid effectiveness 
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agenda is yet to make a considerable contribution to the aid-growth relationship and the overall 
aid management of the Bangladesh economy (Rahaman and Khan, 2010; Nadoll, 2010; Dristy, 
2016). Currently, the availability of development finance, particularly foreign aid is perhaps not 
an issue. Rather the Government realises that without a serious overhauling of aid and the 
development management administration and system, the national Vision 2021 is unlikely to 
become reality. Subsequently, achievement of SDGs will be uncertain (ERD, 2016a). 
Therefore, effective implementation of aid effectiveness principles is crucial for Bangladesh. 
 
1.7 Methodological Approach of the Study 
 
This study adopts a qualitative mode of inquiry, combining a critical realism philosophy with 
an abductive approach and case study strategy. It analyses primary data in the form of sixty 
six interviews of high-level policymakers including three ministers and six secretaries, senior 
officials from development partners and associated professionals. Moreover, it scrutinises 
official Government documents, which to the best of knowledge, no previous study has been 
able to access. A thematic data analysis technique is then applied to data using NVivo to code 
transcribed data, organised as node and child-node to develop themes and sub-themes.  
     
1.8 Contributions to the Literature  
 
This study seeks to make four contributions to the research literature:  
i. It is an extensive examination of Bangladesh‟s efforts to implement the aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
ii. It provides further insights into the partnership approach between donors and 
recipients, central to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
iii. It provides an update on the “unfinished business” of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
iv. It analyses the top-down public policy implementation approach and some of the 




In terms of research question one, the Government of Bangladesh has undertaken several 
initiatives with regard to the aid effectiveness agenda. For example, alignment between long, 
23 
 
mid and short-term plans, the introduction of a Development Results Framework, public 
finance management reforms, Development Finance Assessment (DFA) and draft aid policy. 
Another important undertaking is the establishment of the Development Effectiveness Wing 
in the ERD. However, the execution of many policy initiatives has been disappointing. For 
instance, the five year plan is not well aligned with the annual development programme, 
execution is weak, frequent amendments of public finance management policies and laws are 
made and aid policy has remained in draft stage for the last eight years. The reasons for this 
are complex, but key issues include a lack of political commitment and weak leadership, 
capacity constraints, poor awareness and understanding of the importance of the aid agenda, a 
project-based approach which has not been institutionalised and non co-operation of donors 
to some extent.  
 
With regard to research question two, a number of collaborative efforts by Government and 
donors have been made, mainly through the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) to address core 
aid effectiveness issues. For example, donor harmonisation, use of a country system, 
alignment, mutual accountability and results management. However, outcomes of 
collaborative efforts remain unsatisfactory. A Local Consultative Group plenary and 
economic sector-wise working groups have not been functional and the Bangladesh 
Development Forum is taking place only intermittently. The main reasons for unsatisfactory 
outcomes include the disjointed project-based approach, a fear of losing funds, poor 
leadership of Government, weak institutions, a dominating attitude by donors, greater focus 
on international visibility rather than results of initiatives and donor reluctance to change 
systems and procedures.  
 
In relation to research question three, it appears that neither the Government nor development 
partners are currently endeavouring to implement the principle of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. Therefore, the implementation process of “unfinished business” is in limbo. This 
study identifies a few reasons for this. The main include the shift of the agenda from aid to 
development effectiveness, the voluntary approach of the development effectiveness agenda, 
a lack of GPEDC initiative, fewer international activities related to the aid effectiveness 
agenda and demotivation of both donors and Government.    
 
     
24 
 
1.9 Policy Recommendations 
 
This study sets out the following policy recommendations:  
 
i) The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) could 
enhance its efforts to implement “unfinished business” under a time-bound 
commitment. Inclusion of harmonisation as a principle of development 
effectiveness is also important.  
 
ii) Recipients need to undertake sustainable initiatives and adopt an institutionalised 
approach to implement the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. On the other 
hand, donors could not only finance recipient initiatives but also change their 
systems and procedures to uphold the principles.  
 
iii) Recipients could introduce and improvise systems and policies without being 
afraid of losing funds. Donors could change their dominating attitudes and 
procedures to ensure ownership and leadership by recipients.  
 
iv) Donor and recipient priorities could emphasise outcome-based activities rather 
than collective visibility at international forums. 
 
v) Continuous dialogue is important between donors and recipients, therefore 
collaborative or co-ordination platforms need to be functional.  
 
vi) Awareness and understanding of the importance of the aid effectiveness agenda at 
all levels of recipient Governments is the catalyst to reap the benefits of the aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
 
1.10 Context of the Bangladesh Economy and Foreign Aid  
 
In spite of infrastructural deficits and perennial governance challenges, Bangladesh has been 
able to maintain a GDP growth rate of over 7% in the last couple of years, including 7.86% in 
the financial year 2017-18 (Ministry of Finance, 2018). The country is a lower middle income 
country (LMIC) as per World Bank classification and according to the UN, it is a least 
developed country with a per capita income of USD1751 (Ministry of Finance, 2018). In 
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2018, Bangladesh met all three criteria of the UN ECOSOC, GNI per capita, Human Asset 
Index (HAI) and Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI), for its graduation from LDC in 2024 
(ERD, 2018a). A country with more than 160 million people, still owns a headcount poverty 
rate of 21.8%. Extreme poverty stands at 11.3 with Bangladesh 136 out of 189 countries in 
the Human Development Index of the UNDP (Ministry of Finance, 2019; UNDP, 2018). 
However, Bangladesh has also been identified as one of the next eleven emerging economies 
and a frontier five country (Goldman Sachs, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, more than 30% of the development budget of Bangladesh currently comes from 
foreign aid. Mostly in the form of loans which account for around 2% of national income 
(Calculated using: World Bank, 2019a; ERD, 2019a). Bangladesh received USD 6.21 billion 
in foreign aid from development partners in the 2018-2019 financial year, with USD 5.95 
billion in loans and USD 0.26 billion in grants (ERD, 2019a). USD 79.26 billion in aid has 
been received since independence in 1971, USD 27.42 as grants and 51.84 as loans. The 
current amount of foreign aid in the pipeline is USD 48.11 billion (ERD, 2019a).  
 
Figure 1.1 Top ten donors to Bangladesh as of 2019 
 
 
Source: ERD, 2019 
 
The total budget of Bangladesh in 2018-2019 was $52 billion, with $19.8 billion for 
development and $6 billion expected from foreign aid – 30.54% of the development budget 





Figure 1.2 Ratio of Government contribution and foreign aid in the 2018-19 Annual 
Development Programme (ADP)  
 
 
Source: ERD, 2019 
 
Bangladesh inherited foreign aid when it was a part of Pakistan. After the independence in 
1971, owing to poor internal savings, poverty and a large population, the country had fallen 
into the foreign aid trap. Starting with 8.5% in 1972-1973, the aid-GDP ratio increased up to 
13.7% in the 1981-82 financial year. However, in first ten years of independence, 1972 to 
1982, the contribution of foreign aid in the development budget was 61% to 65% (Sobhan, 
1982). With the increase of exports, remittances, internal savings and an overall development 
of the economy, the aid-GDP ratio now hovers around 2%. Nonetheless, with the size of the 
development budget, known as the Annual Development Programme (ADP), the total amount 
of aid has always been increasing because of the budget deficit or investment gaps. 
 













At the same time, a number of mega projects such as metro rail, nuclear power, big bridges, 
four lane highways and elevated express also contribute to the increase. The contribution of 
foreign aid in the Annual Development Programme (ADP) for the 2018-19 financial year was 
USD 6 billion but USD 3 billion in the 2014-15 financial year (ERD, 2019a).    
 
 
Figure 1.4 Foreign Aid in the Annual Development Programme from 2014-15 to 2018-19  
 
 
Source: ERD, 2019 
 
Figure 1.5 Ratio of Government Contribution and Foreign Aid in the Annual 




Source: ERD, 2017d, 2017e, 2018b, 2019a 
2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Total Resource 8431.04 10463.08 11288.63 14402.16 19880.98
Foreign Aid 3005.54 3531.72 4125 6271.08 6071.45




















Currently, all seventeen sectors of the economy have aid dependency. The following table 
provides a clear picture. 
 
















































1.10.1 Bangladesh’s Performance in Aid Effectiveness Surveys and Monitoring 
 
Bangladesh has participated in all of the OECD-DAC aid effectiveness surveys in 2005, 2007 
and 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, it was able to meet three indicators out of twelve; 
indicator three: aid flows are aligned to national priorities, indicator four: strengthen capacity 
by co-ordinated support and indicator eight: aid is untied. Three indicators remained static, 
five indicators showed progress and four indicators resulted in setbacks.  
 
Table 1.2 Bangladesh’s Performance in the OECD-DAC Surveys 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2011c 
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The GPEDC (2016) monitoring round report again denoted an unsatisfactory performance for 
Bangladesh, especially in core aid effectiveness indicators. Alignment of aid to national 
priority went down to 89%, from 100% in 2010. Budget support was 80% in 2010, also down 
to 75%. Only 23% of aid was using national budget execution, down from 62% in 2013 and 
disbursement beyond schedule was 54% for a target of 0% (GPEDC, 2016a).  
 


















Source: GPEDC, 2016a 
 
 
Source: GPEDC, 2016a 
 
1.10.2 Planning, Development and Aid Administration in Bangladesh 
 
The Government of Bangladesh has a structured planning strategy as well as a development 
administration to underpin the country‟s socio-economic vision. The National Economic 
Council (NEC), the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), the 
Planning Commission (PC), all four divisions of the Ministry of Finance: Finance Division 
(FD), Internal Resources Division (IRD), Economic Relations Division (ERD) and Financial 
Institutions Division (FID), and all three divisions of the Ministry of Planning: Planning 
Division , Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) and Statistics and 
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Informatics Division (SID) and line ministries/divisions constitute the planning and 
development administration of Bangladesh (AEU, 2010; Rahman, 2014).  
 
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning jointly undertake and co-ordinate 
planning and development activities for the country. The Planning Commission (PC) 
formulates long, medium and short term plans reflecting the country‟s vision, development 
goals and priorities. As an executing agency, the line ministry/division and its agencies 
formulate development projects, aligning plans and development goals. The Ministry of 
Finance (FM) arranges resources for development projects but due to a scarcity of internal 
resources, the FM sources foreign aid through the Economic Relations Division (ERD). As 
the country‟s development undertaking is project-based and all seventeen economic sectors 
have aid dependency, almost all institutions of the development administration are involved 
in the management of foreign aid.  
 





















1.10.3 Current Development Planning Structure 
 
Historically, Bangladesh‟s national development strategy has been formulated as a five-year 
development plan, except for the period 2003 to 2010, when poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRSP) were prepared. Bangladesh‟s current planning strategy is guided by a national 
vision to become a middle-income country by 2021 in the 50th anniversary year of 
independence: “Vision 2021”. The five year plan is implemented by a three-year rolling 
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) and a one-year Annual Development 
Programme (ADP). The ADP is a compilation of projects approved by the Planning 
Commission, the Finance Division and the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of 
Finance (ERD, 2016). The ADP is revised with the budget and called the Revised ADP 
(RADP) (Planning Division, 2016).  
 
Figure 1.7: Development Planning Process of the Government of Bangladesh 
 




1.10.4 Economic Relations Division (ERD) 
 
The Economic Relations Division (ERD), one of the four divisions of the Ministry of 
Finance, is the designated organisation of the Government to mobilise foreign aid, liaise with 
development partners and co-ordinate all foreign aid inflows to the country. For line ministry 
requests for foreign aid, the planning commission determines priorities and investment levels 
and the ERD assesses foreign aid needs, mobilises aid, participates in project monitoring and 
plans for debt servicing.  
 




















Figure 1.8 ERD Business Process 
 
 
Source: ERD, 2015a 
 
The ERD is divided into ten wings according to development partners, except Wing ten, but 
wings are also responsible for other activities. These wings negotiate with DPs and mobilise 
aid. ERD wings include Wing one: America and Japan, Wing two: the World Bank, Wing 
three: Administration and the Middle East, Wing four: the UN, Wing five: the ADB, Wing 
six: Co-ordination and Nordic, Wing seven: Europe, Wing eight: Asia and the Joint 
Economic Commission (JEC), Wing nine: Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts (FABA) and 
ICT Functions and Wing ten: Development Effectiveness responsible for aid and 
development effectiveness related activities (ERD, 2105, 2017). However, the ERD‟s wings 
in general also take part in project monitoring by way of project progress information reports 
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from project directors/line ministries and field visits. The ERD organises a tripartite meeting 
between itself, implementing agencies and development partners to resolve issues such as 
procurement, delayed implementation or delayed disbursement (ERD, 2017). 
 
1.11 Summary of Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis comprises eight chapters including an introduction and conclusion. Chapter one 
outlines the background and objectives of the study and also provides a context for the 
Bangladesh economy and foreign aid. Chapter two reviews the existing literature on aid 
effectiveness with a particular focus on the aid effectiveness agenda. It highlights the debate 
on aid effectiveness, defining it from the perspective of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
Traditional issues which have historically appeared in the aid literature such as weak 
institutions and policies, governance and corruption in recipient countries have also been 
discussed in this chapter. Both the empirical and theoretical literature are reviewed to outline 
the emergence and normative framework of the aid effectiveness agenda in an order of 
international aid effectiveness forums and conferences. For example, Rome, Paris, Accra and 
Busan High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness. A literature review on the experience of 
different countries in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda is also presented in this 
chapter. The literature review on a shift from aid to development effectiveness and its impact 
is also included in this chapter. An analysis of this chapter helps to outline the conceptual 
framework in chapter three. In line with the top-down policy approach of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, the conceptual framework is outlined adopting a top-down public 
policy implementation model. The chapter discusses public policy and different models of 
policy implementation and suitability in different contexts. An argument is offered in favour 
of the selection of the top-down policy implementation approach or model. Finally, the 
conceptual framework of the thesis is presented at the end of the chapter. In Chapter four, a 
research methodology is elaborated. The chapter outlines a rationale for qualitative research, 
critical realism, an abductive approach and a case study research strategy. Sampling, data 
collection methods, questionnaires, data analysis techniques and procedures are described. 
The necessary steps to ensure validity and reliability of the research as well as findings are 
also discussed. Due to the sensitive nature of interview information, ethical considerations are 






Chapter five is one of the analytical chapters. It analyses policy decisions or initiatives of the 
Government of Bangladesh to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. It also critically 
evaluates the impact of these initiatives in the aid and development administrations of 
Bangladesh. The chapter also identifies gaps in the implementation process. The next chapter, 
chapter six, is a second analytical chapter evaluating the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners‟ collective efforts in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and the 
impact of these efforts in aid administration in Bangladesh. The chapter examines the 
application of guidelines for aid effectiveness at country level. Chapter seven, another 
analytical chapter, evaluates the current implementation status of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. This chapter examines the present initiatives of the Government of Bangladesh as 
well as development partners in implementing the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda 
with a special focus on contemporary transformation of the aid effectiveness agenda to 
development effectiveness. The final chapter, chapter eight is the concluding chapter of the 
thesis and contains findings, contributions to knowledge, limitations of the study and 


















2.1 Introduction  
 
After more than sixty years the business impact of foreign aid is still a matter of intense 
debate. The aid community and academia identify a number of issues detrimental to aid 
effectiveness associated with donors as well as recipients. For example, donors are held 
responsible for conditionality, fragmentation and dominance; in contrast, recipient countries 
are liable for weak policy and institutions, and poor governance. In the late 1990s, 
discussion developed in the aid community to set-up principles and targets to change the 
approach from donorship to partnership to ensure aid effectiveness eliminated these 
concerns. Nonetheless, a breakthrough came after the UN MDG declared a need for more 
and effective development finance which eventually accelerated the aid effectiveness 
agenda. This agenda does not necessarily reflect only on the aid and growth relationship 
rather it includes issues such as aid management, delivery, and development impact. The aid 
effectiveness agenda was initially driven by the OECD-DAC and eventually by the United 
Nations and the World Bank as well.  
 
Four High-Level Forums (HLF) helped shape the aid effectiveness agenda. The first HLF 
convened in Rome in 2003 with an explicit emphasis on harmonisation. However, the 
revolutionary Paris HLF of 2005 popularly known as the „Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (PD)‟ influenced the aid regime most. Five aid effectiveness principles: 
ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability, and 
twelve indicators and target deadlines made it a complete package. The Accra Agenda for 
Action (AAA) was resolved in Accra 2008 HLF to expedite PD implementation. The 4
th
 
HLF on Aid Effectiveness convened in Busan in 2011 where the Historic Busan Partnership 
for Effectiveness Development Co-operation document was adopted and a broader and more 
inclusive platform, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
(GPEDC) was created to achieve development effectiveness where „unfinished business‟ of 
the PD and Accra remained at the centre. The GPEDC is now focused to achieve the 





The following literature review extensively covers the existing literature on aid and the aid 
effectiveness agenda within which the current research has been undertaken. As the current 
research examines the Bangladesh Government and its development partners efforts to 
implement aid effectiveness, this literature review mostly emphasises the evolution of the aid 
effectiveness agenda as well as the implementation exercises of different aid recipient 
countries to establish a context.  
 
Section 2.2 discusses the aid effectiveness concept, Section 2.3 focuses on the long-standing 
debate „aid works or not‟, Section 2.4 examines the importance of recipient policy, 
institution, governance and corruption issues for effective utilisation of foreign aid, Section 
2.5 reviews donor behaviour in managing aid , Section-2.6 discusses the emergence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, Section 2.7 sheds light on the first High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness with a special focus on changes in policy and management, significance of the 
Managing for Development Results Round Tables is evaluated in Section-2.8, Section- 2.9 
reviews the Paris Declaration (PD)‟s significance, policy implications and progress (Section-
2.11 also discusses progress) and weaknesses and Section-2.10 inspects the Accra High-
Level Forum‟s input for faster implementation of PD. A major aid effectiveness policy shift 
took place in Busan HLF which is discussed in Section-2.12, SDG Declaration‟s implications 
are discussed in Section-2.13, Section-2.14 examines GPEDC progress and implications for 
aid effectiveness policy implementation, the PD policy implementation experience and 
challenges are discussed in Section-2.15 and 2.16, and Section-2.17 evaluates the impact of 
the aid effectiveness agenda and the future of it. Section-2.18 under the caption of Gaps in 
Literature argues the need for this research in the area of aid effectiveness policy 
implementation especially from a recipient country perspective.   
 
2.2 Concept of Aid Effectiveness 
 
A vast majority of the existing aid literature defines aid effectiveness from the perspective of 
economic growth with special reference to poverty reduction (Burnside and Dollar, 1997a; 
Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Karras, 2006; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010; Lacalle-Calderón, 2015). 
Some authors attempt to define aid effectiveness relatively broadly linking aid effects to 
economic and social development or to increase per capita income (Chenery and Strout, 
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1966). Aid effectiveness is also seen as an effect on development (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 
2006) or economic prosperity (Simplice, 2014). But the group of literature that narrowly 
focuses on the aid and growth relationship certainly omits the link of aid with final 
development outcomes especially in the new aid landscape (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 
2007). However, there is a growing literature influenced by the aid effectiveness agenda 
particularly after the Paris Declaration which describes aid effectiveness from the viewpoint 
of aid delivery, management and achievement of development outcomes (OECD, 2006; Stern 
et al., 2008; Abdel-Malek, 2015). 
 
Indicator-based aid management imperatives of the PD immensely influenced the post PD 
literature in reference to aid effectiveness. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) asks for the commitment of its members to aid effectiveness and its 
idea of aid effectiveness as „improving the management, delivery and complementarity of 
development cooperation activities to ensure the highest development impact‟ (OECD, 2006; 
p.139). Focusing on the management and objectives of aid, Stern et al. (2008; p. vii) define 
aid effectiveness as an „arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid 
that is efficient, reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes 
including poverty reduction‟. Outcomes of the aided project and its implementation also 
appear in the definition of aid effectiveness. Roberts (2009; p.2) says that „aid should 
effectively meet the needs of the people by having a positive impact during and following 
project implementation‟. However, these definitions do not expressly speak about ownership 
and accountability which are articulated as fundamental prerequisites of aid effectiveness in 
High-Level Forums particularly in the PD. Abdel-Malek (2015; p.1) makes an attempt to 
define aid effectiveness combining all principles evolving through the aid effectiveness 
agenda and he reveals that „the extent to which aid provided to a country supports its plans to 
achieve development goals in a sustainable and measurable way‟.  
 
The current aid effectiveness discourse is very much motivated towards the achievement of 
the universal 2030 SDG agenda that emphasises development effectiveness and is measured 
through indicators (GPEDC, 2016). However, this thesis upholds the PD together with its 
normative framework- ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual 




2.3 Debate of Aid Effectiveness 
 
The study of the aid literature explicitly reveals three distinct categories; aid positivist, aid 
critic and conditional supporter. Aid positivists claim that aid creates a positive impact on 
economic growth and poverty reduction (Sachs, 2005, Alvi and Senbeta, 2012, 2015; Larsen, 
2016; Mohapatra et al., 2016). It contributes to the rise of economic indicators such as 
physical and human capital and infant mortality (Ardent et al., 2015) and vital economic 
sectors such as agriculture and industry are benefited from foreign aid (Feeny and Ouattara, 
2009). Socio-economic infrastructural development is fundamental for the sustainable 
economic growth of a country and foreign aid significantly contributes to the improvement of 
infrastructure in developing countries (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017). Furthermore, studies 
find a long-run positive impact of aid on economic growth (Minoiu and Reddy, 2010). But 
the evidence is there that the positive impact of aid can make recipient governments lazy in 
mobilizing domestic resources (Chowdhury and Sugema, 2005). However, positivists do not 
specify prerequisites or conditions which may impact the outcome of foreign aid, for 
example, governance, culture, and weak policies of recipient countries. At the same time, 
they omit country conditions such as slow or fast progressing economies because it is 
reported that high-growth countries can reap more benefit from foreign aid than low-growth 
countries (Simplice, 2014). Besides, some authors claim a diminutive relationship between 
aid and economic development (Burnside and Dollar, 1997a; Sogge, 2002).   
 
Conversely, critics assert that aid fails to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty 
(Djankov et al., 2006; Collier, 2006; Easterly, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Ghosh and Ghosh, 2010). 
Moreover, some research indicates that the aid impact is negative in the economy and it 
further creates a socio-economic problem or weakens institutions (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 
2012; Nourou, 2014; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). There is also a strong allegation 
against foreign aid as a contributory to corruption (Agarwal, et al., 2010) and bad governance 
(Busse and Gröning, 2009). An adverse relationship between aid and social development is 
discussed by some of these authors too, for example, Nourou (2014).  
 
Nevertheless, aid critics have observed the aid impact from a very narrow-angle of growth 
and a broad perspective of economic development is somehow absent in their discussions. 
Even they do not differentiate types of aid-grant or loan because the impact may vary with 
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the type of aid. This aspect of delivery and management of aid needs to be taken into 
consideration in evaluating the outcomes of aid or aid effectiveness (OECD, 2006). Also, the 
amount of aid and time of reimbursement can contribute to the outcome of aid along with a 
myriad of factors as Harbarken et al. (2017, p.780) who use a very interesting phrase „failure 
of aid has many mothers […….] this would encompass, for instance, bad governance, 
including corruption and the mis-use of funds‟.  
 
The conventional „negative‟ or „positive‟ approach in evaluating aid effectiveness is perhaps 
not the right approach in a complex aid regime where many different factors and conditions 
are related, it is just not the positive or negative impact itself. Therefore, to harness a positive 
impact of aid, conditional supporters identify particular issues associated with aid 
effectiveness among which governance (Qayyum et al., 2014), quality institutions (Burnside 
and Dollar, 2004; Chong et al., 2009; Christopoulos et al., 2016 ), corruption (Sachs, 2005; 
Collier, 2006), donor co-ordination (Winters, 2012), good policy (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000), politics (Tingley, 2010), conditionality (Agarwal et al., 2010) and bureaucracy 
(Easterly, 2002) are repeatedly mentioned. Some of these issues are related to donors and 
some with recipients. The difficulty with this group of thinkers is that most of them articulate 
one or two issues and do not provide a comprehensive solution.  
 
The following section examines aid recipient policy and governance implications for aid 
effectiveness with a special focus on the institution, political system, implementation of 
policy reform and quality of governance.  
 
2.4 Recipients’ Policy, Institution, Governance and Corruption 
 
The quality of aid recipient policy, institutions and governance has extensively been 
discussed in academia. These issues also receive significant importance in all aid 
effectiveness declarations and are identified as the linchpin to implement principles of the aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
 
The first audacious claim in relation to the positive impact of good policy on aid 
effectiveness comes from Burnside and Dollar (1997b) who reveal that aid spurs growth-in a 
sound policy environment and countries that have good policies receive more aid (Burnside 
and Dollar (1997a). These findings were then promoted by the World Bank and they advised 
that aid works well in place of good policy and urged the donor community to pour large-
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scale aid into those developing countries that had sound policies (World Bank, 1998). In 
slightly different language Burnside and Dollar (2000; p.847) repeat „aid has a positive 
impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but 
has little effect in the presence of poor policies‟. Prioritizing policy improvement for effective 
aid and poverty reduction, Collier and Dollar (2001) propose a model and advise for policy 
reform. The ultimate recommendation of their model, for higher growth rates and greater 
poverty alleviation, is to channel foreign aid to those countries that have sound policies (Ram, 
2004). Conversely, research confirms that aid has a positive impact on growth but it is not 
conditional on policy (Hansen and Tarp, 2001). Moreover, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001; p.38) 
assert the „positive effect of aid on growth in any policy environment‟.  
 
Using an extended data set on Burnside–Dollar (2000) models Easterly et al. (2003) find a 
fragile interaction between aid-policy parameters. They get the same result when different 
proxies for aid and good policies are used in different period-lengths. Nevertheless, donors still 
believe that good policy measures of recipient countries are the precondition for aid 
effectiveness and poverty reduction (DFID, 2006). A debate is there that sometimes recipient 
countries undertake policy reforms being afraid to loose donor funds (Rahman et al., 2016). 
Effective aid and type of policy discourses evolved over the time and widespread discussion 
continues in the existing literature. Some studies recommend for good macroeconomic policy 
(Mohapatra et al., 2016) and a combination of economic and political policy (Emara et al., 
2013) for effective aid. Instead, Addison & Tarp (2015; p.5) ask for „macroeconomic 
management of aid inflows, in particular with regard to exchange rate policy, monetary policy, 
and reserve accumulation‟. However, studies also emphasis only on fiscal and monitory policy 
(Sharma and Bhattarai, 2013). It is believed that East Asian countries yield better benefit of aid 
than tropical or African countries due to execution of effective policies (Habtom, 2016).  
 
However, one of the notable works of Burnside and Dollar in relation to the impact of quality 
institutions on foreign aid is published in 2004 which draws serious attention to the donor 
community as did their publications in 1997 and 2000 about the impact of aid on growth, and 
implications of policy and governance on aid (Burnside and Dollar, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 
2004). They claim that aid effectiveness depends on the quality of institutions of the recipient 
country. However, some scholars raise this issue of institution before them, for example, 
Friedman et al. (1999). The importance of the institution is also stated in UN declarations 
(United Nations, 2013). A good number of studies support as well as reject, Burnside and 
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Dollar‟s argument in different dimensions. Scholars recognise the quality of institutions of 
recipients is critical for aid effectiveness (Copestake and Williams, 2014) and find that the 
true benefit of foreign aid depends on the quality of the host country institutions (Asongu, 
2015; Betts and Wedgwood, 2011). Moreover, „absorptive capacity‟ of recipient institution is 
crucial to achieve outcomes of aid (Habtom, 2016; p.49).  On the contrary, few studies find a 
negative impact of aid even in the presence of good quality institutions in recipient countries 
(Easterly, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Besides, donor-imposed institutional reform 
programmes comprise recommendations which may adversely affect recipient institutions. 
But it is observed that countries with good quality institutions receive more aid than countries 
with poor institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Jones and Tarp, 2016; Asongu, 2015).  
 
Although donors channel aid in countries with poor institutions, in many occasions, they 
bypass government system and use NGOs and multinational organisation, for example, 
UNDP to implement projects (Acht et at., 2015). Alternatively, donor sets-up Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU) combining human resource from both donor and recipient. 
However, this bypass increases implementation cost. Furthermore, the contribution of aid on 
recipients‟ institution is also widely discussed. Technical assistance strengthens institutions, 
improves quality (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Busse and Gröning, 2009), enhances capacity 
and ensures sustainability (Kono and Montinola, 2009; Dutta et al., 2013). Conversely, 
studies find negative or no impact on recipients‟ institutions (Djankov et al., 2008; Chong et 
al, 2009; Svensson, 2000; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Heckelman and Knack, 2008; 
Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).  Besides, donor-imposed 
institutional reform programmes comprise recommendations which may adversely affect 
recipient institutions. 
 
On the other hand, a good volume of the literature confirms the positive impact of good 
governance on aid effectiveness and argues in favour of it from many different perspectives. 
Few authors precisely emphasise the quality of bureaucracy, level of corruption and 
execution of law and order as indicators of good governance and claim that governance is the 
catalyst of aid effectiveness (Qayyum et al., 2014). The United Nations (2013) states that 
good governance plays a central role in renewed development effectiveness. Researchers 
support the United Nations statement and confirm that countries that have good governance 
yield more benefit from foreign aid than countries with weaker governance (Habtom, 2016). 
It is found that a large amount of aid has a higher impact on development in countries with 
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good governance (Bräutigam, 2000; Adedokun, 2017). Notwithstanding, countries with good 
governance receive more, diversified and different modalities of aid (Claessens et al., 2009; 
Bermeo, 2017; Gani, 2009). Bilateral and multilateral donors prefer to provide more budget 
support, infrastructural and industrial aid to countries which have good governance (Winters 
& Martinez, 2015; Clist et al., 2012; Nordveit, 2014). Also, countries with good governance 
enjoy debt relief facilities from donors (Freytag and  Pehnelt, 2009). Furthermore, some 
scholars hold a firm position about good governance and assert that aid effectiveness is not 
possible without good governance (Epstein and Gani, 2009; Sobhan, 2002).  
 
However, there are studies which suggest that aid creates a negative impact on recipient 
country governance (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 
2007; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). Foreign aid not only creates a negative impact on the 
political regime but also deteriorates democracy that contributes to poor democracy 
(Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 2012). Investigating African context, Bräutigam & Knack (2004) 
find high level of aid is detrimental to good governance and high level of aid makes 
government accountable to the donors instead of own citizens which negatively impacts in 
the overall governance of the country (Qayyum et al., 2014). Moreover, industries for which 
good governance is crucial grow slowly in aid recipient countries (Rajan & Subramanian, 
2007). The dependency of aid makes government lazy and it gives less effort in mobilising 
internal resources (Chowdhury & Sugema, 2005). Nevertheless, some researchers argue that 
governance is immaterial for aid effectiveness (Akramov, 2006). Furthermore, Brazys (2016) 
claims that aid has both positive and negative impacts on governance.  
 
There is a tendency among donors to bypass government system in poorly governed countries 
(Dietrich, 2013; Bermeo, 2010; Acht et at., 2015). Similarly, Donor agencies in many 
occasions overtake government functions using foreign consultant and project management 
unit to implement projects. This approach weakens recipient government in the long-run 
(Bräutigam, 2000). Furthermore, donors also have governance issues that contribute to aid 
effectiveness. For example, multi-layers process or bureaucracy, delay disbursement of the 
fund, disclosure of aid data, fragmentation, and conditionality as a whole (Sobhan, 2002; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; Winters, 2014). Moreover, bureaucratic inefficiency is also 
identified as a detrimental factor to aid effectiveness. The available literature on aid 
bureaucracy mostly condemns recipient bureaucracy as one of the reasons for poor aid 
governance (Alesina and Dollar, 2000); however, some authors make donor bureaucracy 
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responsible alongside recipients (Easterly, 2003; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). However, 
bureaucratic relationship between donor and recipient can be adverse. Investigating 
challenges for harmonisation and decentralization, Winters (2012) identifies coordination 
problem between the donor and recipient bureaucracy where he blames donor for non-
compliance.   
 
Among many issues, corruption is widely discussed in the aid literature from many 
dimensions in its relationship with governance. Existing studies find that the impact of 
corruption on aid effectiveness is very high and it can also impede the growth of the country 
(Schudel, 2008; Agarwal et al., 2010; Gani, 2009). Remarkably, a few pieces of research 
claim that foreign aid reduces corruption in recipient countries and this rate of reduction is 
high in those recipient countries that have good governance (Okada and Samreth, 2012; 
Mohamed et al., 2015). As foreign aid can release government pressure of mobilization of 
revenue, governments can endeavour for a rule of law and fight against corruption; it means 
foreign aid can reduce corruption (Busse and Gröning, 2009). Conversely, there are findings 
that aid makes recipient countries corrupt, more corrupt or impede corruption control 
initiatives (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). Furthermore, 
historically countries with corruption continuously receive aid and in many cases aid does not 
decrease (Neumayer, 2003a; Svensson, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Easterly and Pfutze, 
2008; de la Croix and Delavallade, 2014)) but in this regard donor preference varies in 
choosing the recipient country, for example, more corrupt countries receive more aid from 
the USA, Italy and Finland than the UK (Isopi and Mattesini, 2008). Another argument is that 
“Governments of donor states with a low level of corruption allocate less aid to corrupt 
recipients than to better performing countries, whereas more corrupt donor governments do 
not make such a distinction”  (Schudel, 2008; p.508). The amount of corruption likewise 
varies from the size of the project. Corruption in large infrastructure projects is comparatively 
lower than large non-infrastructure projects perhaps due to comprehensive anti-corruption 
measures of donors (Winters and Martinez, 2015).  
 
Although the corruption issue in relation to aid is discussed from different perspectives by 
academics under the predominant approach of the aid effectiveness agenda, corruption is 
treated as very harmful for aid effectiveness. OECD-DAC donors have responded to the issue 
in many ways via suspension of aid, audit, investigation, reimbursement or reducing budget 
support as written in OECD-DAC Anti-corruption Task Team (ACTT) report, however, these 
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responses either resist or remain less successful owing to an opposite cooperation from 
recipients (OECD, 2009). Donors and recipients unanimously include the corruption issue in 
Section-4 of the Statement of Resolve of the Paris Declaration and outline its consequences 
(OECD, 2008). They again reiterate their firm position against corruption in Clause-33 of the 
Busan Partnership Documents and identify corruption as a plague for aid effectiveness 
(OECD, 2011). In Clause-55 of the Second HLM document of GPEDC donor and recipient 
countries, they announce the fight against corruption (GPEDC, 2016).   
 
The subsequent section focuses on issues associated mostly with donors and also donor-
recipient relationships. In the midst of these two issues, the next section will review the 
existing literature related to donor behaviour and aid management with special emphasis on 
fragmentation, donor proliferation, competition and self-interest of donors, and donor 
coordination.  
 
2.5 Donor Behaviour and Aid Management  
 
Along with the existence of certain issues in recipient countries, inter alia weak policy and 
governance, donor proliferation (Acharya et al., 2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Roodman, 
2012; Kimura et al., 2012), competition and self-interest (Sobhan, 2002; OECD, 2009a, 
2011a; Winters, 2012), fragmentation (Easterly, 2003, 2007; Roodman, 2006; Knack and 
Rahman, 2007; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013), duplication of projects (Cameron and Low, 2012), 
and lack of coordination (Riddell, 2007; Easterly, 2007; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Fuchs et 
al., 2015) are identified as pejoratives for aid effectiveness in the aid lexicon. These 
behavioural issues of donors make aid management difficult for recipient countries and 
significantly impact on the effectiveness of aid (Annen and  Kosempel, 2009).. Aid 
proliferation and fragmentation: too little aid from too many donors (OECD, 2011a; p.3); the 
presence of many donors in many countries and sectors and projects, are long-standing 
concerns (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; Knack et al., 2011, Kimura et al., 2012, Knack and 
Rahman, 2007; Fløgstad and Hagen, 2017) because donors want to „plant their flags‟ in all 
places (World Bank 1998; p.26). Individual interest and priorities of donors together with the 
unilateral selection of country and projects subsidise fragmentation and proliferation (OECD, 
2011). Moreover, the use of several agencies by one donor (Birdsall and Kharas, 2010) and 
many donors in priority sectors also contribute to this (Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2007).  
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However, recipients on the other hand, having no other options to fill-up financial gaps 
accept aid from all available sources (Minasyan et al., 2017). 
 
In most of the cases, donors do not really consider recipient development policies nor do they 
seek their opinions to undertake a project or design projects to implement their agenda 
(Lancaster, 1999; Schiff and Winters, 2003). Recipient governments face both management 
and relationship challenges for fragmentation and proliferation (Knack and Rahman, 2007). 
They need extra staff and budgets to support or fulfil donor requirements which increase 
transaction costs and ultimately thwart the positive impact of aid (Acharya et. al., 2006; 
Knack and Rahman, 2007; Knack et al., 2011; Anderson, 2012). On the contrary, few studies 
claim that fragmentation can positively contribute to aid effectiveness subject to the presence 
of good quality bureaucracy and lead donors (Gehring et al., 2017). Supporters of this group 
reveal that diversity of donors is positive because of „more ideas, competition, and 
innovation, as well as a more consistent flow of funding‟ (Lawson, 2013, p. 5). However, 
when too many donors are involved in one sector, it is difficult to make a particular donor 
responsible for aid failure (Winters, 2012). 
 
Together with proliferation and segmentation, conditionality and tied aid are also an enduring 
problem. Traditionally conditionality has been seen as donor prescribed economic as well as 
administrative reforms that recipient governments may not execute without foreign aid 
(Dijkstra, 1999). Some authors reveal that conditionality is a kind of contract between donor 
and recipient where aid is the consideration (Coate & Morris, 1996; Adam &  O‟Connell, 
1999). The World Bank report, „Assessing aid – What Works, What Doesn‟t and Why‟ finds 
that conditionality fails to promote reforms (World Bank, 1998). Furthermore, scholars 
confirm that conditionality does not work and aid money is misused (Herfkens, 1999; Killick, 
2002; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). Donors design conditional reform package without 
considering cultural and political environment of the recipient and most of the time without 
consultation with the recipient. Therefore, the recipient does not own the conditional reform 
package and reforms remain unsuccessful (Killick, 2002; Sobhan, 2002; Morrissey, 2004; 
Lancaster, 2007). However, being fully aware of the fact, due to fear of losing fund recipient 
countries receive aid with conditionality (Scholl, 2009).     
 
However, some researchers speak in favour of conditionality. They argue that to ensure 
effective use of aid money sometimes conditionality contracts can be beneficial (Killick, 
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2002). It is also said that unconditional aid can be less effective in absence of good 
democratic regimes (Dalgaard, 2008). Nevertheless, a burgeoning body of literature points 
out that despite rhetorical change because of the aid effectiveness agenda and promotion of 
budget support modality, conditionality still exists in different names and forms even in 
organisations like the World Bank (Swedlund, 2013; Koeberle at al., 2006; Faust, 2010; 
Dijkstra, 2011; Dornan, 2017). For instance, World Bank in many cases imposes policy 
conditionality even with budget support programmes (Dijkstra, 2011). New conditionality is 
not really imposed rather mutually agreed between donor and recipient (Dornan, 2017).   
 
Furthermore, the tied aid issue is widely discussed in the literature for its detrimental effect 
on foreign aid. The OECD (2007a; p.785) very precisely defines tied aid as „official or 
officially supported loans, credit or associated financing packages where procurement of the 
goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which 
does not include substantially all developing countries‟. Subsequently, the tied aid issue is 
exhaustively discussed in all HLFs on aid effectiveness starting from Rome to Busan and 
even in two HLMs of GPEDC where donors have made commitments to reduce tying. 
Moreover, the OECD published a series of recommendations over a period of time for 
untying aid (OECD, 2009b). However, tied aid still exists in the practice of both bilateral as 
well as multilateral support (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). A study finds that less fragmented 
aid is less tied (Knack & Smets, 2013). However, there is limited scope for the recipient to 
raise voice against the quality and price of procurements. Nevertheless, the GPEDC 2016 
Monitoring Report suggests that „untied aid has marginally increased since 2010‟ 
(OECD/UNDP, 2016a; p.16). According to the report, the percentage of untied aid among 
OECD-DAC donors in 2005 was sixty percent and seventy-eight percent in 2015. 
 
In more than sixty years of development the aid regime has been questioned on many issues. 
Recipients arguably have a weak policy, institutions or poor governance and conversely, 
donor community big brother attitudes along with conditionality, the proliferation of donors 
as well as projects, the self-interest of donors and above all a lack of coordination among 
donors took the aid regime into a situation in the 1990s where aid-giving became 
questionable. The next section outlines the reality of the traditional aid regime, the evolving 
actions of the aid community to overcome these challenges and the beginning of a new aid 
effectiveness agenda.  
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2.6 Emergence of Aid Effectiveness Agenda 
 
Since the 1990s, the aid effectiveness agenda has matured over time. In the 1980s as well as 
in the first half of the 1990s, the effectiveness of aid was seriously criticised. The aid 
community was looking forward to an elixir to continue the aid regime effectively. Initially, 
the debate began with a discussion but eventually transformed into a formal institutional 
order. 
    
2.6.1 The Traditional Aid Regime and the Need for Change  
 
Foreign aid in the 1990s experienced a serious legitimacy crisis and the donor community 
tried to reinvigorate it by introducing new methodologies including partnerships (Ostrom et 
al., 2002; Whitfield, 2009). According to Hebraken et al. (2017; p.779) aid „is under attack 
for its effectiveness‟. It became evident that donor-driven fragmented aid with conditionality 
was not working (Molenaers et al., 2015). Moreover, execution of donors prescribed 
development programmes and reforms without commitment and ownership from recipients 
failed to produce results (Mawdsley et al., 2014). In the language of Bräutigam and Knack 
(2004; p.277) donors and recipients „are locked into a system that is unable to produce 
development consistently or predictably‟. In fact, the proliferation of donors and projects 
along with aid channels and the „significant degree of earmarking has contributed to increase 
the complexity of the global aid architecture‟ (World Bank, 2007; p.i). Therefore, more 
harmonised aid with recipient ownership was the demand of the time (Bigsten and Tengstam, 
2015; Djankov et al., 2009; Knack and Rahmann, 2007), especially from the second half of 
the 1990s when the aid community clearly understood that the regime was not working as 
expected.  
 
There remained issues on both sides, donors as well as recipients, lurking behind the expected 
performance of foreign aid. Poor recipient policy, institution and governance, and donor 
proliferation, completion, self-interest, conditionality and above all the absence of donor 
coordination thwarted aid effectiveness. Donors always tried to dominate recipients as they 
believed that „they know best‟ to design development plans and programmes as well as 
reforms because recipient countries did not have the competencies to lead their development 
enterprise (Dabelstein and Patton, 2013; p.22). Moreover, selective approaches favouring 
countries with good policies, institutions and governance did not work (Molenaers et al., 
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2015; Habtom, 2016). Perhaps the absence of ownership of recipient countries and the non-
existence of donor co-ordination are two issues among many that can be identified as the 
predominant pejorative for aid effectiveness from the above discussion. Furthermore, 
academics find that the traditional system of aid regimes was less competent in the changing 
economic world order. For instance, Abdel-Malek (2015) asserts that the old system of aid 
practice has to be changed to ensure aid effectiveness in the new complex world order.  
 
The second half of the 1990s witnessed a number of events aimed at reform of the aid regime. 
In particular, organisations such as the OECD-DAC and the United Nations, undertook 
several realistic initiatives which eventually helped shape new aid architecture or an aid 
effectiveness agenda. The subsequent section outlines these initiatives.  
 
2.6.2 Thrust for a Solution in the 1990s 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the donor community looked forward to a solution for more 
effective aid, contributing to sustainable development. Remarkably, all declarations, 
meetings, forums, and reports were more focused on the change of behaviour of the donor 
community than the recipients of aid. In 1986, OECD-DAC members agreed to Aid Co-
ordination Principles but those principles were not well practised by members for three 
reasons as pointed out by the German Development Institute (DIE) in 1989: inability of 
recipients to co-ordinate, lack of interest from donors in long-term planning and donors 
considering co-ordination as time-consuming and laborious (Abdel-Malek, 2015). The 
OECD-DAC published „Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance‟ documents in 
1991 where importance was given to partnership and ownership of the recipients (OECD, 
1991). A year later, in 1992 the OECD-DAC announced „DAC Principles for Effective Aid‟ 
and again ownership of the recipients and extended support from the donor community were 
highlighted (OECD, 1996). A high profile meeting of the OECD-DAC in May 1995 
emphasised a „Development Partnership in the New Global Context‟ and asserted recipient 
country ownership, co-ordinating the approach of donors for aid effectiveness (OECD, 1995). 
This initiative of the OECD-DAC can be termed as „Exercise de Réflexion‟ (Manning, 2008; 
p. 3).  
 
Subsequently, in 1996 the OECD published a milestone report entitled „Shaping the 21st 
Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation‟ which is considered a foundation 
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document of the aid effectiveness agenda (OECD, 1996). Identifying the report as a 
landmark, Thérien and Lloyd (2000; p.25) articulate two important points: firstly, specific 
action plans involved high-level policy makers including ministers and heads of aid agencies 
from the OECD-DAC and G-7 in the formulation process and secondly, for the first time the 
donor community agreed to a plan of action for aid effectiveness. Shaping the 21
st
 Century 
report clearly argued in favour of country leadership and more donor co-ordination, the two 
most crucial issues identified by academics as well as realised by the donor community. 
Therefore, arguably the emergence of a new aid architecture is rooted in this report. The report 
identified six goals to be achieved by 2015 and the goals are associated with poverty, 
education, gender disparity, maternal and child deaths, reproductive health, and environmental 
sustainability (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011). This report gained further legitimacy after 
receiving endorsement at the 1999 G-8 summit (Abdel-Malek, 2015). Most importantly this 
report became the genesis of the Millennium Development Goals (Schaaf, 2015). In 1997 the 
United Nations adopted the „Agenda for Development‟ with a vision of effective partnership 
and efficient use of resources for sustainable development (United Nations, 1997).  
 
Besides the OECD-DAC and the United Nations, the World Bank also contributed to the 
nuanced approach of effective development corporations. In 1999 the World Bank formulated 
the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) for effective poverty reduction with an 
emphasis on efficient institutions (World Bank, 2000; Wolfensoln and Fischer, 2000). The 
CDF was produced as a pre-condition of the HIPC-II (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) debt 
relief programme with an emphasis on ownership, partnership and development results 
(Renard, 2007). Afterwards, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was formulated on 
the basis of CDF principles (World Bank, 2000; Stern, 2008). The PRSP was promoted as a 
panacea for poverty reduction where recipient countries were responsible for planning their 
own development activities with robust input from the World Bank and IMF. After 
introduction in September 1999, the PRSP became a guiding document for many recipient 
countries for economic development and external assistance (Malaluan and Guttal, 2003; 
Bretton Wood Project, 2003; ODI, 2004) and it was expected that the PRSP would create a 
significant impact on poverty reduction as well as aid effectiveness (Driscoll and Evans, 
2005). However, the PRSP is widely criticised for an insignificant impact on poverty 
reduction as was the Structural Adjustment Programme, policy conditions and failure of 




Furthermore, the declaration of the United Nations‟ Millennium Development Goals in 
September 2000 with a vision to halve poverty by 2015 changed the whole development 
landscape including the aid regime. Goal-8 of the declaration to „Develop a Global 
Partnership for Development‟ appeared as a challenge for the global development 
community. Perhaps two issues were crucial: the source of finance to achieve targets and the 
effective use of finance for the desired result. Subsequently, the first conference on finance 
for development convened in 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, popularly known as the Monterrey 
Consensus on Financing for Development. The conference urged more financial support for 
the implementation of the MDGs and emphasised the partnership of donors and recipients for 
effective aid where ownership of the recipient was stressed. However, the aid regime became 
more focused on poverty reduction and good governance due to the influence of MDGs 
(Manning 2008; Keijzer, 2011; Molenaers et al., 2015). Some researchers identified two 
trends of the new aid agenda at that time: as promoted by PRSP, recipient countries tried to 
own their development planning and achievement of MDGs. However, both elements were 
concentrating on aid effectiveness that required alignment of donor priorities and agendas 
with recipients to support recipient ownership (World Bank, 1998; Lensink and White 2001; 
Mawdsley et al, 2014).  
 
Driven by the two principles, ownership of recipients and effective partnership between 
donors and recipients, the emerging aid effectiveness agenda continued its journey towards a 
more comprehensive and co-ordinated framework. The next section summarises the shaping 
up process of the aid effectiveness agenda and its transformation afterwards.   
 
2.6.3 Shaping up of the New Aid Effectiveness Agenda  
 
The new aid effectiveness agenda started appearing in formal shape at the beginning of the 
2000s with the introduction of formal bodies and specific high-level forums on aid 
effectiveness. A good amount of the literature confirms the emerging aid effectiveness 
agenda at the beginning was particularly focused on two issues: ownership by recipient 
countries and partnership, where donors are committed to harmonised efforts and 
complementarity (Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007; 
Whitfield, 2009; Hayman, 2009; Faust, 2010; SjÖstedt, 2013). However, immediately after 
the declaration of the MDGs, the OECD-DAC formed a Task Force on Donor Practices in 
January 2001 for a period of two years to review donor practices (Manning, 2008). The 
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primary aim of the Task Force was to underpin recipient ownership improving donor policy 
and practices (Hubbard, 2002). The historic First High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was 
organised by the OECD-DAC in Rome in 2003, perhaps, the formal inauguration of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Just after the Rome High-Level Forum Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness (WP-EFF) was created, replacing the Task Force on Donor Practices to drive 
the aid effectiveness agenda further on behalf of the OECD-DAC with a vision for more 
effective aid (OECD, 2001; OECD, 2012).  
 
The milestone Second High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 2005, popularly known 
as the Paris Declaration (PD) and Third and Fourth High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in 
Accra and Busan were successfully organised by the WP-EFF on behalf of the OECD-DAC in 
2008 and 2011 respectively. The multi-stakeholder Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (GPEDC) platform was launched in 2011 in the Busan High-Level 
Forum. Subsequently, the WP-EFF was dissolved in 2012 and the GPEDC now owes 
responsibility to drive the aid effectiveness agenda to the OECD-DAC as well as the UNDP.      
 
Nevertheless, after a „flurry of innovation‟, significant changes manifested in the aid regime, 
for example, „donor agency staff being retrained, procedures being adapted, new internal 
manuals being issued, new aid modalities introduced‟ (Renard, 2007; p.81)  and donors under 
immense internal and external pressure for effective aid . Therefore, it can be said that „a new 
aid agenda has emerged‟ (Renard, 2007; p.81) which is also known as the „aid effectiveness 
paradigm‟ (Mawdsley et al., 2014; p.27) or the „anti inefficiency agenda‟ (Keijzer and Janus, 
2016). The target-oriented approach of the aid effectiveness agenda significantly 
differentiates it from all earlier initiatives of the aid community.  
 
The United Nations Declaration of MDGs in 2000 significantly changed the world 
development landscape. The MDGs considerably influenced the emerging aid effectiveness 
agenda. The next section examines the implications of the MDG Declaration on the emerging 
aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
2.6.4 MDGs: A Wake-up Call 
 
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in September 2000 posed a 
great challenge to the aid community to achieve a massive task of 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 
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associated indicators by 2015. It was due primarily to two reasons: the requirement of a huge 
volume of money and the effective use of that money to achieve the goals. Arguably, the 
MDGs set a stage for the aid effectiveness agenda to flourish with targets and deadlines along 
with the goals set in the MDGs and it also set an example of working together (Manning, 
2008; Mawdsley et al., 2014; Abdel-Malek, 2015; Schaaf, 2015; Jacob, 2017).  
 
The aid effectiveness issue was deep-rooted in Goal-8 to, „develop a global partnership for 
development‟ where the specific emphasis was on more and predictable aid and 
improvements in the debt servicing capacity of recipients together with improvements in 
governance in recipient countries (United Nations, 2015a). However, studies find that aid did 
not work very well in the MDGs (Dalgaard and Erickson, 2009) and the reasons are: 
„fungibility, insufficient alignment between donor and recipient government policies, 
commercial tying, proliferation of donor activities within recipient countries and insufficient 
policy coherence within and among donor activities‟ (Addison et al., 2005; p.820). Yet, 
MDGs significantly influenced the emerging new aid effectiveness agenda afterwards. MDGs 
become objectives of the aid effectiveness agenda and many of its undertakings were aligned 
with the goals (Manning, 2008; Keijzer, 2011; Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011; Wood et al., 
2011). The aid literature also claims a time-bound target of the aid effectiveness agenda 
especially the Paris Declaration, is replicated from the United Nations MDGs (Dabelstein and 
Patton, 2013).    
 
2.6.5 Monterrey Consensus: Guidance for Take-off   
 
If the MDG Declaration was a wake-up call for the aid community, the Monterrey Consensus 
on Financing for Development provides all necessary guidance for take-off with the aid 
effectiveness agenda. This consensus appealed to donors as well as recipients, a shared 
responsibility to make aid as effective as possible (OECD, 2003; Dabelstein and Patton, 
2013). Moreover, the nature of effective aid with ownership of recipients, alignment and a 
harmonised approach of donors was also rooted in the Monterrey Consensus (Menocal and 
Rogerson, 2006).  
 
The conference convened in the Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 from March 18 to 22 where 
more than 50 Heads of State, around 200 Finance Ministers and almost all bilateral and 
multilateral organisations attended. Although the main focus of the conference was to ensure 
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finance for implementation of the MDGs (United Nations, 2003; Menocal and Mulley, 2006), 
the consensus very categorically outlined the importance of effective aid. Especially, Section 
„D: increasing international financial and technical co-operation for development‟ of the 
statement elaborately points out the importance of effective aid and outlines the „to-do list‟ 
for donors as well as recipients; Para-40 explicitly speaks about the partnership between 
donors and recipients, and recipient ownership is highlighted with relevance to the 
improvement of policy and governance; Para-43, perhaps the revolutionary clause that covers 
many issues required for effective aid, asserts more effective aid and stresses the importance 
of harmonisation; Para-43 emphasises untying aid, predictability, budget support and most 
importantly co-ordination of aid and measurement of results (United Nations, 2003). This 
consensus provided comprehensive guidance for take-off with the aid effectiveness agenda. 
Researchers confirm that the Monterrey Consensus drove the new aid architecture further. 
Many developed countries undertook a good number of initiatives such as coordination of 
aid, more alignment, innovative sources of funding, budget support and so on. However, 
disappointments include non-compliance of 0.7% commitment by the donors (Aguilar, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the general perception was growing from the beginning of the aid effectiveness 
agenda that it was a venture of the OECD-DAC, an elite donor club, but the agenda obtained 
widespread recognition in the Monterrey Conference as the conference was kicked-off by the 
United Nations which was indeed a significant milestone.   
   
2.7 Rome Declaration: The Take-off  
 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation is significant for two reasons: it was the First High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and it was the first dedicated conference on aid 
effectiveness which outlined aid effectiveness principles in a concrete document (OECD, 
2018). Therefore, it is not probably inappropriate to identify the Rome Declaration as the 
formal take-off of the aid effectiveness agenda. The conference also abandoned a long-
standing misnomer of recipient failure and began a new era of joint responsibility where 
donors confirmed effective co-ordination and recipients affirmed a commitment to good 
governance (Hayman, 2009). In the view of Abdel-Malek (2015) a few issues have 
contributed to the Rome Conference. A number of events and reports in the past highlighted 
the need of firm commitments from the donor community for a functioning of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. These included a non-functional experience replicated from the success 
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of the Marshall Plan (American aid for the World War II ravaged Europe), increasing 
transaction costs and pressure from the 1996 OECD-DAC Report, MDG Declaration and the 
Monterrey Consensus for more effective aid (Abdel-Malek , 2015).   
 
It was February 2003, 48 bilateral and multilateral development institutions and 28 recipient 
countries came together in Rome and endorsed the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 
(OECD, 2003a; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). By promoting harmonisation the Rome 
declaration intended to see genuine co-ordination among donors for effective aid (Mawdsley 
et al., 2014) as harmonisation and co-ordination had been a great concern from the 1970s as it 
seriously thwarted aid effectiveness (Abdel-Malek, 2015).  
 
The Rome harmonisation document was more a prescription for donors than recipients. 
Although the declaration is called the Rome Harmonisation, harmonisation terminology is 
used in a broader perspective (Balogun, 2005). Donors committed to align aid with recipient 
priority, promote ownership of the recipients and review their policies and procedures to 
facilitate harmonisation. They also committed to enhance co-ordination with other donors in 
country, internalise harmonisation in official procedures and shaping staff behaviour, 
working closely with recipients for results management, mainstreaming country lead efforts, 
budget and sector support and promoted harmonisation in regional and global programmes 
(OECD, 2003a; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). Importantly, the declaration encouraged 
recipient countries to formulate a country-based harmonisation action plan in consensus with 
donors and it was resolute to organise a stocktaking event in 2005 for reviewing a 
development that was the Paris High-Level Forum. Nevertheless, the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation made a substantial contribution to the mission of the aid effectiveness agenda 
by upholding three very distinct requirements; ownership, alignment and harmonisation 
(Balogun, 2005; Eyben, 2007; Hayman, 2009). However, harmonisation, including 
ownership and alignment, was only a portion of a very wide-ranging aid effectiveness agenda 
and many portions were need to merge together for broader success (Manning, 2008). 
 
Immediately after the Rome Conference, the OECD-DAC formed the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness (WP-EFF) in 2003 to monitor the progress of the Rome Declaration. The WP-
EFF, a donors only forum, over the period of time grew as a large coalition of 80 donors and 
recipients that hosted the aid effectiveness agenda and determined its direction (OECD, 
2010). The WP-EFF developed indicators to measure ownership, alignment and 
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harmonisation in both donor and recipient aid (Balogun, 2005; Abdel-Malek, 2015). 
Afterwards, the WP-EFF conducted a baseline survey on the progress in 14 recipient 
countries and presented a report titled „Harmonisation, Alignment, Results: Report on 
Progress, Challenges and Opportunities‟ in the Second High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness held in Paris in 2005 (OECD, 2005). The report found mixed progress of the 
Rome commitments but indicated a promising trend: by the time of publication of the report 
60 recipient countries and 40 donors agencies were interacting for harmonisation and 
alignment; 43 countries prepared poverty reduction strategies but the absence of midterm 
frameworks, policy clarity and disagreement between donor and recipients thwarted further 
progress; not a single donor in 14 countries was using the country system.  
 
The WP-EFF highlighted the need of a framework with monitored indicators against four 
broad areas ownership, alignment, harmonisation and results with qualitative time-bound 
targets. The WP-EFF recommended the following paradigm for more comprehensive efforts 
towards aid effectiveness.  
 









Source: OECD, 2005; p.15 
 
2.8 Managing for Development Results (MfDR) Roundtable: More Input  
 
The Monterrey Consensus stressed Managing for Development Results (MfDR) for more 
effective development co-operation (United Nations, 2003). With a vision to improve aid 
effectiveness soon after the Monterrey Consensus the First Roundtable of MfDR was held at 
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the World Bank headquarters, Washington on June 5-6, 2002 officially called an 
„International Roundtable on Better Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing for Development 
Results‟ (MfDR, 2002). The Roundtable stressed capacity enhancement of recipient countries 
for MfDR and donors committed to a harmonised approach for implementation (MfDR, 
2002; ADB, 2012).  
 
Two years later immediately after the Rome Declaration on February 4 and 5, 2004 the 
Second Roundtable convened in Marrakech, Morocco where more than 50 countries and 20 
international organisations were present and signed a memorandum popularly known as the 
„Joint Marrakech Memorandum‟ and committed to develop a „global partnership on 
managing for development results‟ (MfDR, 2004; p.1; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). 
Therefore, the Joint Marrakech Memorandum is considered one of the landmarks of the aid 
effectiveness agenda for its valued input of MfDR. The Third Roundtable on MfDR held in 
Hanoi and the Fourth in Accra at the time of 3
rd
 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
2007 and 2008 respectively were influenced by the outcomes of Paris and Accra HLFs. 
Eventually, MfDR became one of the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). 
 
2.9 Paris Declaration - A Breakthrough 
 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is the centrepiece of the recent development 
discourse that reinvigorates orthodox aid practice effectiveness. The Paris Declaration 
(hereafter PD) is flagged as a „significant juncture in the history of development assistance 
and co-operation‟ (Hyden, 2008; p.260) and a critical event in the history of development co-
operation (Vollmer, 2014). It is „a package of specific ideas and measures‟ removing issues 
of the past where recipient ownership is the cornerstone of the declaration (Hayman, 2009; 
p.583; Welle et al., 2009). The PD is a ground-breaking attempt to address the policy co-
ordination issue of aid effectiveness (Severino and Ray, 2007). It is a model of development 
partnership; not only a partnership between donors and recipients but also among donors as 
well as among recipients (Mawdsley, 2014).  
 
The PD is also significant in denoting an equal status of recipients with donors (Lawson, 
2013) and it provides an opportunity for co-ordination and collective decision making among 
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donors and recipients under a programme based approach (Kharas, 2007; Sundewall et al., 
2009; Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; Habraken et al., 2017). In fact, the PD is a „reversal of 
negatives‟ (Stern et al., 2008; p.vi) or a policy shift in the area of aid practice (Gisselquist and 
Resnick, 2014) that eventually becomes an authoritative definition of aid effectiveness (Stern 
et al., 2008: 20). The declaration aims to improve effectiveness in three areas: the efficiency 
of aid delivery, the management and use of aid and better partnerships (Wood et al., 2011).  
 
Following implementation of the Rome Declaration commitments and findings of research 
and evaluation reports of the OECD-DAC and donor agencies, there was an urge among the 
aid community to make a decision to proceed with the aid effectiveness agenda under an 
indicator based time-constrained framework. A framework that can resolve long-standing 
issues such as donor dominance, fragmentation, duplication of donor activities, donor co-
ordination, transaction cost, poor ownership of recipient, budget support, tied aid, 
predictability, results and accountability, conditionality, and recipient poor governance, 
institutions and policy; these issues are discussed in detail in Section 2.4 and 2.5.  
 
In this context, the Second HLF on Aid Effectiveness convened in February 28 to 2 March, 
2005 in Paris where ministers, high-officials, representatives from 60 aid recipients, 30 
bilateral and 30 multilateral aid providers, CSOs and other stakeholders assembled together 
(OECD, 2008; Abdel-Malek, 2015). The development community resolved a „far-reaching 
and monitored actions‟ to reform aid delivery and management for effectiveness and 
ultimately achieve development outcomes (OECD, 2008; p.1). It was also seen that more and 
effective aid is crucial to achieving the MDGs (OECD, 2008). The PD introduces five broad 
principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, and Managing for Results and Mutual 
Accountability to remove long-standing weaknesses of aid practice (Cameron and Low, 
2012).  
 
The PD is very successful in bringing a wide range of recipients and donors to the table to 
agree five principles for aid effectiveness (Molenaers and Nijs, 2011). These principles along 
with the indicators are also known as the normative framework of the PD. Perhaps this 
normative framework is a comprehensive package of solutions to the long-standing problems 
associated with both donors and recipients. Most importantly, an acknowledgement of own 
problems by donors has ended an era of the „blame game‟ that only recipient issues impede 
aid effectiveness. The PD witnessed a revolutionary decision to monitor the progress of aid 
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effectiveness using a framework of 12 targets outlined on the basis of five principles that 
spread over 56 commitments to be achieved by 2010 and these targets were set for both 
donors and recipients (OECD, 2008; Killen, 2011; Abdel-Malek, 2015; Gulrajani, 2014; 
Samy and Aksl, 2015).  
 
 
2.9.1 Understanding PD Principles and Monitoring Frameworks  
 
2.9.1.1 Ownership  
 
The PD requires that recipient countries take leadership of their development activities, 
formulating result-based policies and strategy and co-ordinating implementation where 
donors, civil society and the private sector are consulted. Recipients also endeavour to 
improve their institutions and tackle corruption, and donors accept recipient leadership and 
help enhance capacity (OECD, 2008). The leadership of the recipient in policy and strategy 
formulation and execution of development programmes is the linchpin of PD ownership 
(Khatun, 2008 Welle et al., 2009; Gisselquist and Resnick, 2014; Dornan, 2017). 
Furthermore, the PD determine objectives that allow country level initiatives and leadership 
to ensure development results not the prescribed methodologies of donors (Booth, 2011). 
Ownership is a principle that disallows donor snooping (Molenaers and Nijs, 2011). It is a 
reverse exercise of a donor-driven conditional development package that espouses recipient 
leadership (Collins, 2009). It is a kind of power shift from the donor to the recipient, it places 
recipients in the driving seat (Hayman, 2009; Collins, 2009; Molenaers and Nijs; 2011; 
Swedlund, 2013). In other words, ownership means recipient countries should accept aid that 
is aligned with country development plans and channelled through the government system 




The PD requires donors to align their resources in line with recipient policies and strategies 
and use country systems that refer to public finance management comprising accounting, 
auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring. Donors and recipients work 
together to improve the quality of the country system for increased use (OECD, 2008). The 
spirit of the PD alignment concept is that donors should support country-owned development 
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aligning aid and use the country system wherever possible to strengthen it gradually 
(Rahaman and Khan, 2010; Booth, 2011). The idea of alignment is deep-rooted in the failure 
story of free-standing projects and structural-adjustment lending (Booth, 2011). As donor-
driven fragmented aid is not effective, aid needs to align with recipient government 
development strategy and plans (Khatun, 2008). However, as a pre-condition of alignment, 
the recipient country needs to take leadership in formulating development plans and 
strengthen country systems so that donors can rely on that, and at the same time donors need 
to overcome challenges related to their institutional procedures for alignment and use of 
recipient country systems (Collins, 2009). More predictable and untied aid with no 




The PD confirms that donors should ensure common arrangement to co-ordinate their 
actions, simplify aid management procedures and avoid fragmentation, duplication and a 
higher number of mission sharing information and executing division of labour (OECD, 
2008). Harmonisation is at the centre of the aid effectiveness agenda (Sjöstedt and 
Sundström, 2017). The common understanding of harmonisation is that it is a co-ordination 
mechanism among donors for the merging of processes, institutions and systems to reduce 
time, cost and administrative burdens for the recipient (Balogun, 2005; Khatun, 2008; 
Lawson, 2013). The PD urges a change in donor policies and practices for effective 
harmonisation (Mawdsley et al., 2014; Minasyan et al., 2017). Failure of harmonisation is 
probably one of the main reasons for ineffective aid (Svizzero and Tisdell, 2016). A lack of 
harmonisation poses a number of challenge for recipients, for example increases transaction 
costs requires more time for individual development planning and communication and 
demands for more effort in managing aid flows from many donors and integrating them in 
budget (Acharya et al. 2006; Monye et al., 2010; Winters, 2012). Division of labour, a 
Sector-wide Approach (SWAP) and budget support are seen as a solution to the 
harmonisation problem (Khatun, 2008; OECD, 2009c; Killen, 2011; Lawson, 2013). 
Discussion about donor co-ordination is also available in Section 2.5: Donor Behaviour and 







2.9.1.4 Managing for Results 
 
The PD upholds that donors and recipients remain committed to producing results from aid 
money as measurement of results helps to improve decision-making and the whole exercise is 
facilitated by recipient results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks (OECD, 2008). 
Managing for result principles calls for the implementation of development programmes that 
can produce the desired result and information can guide future development. The result 
should be measured by recipient country tailored assessment frameworks that donors should 
use as much as possible (Khatun, 2008; Monye et al., 2010). Two perspectives for managing 
for result principles are important: development project or programme results need to be 
measured to understand the impact and allocation of future aid has to be on the basis of 
results (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). Aid becomes very effective if it is strongly linked 
with clear and simple outcomes (Habtom, 2016). Therefore, managing for result principles 
have a crucial role in how the programme is delivered and what outcomes are achieved 
(Monye et al., 2010).  
 
2.9.1.5 Mutual Accountability 
 
The PD resolves that donors and recipients are jointly accountable for the outcomes of 
development. Therefore, mutually assessed accountability and transparency procedures are 
important where donors provide aid information and recipients involve parliament and other 
stakeholders such as CSOs to ensure accountability that helps earn public support for 
development activities (OECD, 2008). PD mutual accountability means donor and recipient 
are accountable to each other and jointly responsible for achieving results; they are also 
accountable to their parliament and people (Monye et al., 2010; Booth, 2011). This 






2.9.2 The PD Monitoring Framework 
 
The PD monitoring framework is comprised of 12 targets. Targets were set to be achieved by 
2010. Details of the monitoring framework are presented below: 
 






Source: OECD, 2008; p. 9-10 
 
2.9.3 Criticism of the PD and its Framework 
 
There is a view that the PD fails to unmask the political issues pegged to foreign aid that 
creates problems in execution for donors as well as recipients (Hyden, 2008; Roberts, 2009; 
Gulrajani, 2011; Habraken et al., 2017). Political realism is probably undermined by the 
enthusiasm of technicality (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011) and a bureaucratic solution is 
given to a political problem emphasising delivery and management of aid (Chandy, 2011; 
Gulrajani, 2011) that hamper implementation as the political object is very much attached to 
foreign aid and selection of sectors depends on political priorities. Furthermore, in practice 
donors interpret the PD principles as necessary for their interests and organisational 
requirements (Habraken et al., 2017). Being ambitious, the aid community has failed to 
estimate the challenges for implementing the PD, for instance, a shared responsibility 
approach is not functioning at the country level and collective rather than individual 
procedures regardless of donors and recipients are still prevailing (Dijkstra and Komives, 
2011). On the recipient side, frequent changes in country political leadership result in varied 
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commitments to the agenda and relationships with donors also vary government to 
government because of political choices of donors (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011). However, 
donors should not stay on the side-lines because of the connection between political issues 
and the PD, they need to join with the recipient to remove political challenges and continue 
implementation (Hyden, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, although the PD framework is very useful, the functionality of it depends on 
the understanding of assumptions behind it (Foresti, 2007). Few researchers believe that five 
year target are unrealistic and some indicators are not realistic or measurable as well (Wood 
et al., 2008; Mawdsley, 2014). Moreover, studies claim that indicators are biased towards 
donors, ask more from recipients, are loosely worded and have scope for interpretation 
(Khatun, 2008; Venter-2008). Nevertheless, monitoring frameworks with indicators and 
timelines, regardless of effectiveness, have contributed significantly to the effective 
management of aid and helped reshape the entire thought process of the aid community 
(Chandy, 2011). 
 
Another major issue identified in the existing literature is the non-binding nature of PD 
commitments (Samy and Aksl, 2015). The PD does not enjoy legal standing, rather it is an 
informal framework backed by political commitment (Khatun, 2008; Blunt et al., 2011). 
Additionally, although the PD is often promoted a flagship of partnership by the donor 
community, the language such as developing and aid recipient or donor do not correspond to 
that spirit (Cameron and Low, 2012). There is criticism that the PD is donor-centric or 
favours donors (Venter, 2008; Chandy and Kharas, 2011). The PD targets are set for all 
countries to achieve under a time-frame but as the PD is loosely drafted, sceptics can interpret 
it in a way that serves their interests (Blunt et al., 2011).  
 
The PD is also being criticised in academia for other reasons. The PD is a good framework 
but narrowly focused on cost reduction, co-ordination, means of development and efficiency 
than effectiveness (Glennie, 2011; Alemany et al., 2008 Booth, 2011; Blunt and Lindroth, 
2012; Karini, 2016). For example, Albania increased the capacity of aid management by 
applying the PD but the effectiveness of aid is still a question (Karini, 2016). The PD is also 
too focused to upstream policy level discussion and actions, therefore, there is a disconnect 
between input and development outcomes which are difficult to implement by stakeholders 
(Kharas, 2007; Owa, 2011). The aid community did not consider the PD an easy thing to 
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implement but it should not be appropriate to say that the PD is aspirational (Chandy and 
Kharas, 2011). There is a criticism that the PD addresses issues at the surface but not at the 
heart of aid problems (Faust and Messner, 2007). It is also said that the PD is very 
cumbersome and bureaucratic in enhancing aid effectiveness (Chandy and Kharas, 2011). 
Hence, after continuous efforts by the aid community to implement an aid effectiveness 
agenda, aid effectiveness has not improved (Svizzero and Tisdell, 2016). The reasons may 
include a late reaction, high expectations, political issues behind key principles, financial 
crises and less aid, and unequal power issues between donors and recipients (Odén and 
Wohlgemuth, 2011). Therefore, some researchers suggest that the aid community should 
revisit the aid effectiveness agenda for a more realistic and updated framework and try to 
change the focus from policy to outcome (Owa, 2011; Gulrajani, 2014). 
 
2.9.4 Progress Monitoring Surveys 
 
The Paris Declaration is intended to be a „principal guide‟ for the development co-operation 
debate (Hyden, 2008; p.260). Therefore, there is optimism in the development community 
about the success of the PD for three reasons: firstly, a large number of very high-level 
participants, a broader consultation process and the PD not being a general statement rather a 
road map with an action plan; secondly, progress monitoring and time-bound achievement 
targets; and finally, to make donor and recipient governments accountable, the PD outlined a 
balanced mechanism for mutual accountability moving from donorship to ownership (OECD, 
2006). As part of the continuous monitoring process, three surveys were conducted to 
measure the performance and progress of targets. A baseline survey was undertaken in 2005 
and 2 comprehensive surveys in 2007 and 2010 with reports published in consecutive years.  
 
2.9.4.1 PD Progress from 2005 to 2007 
 
Perhaps to continue the momentum of such a historic event such as the PD and also to keep 
focusing on measurement and monitoring, the first OECD-DAC survey was conducted in 
2005 to mark a reference point and the report was published in 2006. The „2006 Survey on 
Monitoring the Paris Declaration‟ report concludes as „in half of the developing countries 
signing the Paris Declaration, partners and donors have a long road ahead to meet the 
commitments they have undertaken‟ (OECD, 2007; p.9). The second survey report of the 
OECD-DAC was published in 2008 and „the findings are clear: progress is being made, but 
not fast enough‟ (OECD, 2008a; p.11). Poor progress is reported in relation to targets such as 
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joint missions, donor co-ordination for aid delivery, budget support, project implementation 
unit, predictability, capacity development of recipient countries and untying aid (OECD, 
2008a). An independent evaluation report „Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris 
Declaration –Phase one – Synthesis Report‟ on PD progress was published in 2008, 
conducted by Wood et al. (2008) and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Denmark. Wood et al. (2008) examined 8 recipients performance and consulted with 11 
donors to find slow progress of the PD. Overall, unsatisfactory progress was reported. The 
principle findings were ownership: countries are formulating a national strategic plan; 
alignment: uneven; managing for results: lack of attention by donors and recipients; and 
mutual accountability: falls short of efforts. The following table shows PD progress from 
2005 to 2007 (OECD, 2008b).  
 































Source: OECD, 2008b; p.2 
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2.10 Accra HLF- Evaluation of Achievement 
 
The development community met again in Accra, Ghana in September 2008 to take stock of 
the progress of the PD and after senior-level political assessment, the Accra Agenda for 
Action (AAA) was adopted to accelerate the PD implementation commitments (Hayman, 
2009; Wood et al., 2011; Cameron and Low, 2012; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). Two OECD 
surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008 and two independent evaluations, Stern et al. (2008) and 
Wood et al. (2008), reported slow progress of the PD commitments. Most importantly 
„momentum has been lost‟ to implement mutual accountability (OECD, 2008a; p.25). The 
delegates admitted that the PD approach was technical and bureaucratic and without political 
support from both donors and recipients, the principles of the PD were difficult to implement 
(Wood et al., 2008; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013).  
 
Extensive discussions took place among 1,700 participants from 120 developed and 
developing countries, international development organisations and 80 civil society 
organisations to find ways for better performance (OECD, 2008; Dabelstein and Patton, 
2013). Upholding the PD principles, the Accra Agenda for Action integrated issues such as 
the inclusion of parliament and CSOs for greater ownership and accountability, human rights, 
gender equality and a sustainable environment. It also stressed continuous assessment of aid 
effectiveness progress and commitments for improvement, south-south co-operation, non-
interference in recipient actions, equality and diversity for meaningful execution of the aid 
effectiveness agenda and acknowledged that aid is one of the factors to achieve development, 
not the main factor (Kindornay, 2011; Cameron and Low, 2012; Dornan, 2017). In summery 
Accra gave special emphasis to joint responsibility, donor division of labour, recipient 
ownership, development result management, predictable aid, use of country systems, the 
untying of aid, the removal of conditions and real mutual accountability (OECD, 2008a; 
Rogerson, 2011; Mawdsley, 2014; Abdel-Malek, 2015; Li, 2017; Dornan, 2017).  
 
Finally, 56 actions were agreed under three themes for the effective use of aid: Strengthening 
Country Ownership over Development, Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships 
for Development and Delivering and Accounting for Development Results (OECD, 2008; 






2.11 PD Progress after AAA 
 
The OECD-DAC conducted a comprehensive survey „Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in 
Implementing the Paris Declaration‟ two years after the Accra HLF and before the Busan 
HLF 2011, where 78 countries participated. The report notes that „the results are sobering‟ 
and „nonetheless, it is important to note that considerable progress has been made‟ and only 
one target out of 12 has been met (OECD, 2011b; p. 15). The Danish Institute for 
International Studies also published a report entitled „The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration: 
Phase 2‟. The findings of the report are: ownership shows progress, uneven advancement is 
seen in alignment and harmonisation and progress of managing for results and mutual 
accountability is slow (Wood et al., 2011). The following table presents a concrete picture of 
progress in the PD commitments and shows the trend from 2005 to 2010. The table is 
prepared using information from three OECD-DAC surveys: 2005, 2007 and 2010.  
 





























Source: OECD, 2007; OECD, 2008a; OECD, 2011b 
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2.12 Busan HLF- From Aid to Development Effectiveness 
 
Due to disappointing progress of the PD, the aid community sought to avoid a „business as 
usual‟ approach. Instead, given the challenges identified and lessons learned, the community 
pursued an innovative framework and a renewed outlook (Atwood, 2012; Abdel-Malek, 
2015). In addition, there was pressure on the OECD-DAC development community to re-
invigorate an aid centred concept of development co-operation to a more open and 
accommodative platform due to the changing landscape of development co-operation for the 
development of different types of finance and financiers (Janus et al., 2014). The MDGs 
achievement was also a challenge for the development community (Busan Statement, 2011). 
At that juncture, the 4
th
 HLF held in Busan between November 29 to December 1, 2011 drew 
3,500 delegates from 160 countries including 100 ministers, 30 heads of international 
development organisations, and parliamentarians, CSOs, people from the private sector and 
academia to review progress of the PD and determine the next course of action for the 
effective use of aid (Busan Proceedings, 2011; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013; Abdel-Malek, 
2015). OECD reports, independent evaluations and academics use different words to discuss 
PD progress, for instance, mixed, uneven, sobering, poor, limited, slow, unmet and so on 
because only one target out of 12 had been achieved by 2010 (OECD, 2011b; Wood et al., 
2011; Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; Owa, 2011; Keijzer, 2013; Gulrajani, 2014). In a state of 
unsatisfactory progress and out of five PD principles, ownership was fractionally ahead, 
alignment and harmonisation uneven and managing for results and mutual accountability far 
from target (Wood et al., 2011, p. xv; OECD, 2011b).  
 
The Busan HLF evaluated problems in applying principles identified by the OECD, academic 
research and other reports and examined their recommendations as well. The forum accepted 
that „political will, especially from the donor, is critical to bringing further progress‟ and 
„moving from process-oriented, technical talks to more focus on sustainable development 
results‟ was important (Busan Proceedings, 2011; p. 9). Consequently, the forum decided to 
move from aid to development effectiveness and uphold new principles and targets that could 
help achieve development effectiveness. The agreed principles are (Busan Statement, 2011):  
 
 ■ Ownership of development priorities by developing countries: This principle 
stresses developing country leadership, indigenous policy and implementation supported by a 
strong partnership.   
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 ■ Focus on results: It is expected that investments create a long-lasting impact on 
poverty elevation, inequality, sustainable development and capacity enhancement, and these 
have to be aligned with developing country policy priorities.  
 
 ■ Inclusive development partnerships: This principle makes a call for an inclusive 
and effective partnership of many stakeholders involved in the current diverse development 
landscape of developing countries, Northern and Southern donors, CSOs, NGOs, 
Foundations, business and the private sector, international development organisations and so 
on. Openness, trust, mutual respect and learning are keys to the success of this partnership.  
 
 ■ Transparency and accountability to each other: Developing country and 
development co-operation providers should be accountable to each other as well as to 
beneficiaries, respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders as it is crucial 
to yield expected development results, and transparent practices are expected from parties 
involved in development co-operation as it enhances accountability.   
 
The Busan HLF has taken a broader approach to replacing aid effectiveness with 
development effectiveness by adapting to the changing dynamics of the development world 
due to emerging donors, financial crises, different financial circumstances, climate change 
and fragile states (Eyben, 2013; Keijzer, 2013; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013; Abdel-Malek, 
2015). Busan has also widened the area of development co-operation to include human rights, 
gender, democratic ownership of development, effective institutions and parliaments (Oxfam, 
2012). The creation of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
(GPEDC) replacing the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness is a reflection of this wider 
approach (Busan Proceedings, 2011; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013; Abdel-Malek, 2015). The 
inclusion of Southern donors such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, CSOs and the 
private sector in the formal structure of Busan is a key event in the history of aid and 
development co-operation (Atwood, 2012; Eyben, 2013; Mawdsley et al., 2014).  
 
The Busan HLM is significant for three milestone issues: it is a shift from aid to development 
effectiveness which is a combination of aid effectiveness and national development 
effectiveness, it is an end of the WP-EFF and the creation of GPEDC and it is a shift from 
OECD-DAC development discourse to more open and inclusive partnerships where all are 
equal; not donor-recipients, Northern or Southern donors (Day, 2014; Schaaf, 2015; Dornan, 
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2017; Li et al., 2018). Chair of the OECD-DAC, Brian Atwood proudly pronounced in the 
Busan HLF that „we are no longer a world of donors and recipients; we are a world of 
partners: that is what Busan is about‟ (Mawdsley et al., 2014; p. 30).  
 
Busan has taken a two-tier approach to introducing the development effectiveness concept 
under GPEDC; from a traditional donor focus to an unfinished aid effectiveness agenda 
(Abdel-Malek, 2015) and emerging donors to implement commitments on a discretionary 
basis (Kim and Lee, 2013; Oxfam, 2012; p.5) with the vision of „shared principles, common 
goals and differential commitments‟ (Busan Statement, 2011; p.1) . To accommodate South-
South donors or emerging donors, the Busan Document adopts a voluntary stance (Lawson, 
2013; Kim and Lee, 2013) with no specific timeline in relation to most of the indicators for 
achieving development effectiveness targets (Atwood, 2012; Lawson, 2013; Mawdsley et al., 
2014; Gulrajani, 2014). A major setback of the Busan Statement is the lack of clarity about 
donor co-ordination, a crucial yardstick for aid effectiveness and the PD has an incredible 
degree of donor co-ordination. It‟s absence would make donor co-ordination difficult in the 
field (Cameron and Low, 2012). Perhaps a soft approach to donor co-ordination is intended to 
accommodate emerging donors but in doing so, OECD-DAC donor may contradict a long-
standing issue in aid effectiveness and drop the whole aid effectiveness agenda (Gulrajani, 
2014). However, a lack of enthusiasm by South-South donors about this new initiative has 
raised questions about the voluntary nature of the Busan document moving away from the PD 
framework of aid effectiveness (2015; Li et al., 2018; Li, 2017; Lawson, 2013; Fues and 
Klingebiel, 2014; Klingebiel and Xiaoyun, 2016).  
 
A twenty five member committee of the Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG) was formed from 
members of the WP-WFF to make GPEDC operational by June 2012. The group chose a 
Steering Committee format as the governing council of the GPEDC with 18 members 
including 3 co-chairs representing recipients of development co-operation, providers of 
development co-operation and recipient-providers of development co-operation and 
secretarial support from a Joint Support Team OECD and UNDP (Eyben, 2013; Mawdsley et 
al., 2014;). However, currently, the GPEDC has 4 co-chairs and 20 members on a Steering 
Committee. The PBIG developed 10 indicators to measure commitments and progress of four 




2.13 SDG: Ambitious Target, More Responsibility 
 
On 25 September 2015, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly unanimously announced 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda with the motto „leave no one 
behind‟ (United Nations, 2015). The SDGs are an unfinished element of the MDGs but more 
forward-thinking (Brolan, 2016) with 17 goals, 169 targets and 230 indicators (Klingebiel et 
al., 2016; Jacob, 2017; Jones, 2017). However, the SDGs are a multifaceted long term vision 
that combines a plethora of sectors (Klingebiel et al., 2016). Therefore, the setting of 
priorities, distribution of responsibilities and the division of labour among donors with regard 
to goals and indicators are very important for developing countries to achieve targets (Jones, 
2017). SDG implementation also requires very large amounts of funding (Jones, 2017). 
Foreign aid was the main source of finance for MDG implementation but SDGs require 
finance from other sources (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). SDGs not only require more finance 
but equally important are the quality and impact of it (Greenhill et al., 2015).  
 
As the development community needs to do more than the MDG to achieve SDGs (United 
Nations, 2018), a global development paradigm is required (Gore, 2015). The SDG‟s Goal-17 
explicitly mentions the importance of partnership and multi-stakeholder platforms. Goal-8 
notes global partnerships for development of the MDGs in terms of knowledge, expertise, 
technology and sharing of finances. The GPEDC is a perfect match for this partnership 
approach. GPEDC is not expressly mentioned in the SDG document but certain links can be 
observed such as the „new agenda‟, a „global partnership‟ and so on (Bhattacharya et al., 
2016). The declaration of the 2030 Agenda (SDGs) has influenced the functions of GPEDC 
just as the MDGs influenced the Rome declaration. The core activities of the partnership are 
now focused on the achievement of SDGs and the 2030 Agenda (GPEDC, 2016). The 
outcome document of HLM 2 confirms that GPEDC is „committed to effective development 
co-operation as a means to achieve universal and inter-related Sustainable Development 
Goals‟ (SDGs) (GPEDC, 2016; p.1).  
 
Annual SDG implementation requires $5-7 trillion, whilst the development community is 
able to mobilise $1.4 trillion in a year; around 25% of the requirement (United Nations, 
2018). So, the 2030 Agenda has presented two challenges for the development community: 
mobilisation of more funds and effective use of them. From this perspective the 2030 agenda 
offers a tremendous opportunity for the development community to reinvigorate the aid 
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effectiveness agenda as developing countries formulate their sustainable development 
strategies and donors can identify their priorities to ensure division of labour and 
harmonisation of efforts (Rudolph and Holzapfel, 2017).  
 
2.14 GPEDC in Progress 
 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) is a formal and 
broader collaboration of development actors such as government, parliament, development 
organisations, CSOs, NGOs and the private sector (Busan Statement, 2011; Abdel-Malek, 
2014; Klingebiel and Xiaoyun, 2016; Bracho, 2017). The GPEDC embraces a more open 
agenda and an inclusive partnership where all are equal, rather than donor and recipient 
(GPEDC, 2016; Li, 2017). It was created to replace the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
(WP-EFF) to change the dynamics of the aid effectiveness agenda, not to run „business as 
usual‟ since the Rome Declaration (Abdel-Malek, 2015; p.4). The vision of the GPEDC is „to 
maximise the effectiveness of all forms of co-operation for development for the shared benefit 
of people, planet, prosperity and peace‟ and the current focus is to achieve the SDGs through 
effective development co-operation (GPEDC, 2016; p.9). It aims to synthesise knowledge of 
development co-operation and innovation of development tools for country-led development 
activities supported by aid and other financial sources to help change the aid receiver status 
of developing countries to aid providers (Eyben, 2013; Schaaf, 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 
2016; Klingebiel and Xiaoyun, 2016). However, the „unfinished business‟ of aid 
effectiveness is the core undertaking of the GPEDC (Abdel-Malek, 2015). The GPEDC 
monitors the progress of the Busan HLF commitments organised in 10 indicators in every 
two years and the last monitoring survey report was published in 2019.  
 
In total, 161 nations and 61 international organisations have endorsed GPEDC 
(OECD/UNDP, 2014; Day, 2014). OECD and UNDP jointly provide secretarial support to 
GPEDC (Eyben, 2013, Abdel-Malek, 2015). The GPEDC is governed by a 24-member 
Steering Committee with 4 co-chairs and 20 members. Bangladesh, Switzerland, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and a Non-executive Consultative Co-Chair: Executive 
Director for Reality of Aid Africa are the current four co-chairs and of GPEDC. Few 
academics believe, given the bigger agenda, that GPEDC will achieve visible results in the 
near future (Glennie, 2014) and the broad approach of GPEDC can cause problems in 
decision making or fragmented co-operation (Kharas, 2014). In contrast, some people believe 
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that a multi-stakeholder platform with diverse objectives can really meet the needs of the 
changing development world (Atwood, 2012).  
 
Two High-Level Meetings (HLM) of GPEDC have already convened, the first one was in 
Mexico City in 2014 and the second was in Nairobi in 2016. The First HLM convened in 
Mexico on 15-16 April 2014. Around 1,700 delegates from 152 countries attended the 
meeting including the UN Secretary-General, the OECD Secretary-General, Ministers, 
parliamentarians, CSOs, NGOs and academics (MoFA, Mexico, 2014; Abdel-Malek, 2015). 
Developing country and CSO participants criticised GPEDC‟s approach of loose voluntary 
commitments and the signing of a much weaker document in the Busan HLF to accommodate 
South-South donors (Li et al., 2018).  
 
However, the meeting reaffirmed the Busan Principles and goals, urging proactive roles for 
all stakeholders to achieve the set target by 2015 in the Communiqué titled „Building towards 
an Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda‟ (MoFA, Mexico, 2014; Abdel-Malek, 2015). 
The Second HLM convened in Nairobi on 28 November to 1 December 2016, a year after the 
SDGs declaration and discussion was mostly focused on the achievement of SDGs: to leave 
no one behind and the Busan commitments (GPEDC, 2016). The next course of action to 
accelerate the progress of four development effectiveness principles was outlined in the 
outcome document (GPEDC, 2016). However, it is said that a 23-page long document does 
not provide any concrete commitment or measurable future actions as a follow-up of the 
Second HLM (Klingebiel & Xiaoyun, 2016). Nevertheless, a senior level meeting, the first of 
its kind, took place on July 2019 in New York. Lack of progress in the „unfinished business‟ 
of the aid effectiveness agenda was recognised by the meeting and an understanding of the 
importance of „unfinished business‟ was reached. An action plan was formulated to discuss at 
the next High-Level Forum (GPEDC, 2019a).  
 
2.15 Monitoring Survey 
 
GPEDC monitors the progress of the Busan Commitments using ten indicators under the 
supervision of a Monitoring Advisory Group (MAG) (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). It intends to 
contribute to the UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) by setting a standard for 
development co-operation actors and monitoring SDGs (Klingebiel and Xiaoyun, 2016). The 
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following framework of 10 indicators is used to examine the progress of the targets for 
Effective Development Co-operation (EDC) to be achieved by 2015 (GPEDC, 2015; p.5).  
 
Table 2.4 GPEDC monitoring indicators and targets 
 
 
GPEDC has conducted three Monitoring Surveys in 2014, 2016 and 2019. In 2014, 46 
developing countries participated in the survey. Overall, results are mixed but the nature of 
development co-operation is changing. Greater efforts are required to transform development 
effectiveness into reality to include strong country ownership, enhanced transparency and 
accountability of development partners (OECD/UNDP, 2014). The development community 
after the 1
st
  round of GPEDC 2014, in its monitoring survey, noted that the „glass is half full‟ 
(OECD/UNDP, 2014; p.23). Reviewing the monitoring report, Abdel-Malek (2014; p.2) 
identifies the non-binding nature of GPEDC as one of the main reasons for little progress in 
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achieving targets along with a „coalition of willingness‟. 81 low and middle-income countries 
and 125 development partners participated in the 2016 2
nd
 monitoring survey (OECD/UNDP, 
2016). In GPEDC‟s official language, this was to „testify to important progress towards‟ the 
development effectiveness agenda (OECD/UNDP, 2016; p.13). The GPEDC (2016) 
monitoring survey reports comparatively promising findings except for indicators such as 
country systems, predictability of aid, inclusive partnerships, transparency and inclusion of 
CSOs (OECD/UNDP, 2016). The 2019 GPEDC Monitoring Report was published on 17 
June 2019 and included 86 countries and more than 100 development partners. The report 
presents mixed progress on indicators (OEDC/UNDP, 2019). 
 
However, survey reviews claim that although few areas of progress have been reported, 
donor commitments are far behind those noted in original documents (Carter, 2016) and some 
of them have moved away from the practice of principles and indicators, for example, the UK 
pulling off-budget support (Carter, 2016; Oxfam, 2016). Clear and straight forward PD aid 
effectiveness effort was an indicator and time-based measurement of implementation where 
donors and recipients were accountable to each other and notable progress was achieved. 
However, recent monitoring surveys are reporting poor progress of „core aid‟ segments of the 
agenda for which a reason could be the voluntary nature of commitments and the lack of 
focus in evaluating results. This inability poses a great challenge for GPEDC (Blampied, 
2016). Studies identify some of the causes of slow progress in the Busan HLM commitments 
and GPEDC initiatives, for example, a shift from aid to development effectiveness and a lack 
of donor commitment (Prizzon, 2016) and unsatisfactory recognition from stakeholders, 
especially emerging donors (Li, 2017), relatively poor alignment of indicators with SDGs 
(Keijzer and Janus, 2016) and the voluntary nature of declaration (OECD, 2011a; Atwood, 
2012; Abdel-Malek, 2014). 
 
There is also an assumption that although GPEDC was created with the intention of a 
common platform of both Northern and Southern donors moving from aid effectiveness to 
development effectiveness, adopting a non-committal voluntary document in the Busan HLF, 
a lack of participation from China, India, Brazil and South Africa perhaps impedes the vision 
(Oxfam, 2012; Lawson, 2013; Fues and Klingebiel, 2014; Klingebiel and Xiaoyun, 2016; Li, 
2017; Li et al., 2018). On the one hand, hope in new global partnerships is dwindling and on 
the other, a shift to development effectiveness for a comprehensive partnership undermines 




Concern exists whether GPEDC has moved away from its promise made in the Busan HLF of 
2011, to complete the „unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda due to the 
widespread development of the effectiveness agenda (Abdel-Malek, 2014). Another 
argument is that the aid effectiveness agenda has gone underground in recent years due to 
donor diversity and a decline in aid for accountability of government to parliament and 
people. However, GPEDC fails to reflect on these points efficiently (Rudolph and Holzapfel, 
2017) but it is a platform for continued discussion of the aid effectiveness agenda that 
emerged due to the inefficiency of aid (Keijzer and Janus, 2016).  
 
It is important for GPEDC to continue focusing on past commitments of aid effectiveness, 
still a crucial issue for developing countries, for greater and proactive engagement of 
developing countries (Rogerson, 2011). GPEDC should prioritise „unfinished business‟ of the 
aid effectiveness agenda for its greater success because these principles are still valid for 
developing countries and their interest will be determined by the amount of focus GPEDC 
provides to their interest (Abdel-Malek, 2015). Countries unable to mobilise internal finance 
would still depend on aid for the achievement of SDGs (Oxfam, 2016). Therefore, the 
implementation of aid effectiveness principles is decisive for the best outcomes from aid 
money.  
 
Prizzon (2016) shows that among development effectiveness principles, ownership and 
alignment are a priority for developing countries. Davis and Pickering (2015) support 
Prizzon‟s findings. Moreover, they highlight the importance of donor finance alignment with 
recipient country national development strategies. For example, predictability and use of 
country systems such as sectoral budget support and division of labour to avoid 
fragmentation (Davis and Pickering, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the importance of core aid effectiveness was again raised and reinforced in the 
third international conference on financing for development held in Addis Ababa on 13-15 
July 2015 with an objective to ensure resources for SDGs. Section 58 of the conference 
document urges GPEDC to align development co-operation, avoid fragmentation, country 
ownership and country systems, practice a programme based approach, develop effective 
partnerships for development effectiveness, increase transparency and mutual accountability 
and reduce transaction costs (United Nations, 2015b; p. 19). Therefore, core aid effectiveness 
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issues such as ownership, alignment, predictability, use of country system and division of 
labour need to be at the top of the priority list in implementing the development effectiveness 
agenda (Davis & Pickering, 2015; Prizzon, 2016; Keijzer & Janus, 2016; Oxfam, 2016; 
Blampied, 2016).  However, in both High-Level Meetings the „unfinished business‟ of aid 
effectiveness received serious importance and the meetings reiterated a firm commitment to 
the „unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda. For example, the 1
st
 HLM  
communiqué stresses that „GPEDC is committed to implementing a paradigm shift from aid 
effectiveness to effective development co-operation, sustained by the contribution and 
catalysing effect of ODA, as the main source of international development assistance‟ 
(GPEDC, 2014; p.1) and also mentions that „unfinished, the aid effectiveness agenda remains 
a critical concern‟ (GPEDC, 2014; p.2). In the 2nd HLM, the development community 
„renew their full commitment to achieve this unfinished business‟ and „will develop time-
bound action plans in relation to these commitments‟ (GPEDC, 2016; p. 9-10). In a recent 
senior level meeting held in July, it was decided an action plan would be submitted to the 
next HLM to take concrete action for the progress of „unfinished business‟. However, studies 
claim that the progress of the aid effectiveness agenda is in limbo or mixed under GPEDC 
(Abdel-Malek, 2015; Fues and Klingebiel, 2014).  
 
2.16 Implementation of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda and Challenges  
 
The following section reviews the implementation experience of the aid effectiveness agenda 
in different countries as a prelude to a systematic analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The 
discussion helps to outline a conceptual framework to evaluate the aid effectiveness agenda 
in the foreign aid policy regime of Bangladesh. The specific focus will be on aid and 
development administration, development partner collaboration, impact and current aid 
effectiveness in Bangladesh.  
 
2.16.1 Implementation Experience of the aid effectiveness agenda in Different Countries 
 
A number of studies in different countries examine the impact and implementation 
experience of the aid effectiveness agenda from different perspectives and the results are 



































Studies identify a good number of issues detrimental to the execution of the PD principles at 
the country level. Examining Uganda‟s initiatives to adopt the PD principles for example, 
particularly ownership, alignment and harmonisation, Habraken et al. (2017) argue that the 
implementation of principles varies from donor to donor and the PD should not be considered 
a blueprint for every country and every donor.  Rather, a different approach can be adopted in 
the application process. It is not correct to suggest that the PD is too rigid and cannot be 
diversified, this is perhaps an incorrect assumption (Blunt et al., 2011; Habraken et al., 2017). 
Therefore, to make sure aid effectiveness donors can develop appropriate mechanisms, an 
agreement outside of the PD which accommodates this and at the same time ensures 
ownership of the recipients (Blunt, et al. 2011. Owa, 2011).  
 
Studies also find that PD implementation varies from donor to donor (Blunt et al., 2011. 
Owa, 2011). Analysing donor thoughts about the implementation of PD in Dar es Salaam in 
Tanzania,  Hyden (2008) identifies three important issues for donors in transforming the PD 
principles into reality: firstly, although the PD is not legally binding, in realising the social 
value of the declaration donors should support the partnership approach of the PD that 
upholds ownership by recipients; secondly, the lack of harmonisation should not undercut 
recipient government development initiatives; finally, donors should not undertake policy 
intervention in respect of the cultural and political contexts of recipient countries. 
Investigating the education, health and water sectors of Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda 
from a governance perspective Welle et al. (2009) identify two issues that are crucial to 
implement aid effectiveness principles: equal adherence of the PD principles at global, 
national and sub-national levels helps to achieve faster implementation, and political 
commitment of recipient countries for economic development and poverty eradication.  
 
Evaluating the implementation process of the PD in three Latin American countries, Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, Dijkstra and  Komives (2011) identify  some problems in 
implementing the PD principles such as recipient loss of planning control in the negotiation 
process with the donors thereby making it difficult for recipients to take leadership over aid, 
donor-recipient working groups remaining ineffective because of donor dominance, budget 
support and a programme based approach, conditions attached to budget support, 
unpredictable aid,  donor focus on administration and financial management. A Nigerian 
study suggests a less committed and inefficient leadership of recipient countries and an 
absence of donor motivation are responsible for the non-execution of the PD principles 
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(Monye et al., 2010). The absence of a clear strategy, donor support and donor-imposed 
conditions are predicaments for PD implementation in Uganda (Habraken et al., 2017).   
 
2.16.2 Aid Effectiveness Principle-Wise Implementation Experience 
 
2.16.2.1 Ownership  
 
All aid recipient signatories of the aid effectiveness agenda are trying to ensure their 
ownership produces effective development strategies and plans but progress is very slow and 
country experience different. There is one indicator under the ownership principle in the PD 
framework - „Operational Development Strategies‟ and the target was for 75% of countries to 
have national development strategies by 2010. The 2005 baseline was 17% and in 2010 this 
was 38%, so the target was not met (OECD, 2011b). Implementation of ownership principles 
varies from country to country. For example, Tanzania, Colombia and Albania claim 
considerable ownership over development initiatives (DPG, 2011; McGee and Heredia, 2012; 
Karini, 2016). Rwanda is also identified as a country that has a relatively higher level of 
ownership which has evolved over the years as an outcome of bold steps such as aid policy 
and sector strategy with firm commitments and support from strong and visionary leadership 
(Hayman, 2009).  
 
Analysing the education, health and water sectors of Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda, 
Welle et al. (2009) claim that the principle of ownership has made weak progress in 
Bangladesh and Ethiopia, and in Uganda strong or moderate to strong progress. However, 
three island countries, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Tonga, show ownership is not 
guaranteed because donors and recipients did not support each other‟s reform and this 
impaired their relationships (Dornan, 2017). It might be argued that donors still dominate in 
formulating policies or drive policies in Cambodia as well as in Indonesia, but governments 
are pressing for ownership (Blunt et al., 2011). Nigeria is struggling to achieve ownership 
because donors still implement pre-designed projects that are the priority of Nigeria‟s 
government in a broader sense but not included in the strategic development plan or budget 
(Monye et al., 2010). An initiative in Cambodia to exercise the ownership principle of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in the law and justice sector was limited by the donor community 




However, implementation experiences indicate poor recipient policy (Winters, 2012; Bigsten 
and Tengstam, 2015), weak institutions and political leadership (Booth, 2011) and a lack of 
commitment and co-operation (Cameron and Low, 2012; Oxfam, 2016) on the part of donors 
impedes implementation of the ownership principle. Moreover, new conditions of the PD 
mentioned in the alignment section of the PD document enforce conditions related to 
recipient development strategies but donors abuse this option to impose other conditions 
which go against the ownership principle (Dornan, 2017).  
 
2.16.2.2 Alignment  
 
There exist expectations that donors offer autonomy to recipients for self-determine of their 
own programmes and align their resources to ensure support for successful completion 
(Habtom, 2016). However, some studies claim donors did not support government action on 
implementation of the alignment principle (Cameron and Low, 2012) and alignment is still a 
matter of tension between donors and recipients (Sjöstedt, 2013).  
 
The overall progress of alignment is slow, varying between donors, countries and 
components of alignment (Wood et al., 2011). The 2005 baseline alignment indicator in the 
PD measurement framework, „Aid flows are aligned on national priorities‟, was 42% and the 
2010 target was 85% against a 2010 actual figure of 41%; the target was not met (OECD, 
2011b). According to the GPEDC 2016 survey, 74% of developing countries have a strategic 
plan comprising of priorities, targets and indicators. However, alignment of aid is still a 
challenge. Few studies investigate progress of the alignment principle in some countries. 
Tanzania‟s experience provides a promising picture of alignment (DPG, 2011). The 
Cambodian experience shows that donors did not uphold the alignment principle because of 
idiosyncratic agenda (Cameron and Low, 2012). Welle et al. (2009) find that alignment in 
water, health and education sectors of Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda is mostly weak, 
moderately weak or moderate. Aid projects in Nigeria are not aligned with government 
development priorities (Monye et al., 2010). In Rwanda aid is not fully predictable, donors 
implement individual projects and mutual accountability among donor and recipient is mostly 
missing (Hayman, 2009; Abbott and Rwirahira, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, difficulties exist between both donors and recipients when implementing the 
alignment principle. Donor political objectives, strategic interests, priorities, accountability 
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procedures and limited authority of donor local offices restrict the alignment of aid with 
recipient priorities (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; Habraken et al., 2017). On the other hand, 
politically motivated policy (Booth, 2011), bureaucrat and NGO interests to have projects 
outside of government priorities (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011), weak planning and 
management of public finance amongst recipients also contribute to non-compliance of 
alignment.  
 
2. 16.2.3 Harmonisation  
 
Modest progress has been made in harmonisation since the PD (Wood et al., 2011). The 
OECD admits „little progress has been made among donors to implement common 
arrangements or procedures and conduct joint missions and analytical works‟ (OECD, 
2011b, p. 16). There are three indicators under harmonisation principles in the PD 
measurement framework. These are „use of common arrangements or procedures‟, for which 
the 2005 baseline was 43% and a 2010 target of 66%. In 2010, the actual figure was 45%. For 
the „joint mission‟ indicator the 2005 baseline was 18% and the 2010 target was 40%. In 
2010 the actual figure was 19%. For the „joint country analytic work‟ indicator the 2005 
baseline was 42% and the 2010 target 66%. In 2010 this figure was actually 43% (OECD, 
2011b). It is worth mentioning here that there is no indicator as such to measure the 
harmonisation principle‟s implementation in the GPEDC framework and therefore, it is not 
possible to refer to data from the GEDC 2014 and 2016 surveys.  
 
The literature in relation to the harmonisation principle‟s implementation in different 
countries represents a disappointing situation after the decades of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The findings are similar to the OECD (2011) survey report (Cameron and Low, 
2012; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). The DFID and the World Bank made attempts in Indonesia 
to harmonise donors for decentralisation and local governance programmes in 2005 but after 
5 years there was little progress; political economy, co-ordination in government and 
bureaucracy and unmotivated donors are identified as the reason behind this failure (Winters, 
2012).  
 
The progress of harmonisation in Bangladesh is slow despite some initiatives being taken, for 
example, the establishment of a donor Local Consultative Group (LCG) and a Sector 
Working Group but these initiatives remain ineffective because of an unclear framework, 
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weak communication between donors and government, little motivation of donors and 
government capacity constraints (Rahman and Khan, 2010). Two issues are identified for the 
absence of effective harmonisation in Indonesian: one, donors prefer distinctiveness and two, 
government choices over the mode of delivery (Blunt et al., 2011). In Bolivia, Honduras and 
Nicaragua (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011) problems associated with donor lack of 
harmonisation can be identified, for example, donors having their own priorities, systems or 
agendas. Uganda introduced a Local Development Partner Group (LDPG) to co-ordinate 25 
donors. The initiative proved unsuccessful because of the different political interests of the 
donors. A difference in country level autonomy is also an issue because some donors hold 
country level decision making power and some do not. For example, Nordic countries do but 
the US does not (Habraken et al, 2017). Harmonisation seems difficult in Eritrea mainly 
because of different donor policy interests, too many aid channels, proliferation and 
fragmentation resulting in huge costs (Habtom, 2016). Also, Nigeria‟s situation did not 
change after the emergence of the aid effectiveness agenda; many donors in many sectors, no 
reporting to government and no co-ordination among donors (Monye et al., 2010). Zambia‟s 
aid co-ordination experience is also weak (Sundewall et al, 2009).  
 
Investigation of the education, health and water sectors of Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda 
shows mostly moderate to weak progress in harmonisation (Welle et al., 2009). However, 
good examples are set in Colombia where donors promote peaceful co-existence for 
harmonisation (Killen, 2011). Joint Assistance Strategies (JAS) take various forms and 
objectives. A JAS in Nigeria includes only the World Bank and the DFID but Tanzania 
involves 45 donors and media, NGOs, CSOs and academic institutions in the forum (Lawson, 
2013). El Salvador introduced a National Agenda for Aid Effectiveness and Guatemala an 
International Co-operation Management System for more harmonised aid (Killen, 2011). In 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia most donors remain outside of the Joint Assistance 
Strategies (JAS) initiative probably because of autonomy and interest and therefore the 
dialogue mechanism is becoming complex. This is not a good sign for the harmonisation 
principle implementation (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011). 
 
2.16.2.4 Managing for Results 
 
Progress in result management is poor and relatively slow relative to other principles (Wood 
et al., 2011; Booth, 2011). A 2005 baseline of managing for results principle indicator in the 
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PD measurement framework - „Results-oriented frameworks‟ was 9% and in 2010 the target 
was 36%. In 2010 the actual figure was 20% (OECD, 2011b). However, a study finds that 
recipient country aid information systems are improving and they are asking for disclosure of 
donor aid information (Wood et al., 2011). A GPEDC (2016) survey found country result 
information and dependence on domestic monitoring and evaluation to determine the status 
of implementation and impact is considerably lower at 52% (OECD/UNDP, 2016a). Country 
experience is diverse in implementing the managing for results principle. It was found in 
Malawi that the managing for results framework is behind four principles and indicators of 
mutual accountability are not aligned with national or sectoral plans (Collins, 2009).  
 
Managing for results in the education, health and water sectors in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and 
Uganda is weak or moderate to weak (Welle et al., 2009). Few countries such as Nicaragua 
are able to jointly develop a results management framework with donors but mitigating 
measures or forfeit procedures are not mentioned in the case of non-compliance of criteria 
(Dijkstra and Komives, 2011). Bolivia tried to formulate an indicator based results 
management system in the education sector but was unsuccessful because of inconsistent 
political policies and rejection from donors (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011). Referring to 
Cambodia‟s law and justice sector, Cameron and Low (2012) claim that donors prefer to use 
their own results frameworks and recipient governments experience difficulties in reaching 
agreement for the use of common results frameworks (Cameron and Low, 2012). Rwanda‟s 
experience is similar to Cambodia where a results framework is in place but donors are less 
interested in using it (Abbott and Rwirahira, 2012). Donor co-operation in Nigeria to 
formulate a robust, indigenous, evaluation and monitoring framework is absent.  
 
Moreover, donors seem interested in providing funds, even for administrative development 
but less interested in doing so for building capacity to introduce an evaluation and monitoring 
framework (Monye et al., 2010). In Albania‟s case, it is found that outcome assessment of 
development projects is not a priority of the government as well as donors (Karini, 2016). 
Also, the priority of managing for results is lower in Colombia (McGee and Heredia, 2012). 
Furthermore, it is seen that donors are more interested or focused on administration and 
financial management rather than managing for results and most of the time, meeting 
objectives of projects or programmes are not a pre-condition for the disbursement of funds. In 
addition, this does not necessarily depend on the fulfilment of objectives (Dijkstra and 
Komives, 2011).  
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2.16.2.5 Mutual Accountability 
 
Overall, progress on implementing the mutual accountability principle is slow or mixed 
(Rogerson, 2011; Wood et at., 2011). The 2005 baseline in the PD measurement framework 
was 22% and the 2010 target was 100% but in 2010 the actual was 38% (OECD, 2011b). 
Countries have made considerable, gradual, uneven or little progress but the momentum of 
change is observed among the aid community (Wood et at., 2011). The 2016 GPEDC survey 
reported a mutual assessment review score of 46% from a target of 100% but 80% of 
countries now have aid or partnership policies (OECD/UNDP, 2016a). There are countries 
such as Mozambique where a mutual accountability framework is established through a 
memorandum of understanding between donors and government. The latter assesses and 
ranks donor performance through a “performance assessment framework” and donors 
evaluate government performance on the basis of poverty reduction and development result 
monitoring indicators (Killen, 2011). Tanzania was able to meet the 2010 target set by the PD 
evaluation (DPG, 2011). However, considering the water, health and education sectors of 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda, Welle et al. (2009) conclude mutual accountability has 
made weak or moderate to weak progress, lagging behind other principles. Here, a power 
imbalance is the main reason for slow progress; rich patrons and poor client relationships 
cannot really ensure mutual accountability (Rogerson, 2011).  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda insists on joint assessment using a framework that is designed to 
understand the country context to measure development outcomes and make each party 
accountable to one another and the people of respective countries (Khatun, 2008). However, 
due to institutional requirements most donors use their own evaluation frameworks and 
therefore, it is difficult to introduce jointly developed evaluation instruments to measure 
results and ensure accountability (Karini, 2016). Weak governance and institutions of 
recipient countries such as Eritrea, do not allow for the functioning of mutual accountability 
principles (Habtom, 2016). Furthermore, a project-based approach and donor involvement 
and influence are detrimental to mutual accountability. For instance, a project approach and 
donor control in Nigeria did not allow the government to adequately monitor donor 
performance (Monye et al., 2010). Moreover, the mutual accountability principle remains on 
the side-lines even in countries that have a positive experience of the implementation of the 
agenda, for example, Malawi and Colombia where not much discussion takes place among 
donors and government to measure indicators related to mutual accountability (Collins, 2009; 
88 
 
McGee and Heredia, 2012). Studies suggest recipients should raise their voices in the form of 
conferences, seminars or citizen dialogues to give a message to donor headquarters via local 
offices, asking to ensure mutual accountability and support recipient countries for system 
improvements (Rogerson, 2011). Others argue in favour of the Aid Information Management 
System (AIMS) for functional mutual accountability (Monye et al., 2010). 
 
2.17 Donors are Behind in Implementation 
 
Weak recipient leadership due to poor capacity, institutions and systems obstruct 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda (Chandy, 2011). The poorly co-ordinated, 
fractionalised policy of the recipient also creates a problem for ownership and ultimately for 
the execution of the agenda (Winters, 2012). However, it is noted by Easterly and Williamson 
(2011; p.1946) that donors do not follow the best practices of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
So, donors lag behind recipients in implementing (Winters, 2012; Gulrajani, 2014). However, 
the agenda requires relatively fewer actions from donors than recipients but politics, 
institutions, bureaucracy and concern over public support perhaps contribute to this 
performance (Wood et al., 2011). Donors are less motivated than recipient countries on 
initiatives to adhere to the principles, for example, the US and Japan do not follow Uganda‟s 
joint strategies and donor platform (Habraken et al., 2017). Donor political interest, 
personalised agendas and visibility also hamper adherence to these principles (Nunnenkamp 
et al., 2013; Gulrajani, 2014; Cameron and Low, 2012; Vollmer, 2014).  
 
Scholars hold donors responsible for the relatively poor progress of the aid effectiveness 
agenda especially because of alignment, selectivity, overhead costs, harmonisation and 
transparency (Gulrajani, 2014). Conversely, research suggests donors to be altruistic in 
implementing the principles, their organisation have complex internal systems and 
accountability to citizens impedes progress (Nunnenkamp et al., 2013). Moreover, donor 
inability to understand local systems and country cultures contributes to the slow progress of 
the aid effectiveness agenda (Hyden, 2008). Therefore, on the one hand, donor burdens on 
recipient countries do not decrease and on the other, donor efficiency does not increase 
(Birdsall and Kharas, 2014). Some analysts believe that donor country governments make 
commitments in international forums but their development agencies attach less importance 
to implementing commitments to enhance aid effectiveness (Gulrajani, 2014). Another 
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crucial issue is the internal procedures and rules of business for donor country organisations 
and their interpretations of the agenda. Four problems related to donor implementation of the 
PD process have been identified by Gulrajani (2014) that are related to donor internal 
governance: aid modality of the aid effectiveness agenda is presumed not proven to deliver 
better outcomes, equal emphasis is not given to goals, the PD fails to understand the 
complexity of donor organisations and there is no prescribed format for donor organisations 
to implement principles.  
 
An independent PD evaluation states that „it is urgent that all donor governments find ways 
to overcome the internal institutional or administrative obstacles slowing their aid reforms‟ 
(Wood et al., 2011: xv). From ideological and political perspectives, it is very difficult to 
change (Blunt et al., 2011). Also, decision making powers of local offices varies from one 
donor to another, for example, Nordic country offices enjoy the freedom to co-operate with 
recipient government initiatives depending on the local context but the US requires 
centralised decision making (Habraken et al., 2017).  
 
2.18 Slow Progress of Implementation but Important to Continue the Journey  
 
Although progress is slow, the aid effectiveness agenda is able to show the way for the 
improvement of aid practice. It has raised development awareness and helped to improve the 
quality of aid partnerships (Wood et al., 2011; Keijzer, 2013). Research finds some evidence 
that the agenda helps to improve the delivery and management of aid (Stern et al., 2008). 
According to the OECD (2010a), the agenda has brought changes to the aid business. 
Recipients raise their voices for ownership and alignment, donors are promoting 
harmonisation, donors-recipients are trying to measure the outcomes of development efforts 
and make each other accountable for results. Arguably, implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda can make a real difference as it is not a „paper tiger‟ (Rogerson, 2011; 
p.4). An argument is that donors and recipients are in a hurry for results but patience is 
needed on both sides as many long-standing problems cannot be resolved in a short span of 
time; there exists a need to work through trust (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011; Samy and 




The aid effectiveness agenda shifted from one policy to another very quickly, for example, 
aid to development effectiveness in Busan and a short time to achieve targets is a problem for 
both donors and recipients (Samy and Aksl, 2015). Implementation of donor commitments 
and capacity enhancement of recipients will take time; therefore, it would be unwise to see 
the end of the aid effectiveness agenda so early (Owa, 2011). If the development community 
desires to see quick results they should set a moderate and realistic target to achieve them as 
they find it difficult to implement current targets (Samy and Aksl, 2015). Although it is not 
fully implemented, the agenda and its commitments are still relevant and not out-dated for 
development co-operation (Wood et al., 2011). Slow progress does not mean the framework 
is bad, rather issues with donors and recipients are a problem. Studies claim that expectations 
of immediate results as well as political and technical issues of donor and recipient can make 
the aid effectiveness agenda an unsuccessful story in the history of development which can be 
a major setback for the aid effectiveness agenda (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011).  
 
This literature review presents many reasons for the slow progress of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. However, six reasons repeatedly appear in the review: 1) policy, institution, 
governance and capacity of recipient countries, 2) weak leadership of recipient countries 3) 
lack of political commitment of donors, 4) donor self-interests and agendas, 5) internal 
bureaucracy or administration of donor aid agencies, and 6) donor co-ordination. 
 
2.19 Gaps in the Literature  
 
This literature review inspects the development of the aid effectiveness agenda and the 
implementation of aid effectiveness principles from diverse perspectives. Most of the 
literature identifies bottlenecks that impede implementation or contribute to slow progress, 
examining different aspects associated with the aid effectiveness agenda. However, the 
following gaps in the existing literature can be identified. 
 
The reviewed literature does not provide comprehensive evidence about recipient government 
initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and its impact on the internal 
management of aid. Most of the discussion is confined to recipient aid-related actions or 
donor organisation activities to implement the agenda. However, the influence of the aid 
effectiveness agenda on recipient government inter and intra-organisations such as line 
ministries, agencies of aid programmes/projects, planning ministries, evaluation and 
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monitoring, procurement, audit and so on are not well addressed. The aid effectiveness 
agenda focuses on the management aspect of aid and stresses recipient country level 
activities. The aid effectiveness agenda is all about partnership, trust and co-operation. 
Recipients formulate good development strategies and build quality country systems to 
establish ownership. Donors support recipient country‟s development strategies in co-
ordination with other donors and use country systems to help strengthen the system. They 
manage results and ensure accountability collectively. However, the existing literature does 
not clearly identify the joint effort of donors and recipients in implementing the agenda.  
 
Recipient policy has been identified as a catalyst for aid effectiveness in the existing literature 
and declarations have repeatedly signified this importance as well, because recipient policy 
and strategy help achieve ownership. However, recipient policy interventions to implement 
the aid effectiveness agenda has not been clearly understood from the available literature.  An 
unclear picture has emerged from the available literature with regard to the implementation of 
the aid effectiveness agenda from a public policy perspective. In other words, the experience 
of implementation as a public policy is not clearly understood. Few case studies have 
examined the implementation process of the aid effectiveness agenda and the impact of 
implementation on aid administration. Moreover, most of the existing case studies either 
examine specific aid sectors or a single principle of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
literature also does not provide much information about the current implementation status of 
„unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
Bangladesh is a leading aid recipient country and proactive on international aid effectiveness 
platforms. In fact, it is the current Co-Chair of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (GPEDC). Very few studies have investigated the Bangladesh 
government‟s initiative to implement the aid effectiveness agenda from narrow angles such as 
harmonisation, the forestry sector or the education, health and water sectors. Nevertheless, no 
existing study has extensively reviewed the Bangladesh government‟s efforts to implement 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Therefore, this thesis endeavours to fill these gaps by examining 
the Bangladesh government‟s initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and the 
impact of the initiatives in aid and development administration, collaborative efforts of the 
government with development partners and the current implementation status of „unfinished 




Precisely, the specific research gaps this thesis addresses are: one of the leading aid recipient 
countries- Bangladesh endeavour in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and its impact 
on the management of aid and aid effectiveness; joint efforts of donors and recipient to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda; policy formulation and the implementation process 
of the recipient government in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda from a perspective of  
public policy implementation; the thesis takes a comprehensive approach to examine the 
implementation of all principles of the agenda; donors response to the implementation 
initiatives of the recipient; the impact of continuous change of the agenda in country level 




The overriding objective of this chapter is to review the existing literature from the 
perspective of the management of foreign aid. The review initially inspects the aid 
effectiveness debate in terms of some of the most oft-used buzzwords in the development 
lexicon: aid works or not. The predominant view of the available literature is that aid works 
subject to good policy, institutions and governance of the recipient country and the removal 
of long-standing issues associated with donors such as conditionality, fragmentation, absence 
of co-ordination, tying aid, poor predictability and so on. The realisation of the donor 
community in the late 1990s of the need to change aid practice from donorship to partnership 
is also discussed. This review exercise investigates the emergence and evolvement of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, a shift from a narrow approach of the aid and growth relationship to aid 
management over time and examines its impact on enhancing aid effectiveness. The OECD-
DAC initiative of the aid effectiveness agenda formally emerged from the Rome Declaration 
but the 2005 Paris Declaration‟s five principles with indicators are the normative framework 
of the aid effectiveness agenda. To accommodate new donors alongside other development 
stakeholders such as CSOs, NGOs, the private sectors and increasing the modalities of 
finance, the aid effectiveness agenda has become a development effectiveness agenda. A new 
platform, namely the GPEDC was created in the Busan HLF to continue with the „unfinished 
business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda. This promotes partnership and financial 
requirements for the achievement of the 2030 SDG agenda. There is a growing body of 
opinion for prioritising the „unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda in GPEDC‟s 
activities because the execution of these principles are still relevant and even crucial for SDG 




Though some studies identify weaknesses in the aid effectiveness framework, a majority 
praise and acknowledge it as a revolutionary event in the history of development co-
operation. A major criticism of the aid effectiveness framework is that it is administrative and 
does not take political issues into consideration that it is non-binding in nature, loose and 
favourable language for donors is used. In addition, recipient incapacity, an emphasis on 
policy management rather than effectiveness and that it is aspirational. Implementation 
progress of the principles of aid effectiveness is slow and mixed over the principles and 
across countries. Donors are behind recipients in implementation and country experience in 
implementing aid effectiveness is also mixed. The main problems faced by countries are 
development organisation internal complexity to support recipient countries for the 
implementation of principles, donor lack of interest in co-ordination, less predictability, tied 
aid, less alignment of aid, recipient incapacity to formulate good policy strategies to uphold 
ownership and weak country systems.  
 
This literature review confirms the slow progress of the aid effectiveness agenda. However, it 
also notes a change in the mind-set of the aid community in creating awareness of aid 
practice and bringing change to aid management. Above all, it is an opportunity for recipients 
to establish their rights. It is suggested that positive results can be achieved if aid 
effectiveness principles are applied properly. The history of aid is more than sixty years old 
now but the aid effectiveness agenda has largely crystallised in the last fifteen years or so. 
There is optimism and commitment from both donors and recipients. In this context, the 
study investigates the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh from the 
perspectives of policy formulation and internal management of aid, focusing on government 
and donor joint efforts because the existing literature does not provide a clear picture. There 
is also little insight into the implementation status of the „unfinished business‟ of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. This study examines government initiatives to implement the aid 
effectiveness agenda from the viewpoint of public policy implementation theory to fill these 
knowledge gaps. The following chapter presents a theoretical framework for the study before 








The aid effectiveness agenda, especially the Paris Declaration (PD)‟s policy framework with 
indicators and time-bound commitments, was considered a panacea to make aid effective and it 
resolved a perennial debate over whether „aid works or not‟. However, surveys of the OECD-
DAC and GPEDC from 2005 to 2019, independent reviews and academic findings show slow 
and uneven implementation of the principles the aid agenda. Nevertheless, the aid effectiveness 
agenda is a good policy guideline and can produce good results if implemented well. The Paris 
Declaration‟s principles and framework have been considered an „unfinished business‟ of aid 
effectiveness in the Busan High-Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness. Nevertheless, six reasons 
have been identified from the literature review that contributed to the slow and uneven progress 
of the implementation of the aid effectiveness principles. The reasons are: 1) policy, 
institutions, governance and capacity of recipient countries, 2) weak leadership of recipient 
countries 3) lack of political commitment on the part of donors, 4) donor self-interest 5) internal 
bureaucracy or administration of donor aid agencies and 6) donor co-ordination.  
 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) is now the responsible 
organisation to drive forward the „unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
literature review suggested the GPEDC should continue its focus on „unfinished business‟ 
under the development effectiveness architecture. Nonetheless, most official reports and 
research use the PD framework and indicators to analyse the policy implementation process 
or progress of the aid effectiveness agenda. Academic papers apply different frameworks 
including the PD framework where a trend or most used framework is difficult to identify.  
 
The present study examines the GoB‟s policy decision to implement aid effectiveness and the 
impact of decisions and initiatives in aid and development administration. The study also 
evaluates the GoB‟s and its development partners collaborative initiatives to implement 
principles of the aid effectiveness agenda including the current status of implementation. In 
overall terms, this evaluates the Bangladesh government‟s policy formulation and 
implementation process related to the aid effectiveness agenda. It adopts the public policy 
implementation theory to outline a conceptual framework. Public policy implementation 
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theory is related to government policy formulation and implementation. This conceptual 
framework analyses three research questions related to the GoB‟s policy decisions to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda, GoB development partner collaborative efforts in 
implementing the agenda and the current implementation status under public policy 
implementation theory. In adopting this framework, the study examines whether the six 
issues identified above are the only reasons for slow and uneven progress of the aid 
effectiveness agenda or if there are other issues which contribute.  
 
 
3.2 Public Policy and Effective Implementation 
 
A policy is a rational sequence of „deciding there is a problem; deciding to do something 
about it; deciding the best way of proceeding; deciding to legislate‟ (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984; p.19). Policy pursues goals to be achieved through means and implementation is all 
about gaining results (Howlett, 2018). Moreover, „policies normally contain both goals and 
the means for achieving them‟ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; p.xxi).  
 
In the 1960s and 70s, academics noted governments were better at legislating policies than 
achieving outcomes (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984), what Dunsire (1978) calls an 
„implementation gap‟. At the same time, it was observed that many government socio-
economic and administrative projects failed to achieve outcomes. Therefore, academics were 
interested in investigating gaps in the implementation of projects. That exercise eventually 
emerged as public policy implementation (Parsons, 1995; John, 1998; Hill & Hupe, 2002). It 
evolved in the 1980s with the work of Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Winldavsky (1973), 
Erwin Hargrove (1975), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Bardach (1977), Gunn (1978) and 
Sabatier and Mazmannian (1979). These works are mostly focused on government policy 
implementation in socio-economic sectors (Parsons, 1995; Hill and Hupe, 2002). 
 
Policy implementation as an integrated approach assimilates policy formulation, 
implementation and evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Younis and Davidson, 
1990). Public policy has a link to politics. Explaining public policy‟s relationship with 
politics, John (1998; p.1-2 & p.27) states that „public policy seeks to explain the operation of 
the political system as a whole‟ that is related to cause and outcomes and it „translates 
intention to reality‟. Moreover, implementation pays more attention to government political 
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and legislative systems because they help introduce programmes through policy interventions 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979).  
 
Academics have endeavoured to resolve issues affecting policy implementation and also 
recommended steps to consider during implementation. Sometimes a good decision can be 
implemented badly (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Hood (1976; p.6) states that “a 
condition in which „external‟ elements of resource availability and political acceptability 
combine with „administration‟ to produce perfect policy implementation” (Hood, 1976; p.6). 
Sabatier and Mazmannian (1980) consider issues such as „factors affecting the tractability of 
the problem‟, „non-statutory variables affecting implementation‟ and the „ability of the statute 
to structure implementation‟ (Sabatier and Mazmannian, 1980, p.544). Ten pre-conditions for 
effective public policy implementation are proposed by Gunn (1978; p.170-174) and these 
are:  
1. That circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling 
constraints.  
2. That adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to programmes. 
3. At each stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources is 
actually available. 
4. That the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect. 
5. That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, if any, 
intervening links. 
6. That dependency relationships are minimal in number and importance. 
7. That there is a complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be 
achieved.  
8. Participant tasks should be specified without incomplete details and in sequence.  
9. That there is efficient communication among, and co-ordination of, the various 
elements or agencies involved in the programme.  
10. That those in authority can demand and obtain compliance. 
 
3.3 Policy Implementation Approaches: Top-down Versus Alternatives 
 
A number of policy implementation models or approaches can be found in the policy 
implementation literature. According to O‟Toole (2000; p.283), „the study of policy 
implementation is in many respects in a relatively mature stage of development. Weaknesses 
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are apparent issues remain‟. There is a propensity among existing policy implementation 
theories to evaluate policy implementation from the viewpoint of success or failure (Sabatier 
and Mazmanian, 1979; Parsons, 1995). The most common or popular model and approaches 
are: top-down, bottom-up or bureaucratic street-level behaviour models, policy action models, 
game theory approaches, principle-agent approaches or a combination of policy and process 
theory. However, top-down and bottom-up approaches have extensively been discusses in the 
existing literature.  In the top-down model, a policy is made at the top and executed through 
strong command and supervision (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Parsons, 1995). Conversely, 
bureaucratic street-level behaviour models or bottom-up models focus on front-line staff in 
policy delivery agencies. Proponents argue that public policy is formed through the ground 
level or through „street-level‟ interaction between bureaucrats and clients (Lipsky, 2010). The 
bottom-up approach emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as an opposite to the top-down 
approach that focuses more on the strategic functioning of the actors in achieving the objectives 
(Sabatier, 1986). However, study argues that both top-down and bottom-up approaches give 
importance to the implementation system and bottom-level variables are equally crucial as like 
as top-level (O‟Toole, 2000). Conversely, Ryan (1999; p.45) states that the top-down model 
stresses on „structural approach‟ and bottom-up model emphasises „a process-based 
approach‟.    
 
Policy action models suggest development and implementation of policy as an interactive 
process, evolving through negotiation (Barret and Fudge, 1981). On the other hand, the game 
theory approach developed by Scholz (1991) argues successful implementation is a pay-off of 
incentives between regulators and their clients. It was originated in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
game theory approach prioritises the understanding of administrative behaviour to eliminate 
issues to policy compliance. The game of policy implementation starts with a persuasive 
approach of the policymakers or regulators. If persuasion fails, in the next stage, regulators 
move to coercive rules which enhances result with high compliance cost. Finally, a balance of 
monitoring and coercion maintain compliance (Howlett, 2018). The principal-agent theory 
develops a relationship between bureaucrats and politicians where policymakers introduce a 
policy and bureaucrats decide how and where policy would be applied (Calvert et al., 1989; 
Francis, 1993). Politicians are principal and bureaucrats or administrators are the agent in the 
principal-agent theory. It is believed that bureaucrats become expert in a particular area of 
administration than politicians due to their contentious long-term engagement in the 
respective fields (Howlett, 2018). There are academic works which fit policy process theory 
98 
 
to policy implementation, which include the entire process starting from agenda-setting 
(Howlett, 2018).  
 
The framework of aid effectiveness agenda is a top-down, up-stream, policy-level approach 
that requires a high level of political commitment and it is technical as well as bureaucratic 
(Kharas, 2007; OECD, 2008a; Wood et al., 2008; Owa, 2011; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). 
Although the aid effectiveness agenda categorically specifies a good number of donor actions 
to change aid practices, it promotes recipient leadership and recipient country level activities to 
implement a policy framework. As a result, recipient government policy interventions to 
implement the framework of the aid effectiveness agenda are crucial. Policy intervention is 
essential for the top of the government because the agenda requires high-level government 
involvement to implement its framework, as many of its requirements have legal implications. 
For example, including enactment and amendment of laws and policies, reforms, restructuring 
and introducing departments and organisations, agencies and bodies. Simultaneously, these 
requirements perhaps need top-level government engagement and commitment to apply the 
framework of the agenda effectively. Therefore, this study applies a top-down policy 
implementation model to develop a conceptual framework that helps to analyse Bangladesh 
government policy interventions in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
 
3.4 Top-down Implementation Model  
 
The top-down approach follows a chain of command from policy formulation to 
implementation as a top-level command and supervision are considered crucial for the 
success of policy implementation. In the top-down approach, implementation starts from 
policy formulation and gradually goes down to the bottom of the agency or organisation. It is 
a forward mapping approach where variables that affect implementation, such as 
organisational, political and technological are controlled by policymakers (Elmore, 1979). It 
is an approach in which individuals are required to do what they are assigned to do. Control 
over stages of the system, managing conflict and deviation from goals are set at the beginning 
of the initiative under a well-developed programme (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
Furthermore, it is an approach where policymakers are important and the role of others 
involved in decision making is not significant (Barrett and Fudges, 1981). „Implementation, 
then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain connecting actions to 




Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, 1984) are considered as the authority of the top-up 
implementation model but Derthick (1972), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Bardach 
(1977), Gunn (1978), Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Sabatier and Mazmannian (1989) have 
also contributed significantly.  
 
A number of factors are important in the top-down policy implementation model and a 
rationale can be drawn in the present study as well. In the top-down model, implementation 
needs to be an undertaking that combines the setting of goals and planned actions to 
materialise goals. This means „a process of interaction between the setting of goals and 
actions geared to achieving them‟ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, p.xv). As the PD is a new 
framework of aid management, top-level goal setting and action plans are required. In the 
implementation process of a top-down model, „simple sequences of events depend on 
complex chains of reciprocal interaction‟ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984: xxv) and the 
sequence of policy design, implementation and evaluation should rotate as a cycle where one 
will impact another. Therefore, the order will change as policy, design, implementation, 
evaluation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue 
interactions are required between policy formulation and implementation processes to 
achieve effectiveness (Hill and Hupe, 2002). This cycle is probably needed to ensure PD 
implementation is effective. According to Parsons (1995; p.464) „implementation requires a 
top-down system of control, communication, resources to do the job and decision makers 
should not promise what they cannot deliver‟. 
 
Aid recipient countries have limitations of resources and thus a careful design of policy 
implementation is required which ensures a balance between strong control and 
communication, resources and deliverables. Parsons (1995; p.465) also supports a „good 
chain of command‟ and a „capacity to co-ordinate and control‟ for successful 
implementation. Arguably, this is one of the challenging factors for recipient countries to 
implement the aid effectiveness framework because of weak capacity. However, recipients 
have to include capacity enhancement programmes in their implementation packages as 
recommended by the declarations of the aid effectiveness agenda. In the top-down model, if 
policy implementation depends on the number of links, organisations involved in the 
implementation process have to address those links almost completely, otherwise it will 
create an „implementation deficit‟ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). In this approach, 
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implementation design is the most crucial issue along with efficient monitoring and control 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1983). Good co-operation between different actors in the 
government, such as agencies and organisations is required for successful implementation 
and even a trivial mishap can result in a massive failure of policy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 
1973). In fact, to implement a complex framework such as the aid effectiveness agenda, co-
operation and interaction between different actors involved in policymaking must exist.  
 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) placed emphasis on some issues to make the top-down 
approach successful; policy standards and focused objectives, necessary resources and 
incentives, inter-organisational relationship quality, understanding of the characteristics of 
implementation agencies, socio-economic and political environment and implementer 
understanding of policy, response to policy and intensity of response is crucial (Van Meter 
and Van Horn, 1975; p.472). Bardach (1977) stresses the complete follow-through of the 
political process for effective implementation of top-down models.  
 
Shortcomings in implementing top-down models include government focus on the enactment 
of laws or policy rather than implementation, creating implementation gaps (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984; Dunsire, 1978). One of the main criticisms of the top-down model is that it 
ignores the roles of different actors as well as different levels which play a vital role in the 
implementation process (Parsons, 1995). Therefore, in practice the top-down model is 
sometimes ineffective (Lipsky, 1980). The risk is that good policy can be implemented badly. 
In this model more focus is given to goals and therefore, people involved in different 
implementation levels and their roles are overlooked (Parsons, 1995). However, lower-level 
agencies and bureaucrats have a role in policymaking (John, 1998) ignored in top-down 
models. Policy formulation and implementation are considered a package without distinction 
between the two (Mabbett, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, without high-level political commitment and top-level involvement, a complex 
framework of aid effectiveness is difficult to execute. Hence, the following conceptual 
framework, developed in Figure 3.1 on the basis of top-down policy implementation to 



































This conceptual framework exhibits that the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the 
Ministry of Finance co-ordinates with Line Ministries (LM), Planning Commission (PC) and 
development partners to implement international commitments in country level. ERD is the 
designated wing of the government to deal with foreign aid-related issues. In line with the 
international top-down approach of the aid effectiveness agenda, the ERD applies a top-down 
policy approach to formulate policy, undertake reform and outline rules and regulations to 
implement the aid effectiveness framework. In the implementation stage i.e. in the 
project/programme planning and execution phase, the ERD, LM, PC and DP are heavily 
involved and are expected to uphold and oversee implementation of the aid effectiveness 
framework. However, the left side of the conceptual framework denotes that international 
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top-down approach of the aid effectiveness agenda is replicated nationally and monitoring 
and evaluation are also conducted with a top-down approach. National level evaluation is 









As a leading aid recipient country, Bangladesh has shown a high level of commitment in 
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. Creation of institutions, reform of the system, 
introduction of co-ordination mechanisms with development partners and a proactive 
presence in international forums, underline the country‟s adoption of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. However, international surveys, reports and academic research suggest Bangladesh 
fails to achieve most aid effectiveness targets set out in international declarations and 
monitoring frameworks. Therefore, this study aims to detail the Bangladesh government and 
its development partner initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and to identify 
gaps in the implementation process.   
 
Many studies on foreign aid adopt quantitative methods to examine aid and growth 
relationships or aid and other economic indicator relationships using statistical packages. For 
example, studies undertaken amongst others by Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
Easterly (2005), Karras (2006), Ouattara (2009), Minoiu and Reddy (2010), Nowak-
Lehmann et al. (2012), Alvi and Senbeta (2012), Nourou (2014), Arndt et al. (2015), 
Mohapatra et al. (2016) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017). However, there are research 
projects which examine foreign aid management processes, the emergence of new aid 
architectures, the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda or even issues such as 
donor-recipient relationships and aid policy implementation, from a qualitative perspective. 
For instance, studies conducted by Hyden (2008), Hayman (2009), Killen (2011), King 
(2011), Booth (2012), Cameron and Low (2012), Kim and Lee (2013), Gulrajani (2014), 
Vollmer (2014), Mawdsley et al. (2014), Schaaf (2015), Karini (2016), Sjöstedt and 
Sundström (2017) and Husain (2017).  
 
An examination of the implementation of aid effectiveness principles and donor-recipient 
collective efforts requires human experience and an interaction between researcher and subject. 
For example, government aid management policy and system, development partner co-
ordination mechanisms, government planning processes or budget and resource plans are 
difficult to understand or explain without human experience and a visible researcher presence 
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in the investigation process is necessary. Furthermore, this study adopts the Paris Declaration‟s 
definition of aid effectiveness together with its normative framework - ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results, with an emphasis on 
improvement of management, delivery, complementarity of development co-operation and 
development impact. Therefore, the nature of the research questions, definitions of aid 
effectiveness and the conceptual framework developed pursue a research method that explains 
these phenomena in detail, facilitates human interaction and further understanding of 
institutional settings, enables the identification of gaps and draws findings. Therefore, this 
research project adopts a qualitative research methodology as a mode of inquiry.  
 
4.2 Qualitative Research  
 
The research methods literature defines qualitative research in different ways. Definitions 
speak about the examination of social phenomena, social reality, natural states, personal 
experience, researcher involvement, individual interpretation, data collection techniques and 
descriptive report writing. It is still evolving.  A popular definition outlined by Van Maanen 
(1979) describes qualitative research as an interpretive technique which deals with meaning 
and not the frequency of naturally appearing phenomena in the social world. Van Maanen 
(1979; p.520) states:   
 
[……..] an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to 
describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world.
  
Qualitative research generally focuses on words rather than numbers and individual 
interpretations of the social world, where social reality changes constantly. This research 
method adopts an inductive approach for theory generation or contribution to existing theories 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). A researcher interested in examining phenomena from the 
perspective of how people give meaning, might prefer qualitative methods (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011).  
 
Considering qualitative research a complex thing to define rather than understand, Merriam 
(2009; 2014) articulates four characteristics of qualitative research. Firstly, qualitative 
research emphasises meaning and understanding of a person‟s experience. It tries to 
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understand the process of interpretation of experiences and the meaning they attribute to their 
experiences. The vital issue here is that the researcher would not understand the phenomena 
of importance from a personal perspective, rather it would be from the perspective of the 
participant. Secondly, a researcher should remain the primary instrument in the entire 
research process regardless of data collection or data analysis. Because understanding is the 
main focus of the research, this engagement provides the researcher with an opportunity to 
react and adapt accordingly. Furthermore, the researcher has an opportunity to expand the 
horizon of understanding through verbal and non-verbal communication and can cross-check 
personal understanding with respondents and avoid unfamiliar responses. Although a 
researcher‟s shortcomings and bias may impact research, there exist ways and means to 
address shortcomings and bias. Thirdly, qualitative research is an inductive process. 
Qualitative researchers embark on research work with an intention to construct theory as 
there is a non-existence of theory to explain phenomena or existing theories are unable to 
explain phenomena. A researcher collects information through interviews, observations or 
documents and develops themes or categories to explain events from the specific to the 
general. Finally, qualitative research is descriptive in nature. Words and pictures both speak 
about the learning of a researcher from the phenomena.  
 
4.2.1 When to Conduct Qualitative Research  
 
Some research methods studies identify reasons or situations when researchers choose 
qualitative research. A researcher might prefer qualitative research methods when s/he wishes 
to study the experiences of respondents, form or transform meanings or investigate an area of 
study which is not extensively researched to date and at the same time study a phenomena 
comprehensively so that afterwards it can be tested using qualitative research methods 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Hennink et al., (2011; p.10) outline a list of situations when a 
researcher might conduct qualitative research:  
 
-  “understand behaviour, beliefs, opinions and emotions from the perspective of study 
participants themselves (this is called Verstehen); 
- understand and explain people‟s views and behaviour, 
- understand processes, how people make decisions, or negotiate a job, or manage a 
business; 
- uncover the meaning that people give to their experiences; 
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- understand social interactions among people and the norms and values shared by them; 
- identify the social, cultural, economic or physical context in which activities take place; 
- give voice to the issue of a certain study population;  
- provide depth, detail, nuance and context to the research issue; 
- examine in detail sensitive issues such as sexuality, violence, personal relationships; 
-  study complex issues such as human trafficking or drug use, which may be too 
complex or hidden to be easily disentangled by qualitative research.”  
 
An inspection of the definitions, characteristics and reasons to choose the qualitative research 
presented above supports the approach in the current research project to adopt a qualitative 
research method. The phenomena, for example, policy making and implementation in relation 
to foreign aid, internal management of aid, development partners and government 
relationships, planning processes and financial management of the government and 
comprehensive foreign aid policy dilemmas cannot be understood without having people‟s 
understanding and experience about these phenomena taken into account. At the same time, a 
researcher‟s constant interaction with respondents is important to understand the meanings of 
phenomena and respondent‟s experiences about these. Thus, the researcher needs to be 
involved in the research process all the time.  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda is not yet fully explored by the academic underpinnings for all 
dimensions or from many country perspectives. Therefore, an inductive, abductive or 
deductive approach is required to construct new theories to minimise knowledge gaps in the 
area. Moreover, a holistic and comprehensive approach is required to learn about the aid 
policy regime and aid management system of a country which is only possible through a 
qualitative channel. Simultaneously, a descriptive approach is probably the best choice to 
present the findings of this research project because of the nature of investigating phenomena. 
Hence, the above arguments relate to this study adopting a qualitative research method.  
 
4.3 Research Philosophy  
 
Academic research should have a philosophical standing (Proctor, 2005). The research 
philosophy is a system of belief and an assumption which helps to develop knowledge. 
Assumptions include reality (ontology), human knowledge (epistemology) and values that 
influence the research process (axiology) (Saunders et al., 2016). Researcher‟s assumptions can 
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result in the selection of an appropriate research philosophy which facilitates a suitable 
methodology, research strategy, data collection and analysis techniques (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Research philosophy guides a researcher to select appropriate research designs, the kind of data 
to gather, the source and how data can be interpreted to answer research questions (Proctor, 
2005). This study requires a research philosophy that facilitates the examination complex 
phenomena. For instance, the aid effectiveness agenda, aid policy regimes and the aid 
management system of Bangladesh. After a careful examination of research philosophies, this 
study adopts critical realism and presents a justification in the following section.  
  
4.3.1 Critical Realism 
 
Critical realism as a philosophical framework has become popular among social science 
researchers in recent decades. It is a relatively new philosophical standing, having evolved in 
the 1970s and 1980s through the work of British philosopher Roy Bhaskar and critical realists 
Sayer (1992), Archer (1995), Collier (1994) and Lawson (1997) further contributed to 
development (Fletcher, 2017). Due to fundamental ontological and epistemological positions, 
critical realism differs from other philosophical paradigms (Xiaoti, 2018). It takes a middle 
ground between positive, direct realism and post-modernist nominalism (Reed, 2005). 
Critical realism considers „reality‟ as the main philosophical consideration and applies 
structured and layered ontology (Fleetwood, 2005) and embraced epistemological relativism 
(Reed, 2005). Critical realism philosophy believes that human observation and experience are 
needed to explain events, with reference to the underlying structure of reality, which forms 
observable events. To the critical realist, reality is external and independent which our 
observations and knowledge cannot access directly. In fact, our experience of something is 
„empirical‟ or a „sensation‟ demonstration of things in the real world, not actual things 
(Saunders et al., 2016).  
 
Critical realism ontology (reality) is stratified in three domains - empirical, actual and real. 
The empirical domain comprises our direct and indirect experiences. In the actual domain, 
events happen even if we experience them or not and which may be observed. The real 
domain produces events in the world (which appears in the empirical level) which can be 
called mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978). Fletcher (2017; p.183) states critical realism explains 
social events, referring to causal mechanisms and their effects in a three-layered „iceberg‟ of 
reality, which is shown below.  
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Figure 4.1 Three-layered ‘iceberg’ of reality 
 
According to Sayer (2000; p.32), critical realism is „mainly concerned with ontology‟ and it 
has a „relatively open or permissive stance towards epistemology‟. On the other hand, 
Danermark et al. (2002) state critical realism provides a shift from epistemology to ontology 
and from events to mechanisms with regard to ontological positioning. Bhaskar (1978; p.13) 
believes that main question of science is: „what properties do society and people possess that 
might make them possible objects for knowledge?‟ The philosophy of reality should begin 
with this question, not the epistemological “how is knowledge possible” question, which 
received importance in the past. The reason for the epistemological departure of critical 
realism is that the world is structured, differentiated, stratified and changing continuously. 
The shift from event to mechanism is also important as it looks for what produces events, not 
just the event itself (Danermark et. al., 2002).  
 
However, Reed (2005) believes that as critical realists are interested in the historical analysis 
of structures, they actually embrace epistemological relativism which is somewhat a 
subjective approach to knowledge. Al-Amoudi and Willmott (2011) speak about the 
epistemological relativism of critical realism and they explain that knowledge and culture 
should be studied historically. Easton (2010) says that critical realism‟s epistemology is 
critical realist/ interpretivist epistemology. He argues that as critical realists accept that the 
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world is constructed socially and in order to explain the meaning of social phenomena there 
is always an interpretive approach in social sciences. The axiological position of critical 
realism admits that our knowledge of reality is a set of outcomes of social conditions which 
cannot be realised independently of the social actors involved (Saunders et al., 2016).  
 
Bhaskar (1989) also emphasises the understanding of social structure for which phenomena are 
created so that we can try to understand as social researchers. Similarly, he says that until we 
understand structure, we will not be able to identify what is going on in the world. Bhaskar 
(1989) believes that researchers can identify mechanisms that are not seen through the practical 
and theoretical route of social science. Hence, critical realism researchers search for the 
underlying causes and mechanisms through which deep social structures shape everyday 
organisational life to explain observable organisational events. Therefore, most critical realist 
research examines a comprehensive historical analysis of social and organisational structure 
and changing patterns (Reed, 2005). Critical realism accepts that our knowledge of reality is the 
outcome of social conditions which cannot be realised independently of social actors 
involvement. Therefore, critical realism researchers need to be embedded with the research 
process and at the same time, need to avoid the influence of socio-cultural background and 
experience in the research as much as possible (Saunders et al., 2016). 
 
4.3.1.1 Why choose critical realism philosophy  
 
Critical realists argue that as the world is stratified into three different domains of reality, 
understanding of a directly observable pattern of behaviour (the empirical domain) through 
experimenting linear causal relationships among variables (the actual domain) may not suffice 
our purpose if we would like to see that the pattern of behaviour is produced by the causal 
mechanisms which are not visible at the level of appearances and can only be explored in open 
systems (the real domain) (Bhaskar (1978). The qualitative approach examines the causal 
mechanisms of the social world in an open context where they interact with one another 
frequently and unpredictably (Roberts, 2014). This study intends to examine the causal 
mechanisms of a complex issue such as aid effectiveness in the context of Bangladesh. The 
project aims to see it through the lens of the qualitative research paradigm- a subjective approach.  
 
The position of Bhaskar (1989) towards structural understanding is important for this study 
which deals with foreign aid policy in Bangladesh in the post-Paris era. Critical realists stress 
an understanding of the underlying causes and mechanisms of events. In an investigation of 
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phenomena such as foreign aid, it is vital to understand underlying causes and mechanisms 
which influence its management and policy formulation. 
 
Sayer‟s (1992), approach to critical evaluation of social phenomena is also relevant for this 
study. The aid effectiveness agenda is a social phenomenon and when examined from a 
country perspective, critical evaluation becomes relevant because foreign aid is distinctly 
different in each recipient country. It is important to study for instance, the aid effectiveness 
agenda from a broader perspective because it involves different stakeholders, institutions, 
policies and complex implementation processes. Therefore, critical realism is an appropriate 
guiding principle for this study. In the spirit of Saunders et, al. (2016), if a researcher feels 
that what s/he is seeing is a small part of a bigger picture, s/he is probably moving towards 
critical realism philosophy.  
 
One of the strengths of critical realism is its ability to analyse social problems and make 
practical policy recommendations as it can engage in explanation and causal analysis rather 
than focus exclusively on empirical explanations of a given problem (Fletcher, 2017). In this 
study, a strong emphasis is placed upon understanding gaps in foreign aid policy decision-
making in Bangladesh and in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. It is therefore 
argued that critical realism helps to underpin these research objectives.  
 
According to Danermark et al. (2002; p.20) if „something is going on below the surface‟ it is 
not a matter of interest for critical realists, rather „there must be something else behind this‟ is 
the foundation of critical realism. As this study intends to identify gaps in the foreign aid 
policy regime of Bangladesh, it proposes to take an approach similar to „there must be 
something else behind this‟ so that rational findings can be drawn.  
 
4.4 Research Approach  
 
A key research question is often whether data should be tested or used to develop a theory 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). Three approaches are common here, deductive, inductive and 
abductive. Studies beginning with a theory developed from existing literature and tested can 
be described as deductive whilst collecting data to understand phenomena and building a 
theory can be considered an inductive approach (Saunders et al., 2016). Abductive approach 
adopts logical inferences to develop theory from phenomena. Mantere and Ketokivi (2013; 
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p.72) distinguish these three approaches as, „we predict, confirm and disconfirm through 
deduction, generalise through induction and theorise through abduction‟.  
 
This study adopts an abductive approach to develop a theory, something increasingly 
common in qualitative research studies (Lipscomb, 2012; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). It 
is also suitable for research which adopts a critical realism philosophy (Schillr, 2016; 
Danemark et al.,2002) or a case study strategy (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Easton, 2010). 
Therefore, the choice of an abductive approach is considered appropriate here, given its 
grounding in critical realism and the case study strategy (discussed in Section-4.5).   
  
4.4.1 Abductive Approach 
 
The abductive approach is associated with the work of the famous American philosopher, 
Charles Saunders Peirce and is considered an inference-based approach in seeking the best 
explanations (Walton, 2004). This „explanation‟ includes both causal and non-causal factors 
(Williamson, 2016). The abductive approach explains the underlying mechanism of 
phenomena using inferences, adopts primary assessment and seeks to understand the nature 
of that mechanism (Ward and Haig, 1997). Danemark et al. (2002) and Schiller (2016) 
mention the suitability of an abductive approach for works which adopt a critical realism 
stance. It constructs an initial judgement, observing the interplay between current theories 
and data when anomalies are identified (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). An abductive 
reasoning process starts with a puzzle or unexpected fact which can arise during any stage of 
the research process. Therefore, it tries to clarify puzzling phenomena (Mantere and Ketokivi, 
2013). This approach acknowledges the importance of cognitive reasoning in theory 
construction, where an understanding is defined as an on-going discussion about data and 
prior understandings of researchers (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Timmermans and Tavory 
(2012; p.180) provide a comprehensive definition of abductive reasoning, identifying it as a 
qualitative data analysis approach that generates creative and novel theoretical insights and 
recommends a research process consisting of a robust theoretical understanding to help solve 
questions which arise in the research process. Dubois and Gadde (2002) outline a number of 
steps in the abductive research process in relation to single case study research, which they 
define as „systematic combining‟. This is where a theoretical framework, an empirical 
fieldwork and case analysis evolve together, leading eventually to the development of a new 
theory. In a systematic combining process, the case is considered a „tool‟ with data added 
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gradually to complete a „jigsaw puzzle‟. This study follows the approach of Dubois and 
Gadda (2002; p.555) to develop a theory and can be described as follows. 
  
In the first step, a preliminary analytical framework is formulated on the basis of 
„preconceptions‟ evolved through empirical fieldwork, analysis and interpretations. In the 
second, an empirical observation process, during which unexpected issues may arise requiring 
further data collection. In the third, discrepancies between empirical observation and theoretical 
frameworks lead to the introduction of new theories. Therefore, the matching process goes back 
and forth between framework, data source and analysis. In the fourth, data are collected in line 
with the pre-designed framework and data collection may require further effort to develop a 
theory, which may lead to a change in direction of the research. In the fifth, observed 
phenomena lead to the proposal of a new theory in light of the theoretical framework.  
 
Figure 4.2 Abductive research framework of Dubois and Gadde (2002; p.555)  
 
4.5 Research Strategy: Case Study  
 
The research questions presented in this study require a detailed examination of Bangladesh‟s 
aid management policymaking and processes of implementation. Therefore, „how‟ and „why‟ 
questions are important to help understand phenomena. These „how‟ or „why‟ questions 
imply little or no control over events to be observed and an appreciation of current 
phenomena in a real-life context. Therefore, a case study strategy is employed (Yin, 2014), 
which suits both critical realism (Schillr, 2016; Danemark et al., 2002) and abductive analysis 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Easton, 2010). This allows for investigation of internal firm or 
policy mechanisms by examining phenomena in great depth and also back and forth between 
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theoretical knowledge and empirical observation. According to Eisenhardt (1989), a case 
study strategy requires an on-going overlap between data analysis and data collection in order 
to help develop a theory.  
 
Punch (2005) identified three types of case study. Firstly, intrinsic case studies are conducted 
for a better understanding of a particular case. Secondly, instrumental case studies investigate 
a particular case to „give insight into an issue, or to refine a theory‟. Thirdly, collective case 
studies cover several cases to learn about phenomena, population or general condition. 
Accordingly, the first two deal with the single case and the third with multiple cases. This 
study therefore falls under the second category and is considered an instrumental case study 
in which the single case is „Bangladesh‟, the study seeks to investigate foreign aid policy 
decision making and implementation in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda and it 
seeks to develop a new theory. Instrumental case studies favour in-depth investigations (Berg, 
2009) whilst according to Saunders et al. (2016), a single case is chosen when it is critical 
and unique. This single case of Bangladesh fulfils both criteria in that uniquely, it is one of 
the leading aid recipient countries in the world and critically, it deals with complex 
phenomena such as foreign aid and specific elements of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
Until recently, few researchers have explored Bangladesh as a case study with regard to the 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, aid policy regimes or aid management 
systems. Identification of actual causes is one of the focuses of this case study. Yin (2014) 
notes five criteria for choosing a single case study, namely critical, unusual, common, 
revelatory or longitudinal. The present case study adopts the critical criteria, in other words 
studies which make a significant contribution to existing knowledge. It is intended that the 
current study will  make a noteworthy contribution to understanding of foreign aid and in 
particular, to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
This study seeks to investigate the foreign aid management process in terms of the „how‟ 
question for causal issues, development partners, government relationships and planning 
processes. At the same time, the „why‟ question seeks to explain Bangladesh‟s performance 
in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. Moreover, a case study strategy facilitates a 
study of the aid management process of Bangladesh in real world settings and provides an 
opportunity to observe underlying mechanisms that impact aid management processes. For 
example, the implementation process of the aid effectiveness agenda. Real world events, for 
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example, responsibilities of government ministries and agencies involved in the aid 
management process, their communication and implementation protocols, government 
communication mechanisms with development partners and policy introduction processes 
can effectively be examined through the eyes of case study strategies.  
 
Issues such as government attitudes, development partner perceptions and concerns in 
relation to implementing the aid effectiveness agenda can also be realised through a case 
study strategy. This might also be argued to be appropriate because of results generated can 
potentially deliver great impact in developing original and innovative insight and theories 
generated through a process of case study research gain great legitimacy to users (Yin, 2014). 
As case study research allows for a number of questionnaires or models, validation of 
research can be better ensured through triangulation using various data collection methods. 
As a result, case study research findings or developed theories should be widely accepted 
(Swanborn, 2010; Silverman, 2010).  
 
This study uses four different sets of questionnaires for government officials in Bangladesh, 
development partners of Bangladesh, academics and professionals, officials of the Economic 
Relations Division (ERD) and the Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh. Semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis methods are also used to collect data in order to gain as 
much information as possible from the case (Stake, 1995). Karlsson (2002) identifies some 
issues as weaknesses of case study research, such as time constraints, the need for competent 
and experienced interviewers, difficulties in drawing generalised decisions from a lower 
number of cases and ensuring rigor of the research undertaking.   
 
The case study design approach of Yin (2014) is followed in this study, which proposes to  
develop a theory. As such, the following steps are followed. Research questions are 
developed after a review of the available literature which consider the „how‟ and „why‟ of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. A proposition of this study which forms a broader perspective is 
that of „foreign aid‟ in relation to policy and aid management, the role of development 
partners and government relationships, planning processes and implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. A further aspect of this study includes two ministries; the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Planning together with their development partners. It is 




A thematic analysis technique is chosen to link data to propositions. Data are collected 
through interviews and document analyses. Four semi-structured questionnaires were used to 
collect data from four different groups of respondents: government officials, development 
partners of Bangladesh, academics and professionals and officers of the Economic Relations 
Division (ERD). According to Yin (2018), control of a „plausible rival‟ is a challenge in case 
study research. In general, observable outcomes are the result of the planned activity of 
research. „Plausible rival‟ refers to those outcomes which are the result of other influences, 
not the outcomes of planned activities of research. The abductive approach helps to mitigate a 
„plausible rival‟ by applying „theory matching‟ and „direction and redirection‟ (discussed in 
details in Section: 4.4.1) strategy. In addition, this case study identifies several flaws in 
Bangladesh‟s aid policymaking and management processes, issues in relationships between 
government and development partners and seeks to distinguish between the rhetoric and a 
reality of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
4.6 Sampling  
 
Although a qualitative sampling category can be described in many different ways, three 
general categories can be identified: convenience, purposeful and theoretical (Koerber and 
McMichael, 2008). This study applies a purposeful sampling technique, intentionally selected 
because of the need for the current research (Coyne, 1997) and popular in qualitative research 
(Creswell and Poth, 2018). Here, it is the maximum variation sampling approach of Bryman 
and Bell (2015). Purposive sampling is a form of sampling where a researcher applies 
judgement to select respondents who might offer the best perspectives on the phenomena of 
research interest (Abrams, 2010). In other words a researcher purposefully selects 
respondents who understand the research problem and central phenomena of the research 
project and can also provide the best possible information (Creswell and Poth, 2018). It is a 
kind of screening process where the researcher searches for participants who have a certain 
trait and quality (Koerber and McMichael, 2008).  
 
Foreign aid or more specifically the aid effectiveness agenda, is an area of study which 
requires a particular kind of respondent to explain the phenomena itself and the issues 
associated with it. It is to be someone with either practical or academic knowledge of this 
specialized field of research. Moreover, the research questions, aims and objectives of this 
study are outlined in a way that respondents are to be either related to the aid management 
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process of the government or work in an organisation which is a development partner of 
Bangladesh. Alternatively, it may be a consultant in aid projects, academics or professionals 
with knowledge about aid policy and management of the Bangladesh government or foreign 
aid-related events in international forums. Therefore, purposive sampling is considered an 
appropriate sampling technique for this study.  
  
Miles and Huberman (1994) identified several criteria for effective and acceptable sampling 
to include relevance to the conceptual framework and research question, generate rich 
information about the type of phenomena studied, generalisability of findings through 
sampling, believable descriptions, explanations that represent real world contexts, feasibility 
in terms of time, money, and access to people and finally ethical in nature and undertaking. 
The sampling approach in this study tries to ensure these criteria are fully met. The 
conceptual framework and research questions of the study focus on the input of Bangladeshi 
government officials and development partners. This is addressed in the sampling process. 
Furthermore, experts, academics, consultants and professionals are interviewed to ensure 
relevant and robust information is received. The sampling strategy is considered feasible and 
it ensures ethical issues such as consent of respondents is accounted for.  
 
Sample size in qualitative or case study research is a matter of debate. Academics consider 
the matter from two different perspectives. Some recommend a particular number, referring 
to different research strategies and some talk about rationale or justification. According to 
Warren (2002), a qualitative study requires 20 to 30 interviews. On the other hand, Koerber 
and McMichael (2008) think if a researcher can justify the sample s/he chooses and provides 
data or information that fulfils the purpose of the study, then the sample size is acceptable. 
The orientation of the researcher and the purpose of the research are crucial in determining 
the sample size (Bryman, 2016). Research should explain the rationale behind the 
determination of sample size and logically demonstrate how that size can meet the intended 
research outcomes (Bryman and Bell, 2015).  
 
This study applies a „maximum variation sampling approach‟ of purposive sampling to 
confirm the maximum variation possible in relation to the inclusion of respondents. 
Therefore, it selects respondents from ministries, agencies and organisations of government 
who represent different layers including Ministers and Secretaries, staff at different levels of 
ten development partners of Bangladesh, both bilateral as well as multilateral and also civil 
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society activists, economists, development experts, public policy experts, social 
accountability experts, financial analysts and non-government organisation representatives. 
The sample size of this study is sixty six and divided into three major groups: government 
officials, development partner staffs and professionals.  
 
4.7 Questionnaire  
 
A questionnaire is a document, which contains a series of open or close-ended questions that 
expects to receive an answer from respondents. Questionnaires are used to understand 
opinions, attitudes, experiences, memories, observations, behaviour, facts, judgment and so 
on (Rowley, 2014; Rivano Eckerdal and Hagström, 2017). It is very important to ensure the 
questionnaire is able to collect relevant data so that the required answers to research questions 
and research objectives are achieved eventually (Saunders et al., 2016). 
 
Qualitative research, especially when it adopts semi-structured interviews to collect data (this 
study selects semi-structured interviews as a method to collect data and discussion is 
provided in Section-4.8.1) uses an informal type of questionnaire with an aim to allow 
interviewees to set the pace of the interview. A clearly written, open-ended questionnaire is 
used to conduct semi-structured interviews but a provision exists to prompt and explore 
issues further (Saunders et al., 2016).  
 
Four different sets of questionnaires are used for the interviews in this study, one for 
Bangladesh Government officials, one for development partner staff, one for professionals and 
another for officials of the Economic Relations Divisions (ERD), the designated organisation of 
the Government to perform and co-ordinate all foreign aid-related activities. There is some 
similarity among the four questionnaires but each one is distinct and carefully drafted to 
generate appropriate data. There are fifteen questions in each questionnaire and with the 
exception of the ERD questionnaire, three other questionnaires have associated questions with 
each question. The questionnaires are in English, but the interviews of development partners 
and some Government officials and professionals were conducted in Bangla to provide comfort 
to Bangla speaking interviewees to express their thoughts as clearly as possible. However, as 
this study adopts semi-structured interviews, questionnaires are not followed strictly. Rather, 
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the researcher intends to have an in-depth understanding of phenomena from respondents in 
line with case study preferences (Saunders et al., 2016; Silverman, 2013).  
 
4.8 Data Collection 
 
A key phase of any research project is data collection and it is indeed important to select 
appropriate data collection techniques to achieve research aims and objectives (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). Selection of data collection methods depends on the type of information 
required, from whom it is required and in what situations. Research problems and strategies 
generally guide the selection process and consideration of practicality is very important 
because a researcher may choose a method that is not suitable for time or cost reasons 
(Robson and McCartan, 2016). The most commonly used sources of evidence in case study 
research are interviews, documentation, archival records, direct observations, participant-
observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 2014). One of the main characteristics of good case 
study research is the use of multiple data collection techniques or sources because no single 
source has competitive advantages over others and multiple sources provide the opportunity 
to the researcher to inspect issues broadly (Yin, 2014). Case study research is expected to 
offer in-depth investigation and in doing so, one source of data may not suffice the purpose 
(Creswell and Poth, 2018). Therefore, this study chooses interviews and documentation as 
sources of data because the study requires both human experience and evidence from existing 
materials to address research questions.  
 
4.8.1 Interview  
 
The interview is a procedure which helps researchers to understand the world from the 
subjects point of view and the procedure helps to develop a meaning associated with subject 
experiences. In the interview process, knowledge is constructed through interaction between 
the researcher and the interviewee and it is an interchange between researcher and 
interviewee about a theme of common interest (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). During a 
qualitative interview, the researcher anticipates open-ended answers to a number of 
questions, topics or themes (O‟Leary, 2010). Yin (2014) notes three important requirements 
for an interview, namely that they follow a line of inquiry to address case study protocols, 
that questions are asked in an unbiased way to fulfil the requirements of lines of enquiry and 




As a method of data collection, the interview is very popular amongst both qualitative and 
quantitative researchers. In qualitative research such as the case study method, some prefer 
the method as it is flexible and aids understanding of much broader issues. More so when a 
different level of meaning is required (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Interviews ensure direct 
focus on the case study topic and provide explanations as well as personal interpretations, 
which include perceptions, attitudes and meanings (Yin, 2014). Consequently, the type of 
data this study aims to generate, might best be collected using the interview method. To 
understand the Bangladesh government‟s planning processes, foreign aid management 
systems, policy decisions on implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and the relationship 
between the government and development partners, interviews of relevant persons are 
essential for obtaining insight into opinions, experiences, attributes, choices and observations. 
In fact, without a significant exchange of views with suitable respondents such as persons 
involved in aid management, the objectives of this study cannot be achieved.   
 
This study relies upon the semi-structured interview method to collect data by outlining key 
questions or themes to cover the research questions but which are not specific and may vary 
from one interview to another. The researcher may overlook some questions at the time of 
interview of some interviewees who represent specific organisations, or new questions may 
be asked in the context of the interview (Saunders et al., 2016). Given an interest in foreign 
aid management and policy-related questions, the data this study requires can be generated 
through the semi-structured interview because it is flexible, provides an opportunity to the 
interviewee to speak in detail and depth and at the same time, allows the researcher to use 
questionnaires to keep the interviewee on track. Semi-structured interviews provide 
comprehensive data about the Bangladesh Government‟s aid management policies and 
processes, development partner relationships and the status of implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. 
  
4.8.1.1 Anonymity of Interviewees 
 
The nature of this study is such that it deals with information and facts related to the 
Bangladesh Government‟s internal issues and relationship mechanisms with development 
partners. Therefore, the information expected from interviewees ought not to be general but 
rather sensitive in nature. At the same time, to achieve the research objectives, some sensitive 
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questions were incorporated into questionnaires; questions which may elicit a response or 
reservation. Nevertheless, both are equally important for this study. Furthermore, a good 
number of government officials and development partner staff interviews were required to draw 
findings, but with an apprehension that because of the nature of the study, some may oppose, 
decline to participate or provide incorrect information. Another aspect is that there are 
statements in the questionnaire which look for development partner opinion about government 
decisions vis-à-vis government remarks about development partner activities. Without accurate 
responses to those questions, it was difficult to draw true conclusions. Considering these 
factors, complete anonymity was given to interviewees in this research study. Pseudonyms are 
used to quote respondents where required and details of interviewees are not presented in this 
section. It is worth mentioning that because of anonymity, information was obtained from 
respondents, which they may not have disclosed without anonymity.     
 
4.8.1.2 Interviewee Selection  
 
The selection of interviewees in a research undertaking depends on the research problem at 
hand (Silverman, 2013). The researcher seeks different ways to confirm how phenomena are 
experienced in select circumstances, but the selection of participants depends on theoretical 
and epistemological positions and on the strategy of the study (Cassell and Symon, 2004). 
Fundamentally, research questions determine who should be the interviewee of a research 
study. The research questions outlined in this study, anticipate interviews of government 
officials involved in foreign aid management and representatives from development partners 
will talk about their aid policies, strategies and relationships with government. It is also 
expected that professionals from different categories with local and international knowledge 
about the aid business and evolving international issues related to foreign aid will do so too. 
Interviewees were selected in a way that ensured representation of all ministries and 
departments of the Government of Bangladesh related to foreign aid management, 
development partners and professionals. The Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the 
Ministry of Finance is the organisation responsible for co-ordinating all activities related to 
foreign aid on behalf of the Government, which has ten wings and representatives of all ten 
wings were interviewed. Altogether, sixty six persons were interviewed. Details of the 












Interviewee G1 Minister Government of Bangladesh  
Interviewee G2 Minister Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G3 State Minister  Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G4 Secretary  Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G5 Senior Secretary  Government of Bangladesh  
Interviewee G6 Senior Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G7 Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G8 Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G9 Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G10 Additional Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G11 Additional Deputy Comptroller 
& Auditor General 
Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G12 Joint Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G13 Joint Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G14 Joint Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G15 Deputy Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G16 Director (Co-ordination) Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G17 Deputy Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G18 Deputy Secretary Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G19 Deputy Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G20 Assistant Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G21 Senior Assistant Chief Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G22 Executive Engineer and Project 
Director  
Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee G23 Deputy Secretary  &  
Deputy Project Director 
Government of Bangladesh 
 
Economic Relations Division, Ministry of Finance Officials 
 
Interviewee GE1 Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE2 Additional Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE3 Additional Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE4 Additional Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE5 Joint Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE6 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE7 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE8 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB  
Interviewee GE9 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE10 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE11 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE12 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
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Interviewee GE13 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE14 Deputy Secretary Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee GE15 Senior Asst. Chief Economic Relations Division, GoB 




Interviewee D1 Operations Manager Development Partner  
Interviewee D2 Lead Economist Development Partner 
Interviewee D3 Principal Country Specialist Development Partner 
Interviewee D4 Assistant Country Director Development Partner 
Interviewee D5 Coordinator for Economic 
Cooperation 
Development Partner 
Interviewee D6 Senior Representative Development Partner 
Interviewee D7 Program Economist Development Partner 
Interviewee D8 Deputy Country Representative Development Partner 
Interviewee D9 Minister Counsellor Development Partner 
Interviewee D10 Head of Cooperation Development Partner 
Interviewee D11 Deputy Head of Mission Development Partner 
Interviewee D12 Deputy Country Director 





Interviewee P1 Former Adviser (Minister) Government of Bangladesh 
Interviewee P2 Professor of Economics University of Dhaka  
Interviewee P3 Aid Management Consultant Economic Relations Division, GoB 
Interviewee P4 Executive Director Transparency International 
Bangladesh (TIB) 
Interviewee P5 Executive Director VOICE-Aid Worker 
Interviewee P6 Programme Coordinator & Aid 
Management Consultant 
RICARDO 
Interviewee P7 Executive Director Policy Research Institute 
Interviewee P8 Professor of Accounting & 
Public Policy 
University of Dhaka 
Interviewee P9 Professor of Development 
Studies 
University of Dhaka 
Interviewee P10 Distinguished Fellow Centre for Policy Dialogue 
Interviewee P11 Executive Director Centre for Policy Dialogue 
Interviewee P12 Managing Director Social Development Foundation 
Interviewee P13 Aid Management Consultant  Former Additional Secretary & 
Chief Technical Advisor 
Interviewee P14 National Project Manager An Aid Project   






4.8.1.4 Interview Protocol  
 
Interviews were conducted in different phases between October 2017 and September 2019. 
All of the sixty six interviews were physically conducted in Dhaka by the researcher and 
transcribed accordingly. Few interviews were interviewed second or third time via mobile or 
Skype in the later state of the study for more input. Most interviewees were contacted via 
email or mobile phone and some asked for formal request letters from the University, which 
were provided by the University of Huddersfield‟s Business School research office. A 
„Participant Information Sheet‟ was given to respondents along with an email request for 
interview or handed over before the interview started. Participant consent was taken before 
the interview, which covers issues such as anonymity, pseudonyms, risk, disclosure, data 
protection, withdrawal and so forth.  
 
The questionnaires used in this study are in English but interviews (with the exception of DPs 
and some others) were conducted in Bangla to make it easier for native Bangladeshi 
interviewees to express their thoughts as clearly as possible. These were then transcribed in 
English for further analyses. Both note-taking and recording options were approved at the 
time of ethical approval from the University but most interviewees did not give permission to 
record their interviews because of the sensitivity of the information being discussed. 
Therefore, notes were taken at the time of interview and only eighteen interviews were 
recorded. Saunders et al. (2016) support both the recording and note-taking approaches 
described here and Merriam and Tisdell (2016) accept recording and note-taking can be taken 
if interviewees are otherwise uncomfortable. However, they recommend writing up of 
researcher reflections immediately after each interview. This advice was meticulously 
adhered to by the researcher and at the end of each interview, whether recorded or not, a 
reflection note was prepared which proved helpful at the time of data analysis. Interview 
length was forty-five minutes to two hours, to facilitate in-depth discussion and these allowed 
for multiple settings and provided deep insights and explanations (Yin, 2014).  
 
4.8.2 Document Analysis  
 
Documents are a natural part of qualitative research, a readymade source and easily 
accessible. Two issues are important in selecting documents and these are that they should be 
relevant to the research question and that they are acquired in a reasonably practical, yet 
systematic way (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). For the purposes of this study, themes were 
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generated from documents (Bryman, 2016). Sources of document information might include 
books, journals, magazine articles, letters, memoranda, emails, diaries, calendars, 
autobiographies, notes, agendas, announcements, minutes of meetings, event reports, 
administrative documents, proposals, progress reports, internal office records, formal studies, 
evaluation reports, news clippings, newspaper articles, transcripts of speech and 
conversations, text from web pages, audio recordings, pictures, drawings, organisational 
databases, government surveys and census information, tweets, blogs and so on (Yin, 2014; 
Saunders et al., 2016). These sources can broadly be categorised as public and private sources 
(Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). This study relies predominantly on the public.  
 
It is very important that the researcher negotiates access to documents ahead of time 
(Creswell and Poth, 2018) and immediately after the commencement of this study, documents 
were collected continuously including a good number of documents procured at the time of 
formulation of the research proposal. It has already been mentioned that the Economic 
Relations Division (ERD) of the Government of Bangladesh is an important organisation for 
this study given that the ERD is designated to perform all foreign aid-related activities. 
Therefore, access to ERD documents was essential and it was possible to receive a „Letter of 
Consent‟ from the Secretary in Charge of the ERD to access their official documents. The 
researcher tried to use verified documents and did not encounter any documents prepared for 
the specific purpose to achieve preferential outcomes (Yin, 2014).  
 
Together with Government of Bangladesh and development partner documents, documents of 
local and international organisations related to foreign aid such as the World Bank, the IMF, 
the OECD, the UN and the GPEDC, research organisations, consultancy firms, NGOs, 
professional data provider companies and many other types of organisational documents were 
used for this study. The documents collected have been classified into two broad categories; 
Government and Development Partner, which are described further below. However, these 
are not the only documents used in this study.  
 
Government Documents: 
Policy, Planning and Strategic Documents: Perspective Plan, Five Year Plan, National 
Sustainable Development Strategy, MDG and SDG Evaluation Report, SDG Financing 
Strategy, National Social Security Strategy, Annual Development Plan, National Integrity 
Strategy, Joint Co-operation Strategy, Bangladesh Harmonisation Action Plan, Draft National 
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Policy on Development Co-operation, Strengthening Finance for the 7th Five year Plan and 
SDGs in Bangladesh, South-South Co-operation for Financing SDGs, Budget Documents, 
Meeting Minutes, Policy Papers and Website.  
 
Reports: Development Finance Assessment Report, Rules of Business, Delegation of 
Financial Power, Project Monitoring Report, Flow of External Assistance, Foreign aid 
Commitment and Disbursement Report, Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of the 
Istanbul Programme of Action for LDCs for the Decade 2011-2020, Annual Report of the 
Statistics and Informatics Division, Economic Census, Bangladesh Economic Review, 
Monthly and Yearly Fiscal Report, Annual Report of the Finance Division, Macroeconomic 
Stability Report, Socio-economic Stability Report, Project Proposal, Project Evaluation 
Reports and Capacity Assessment Report. 
 
Administrative Documents: Project Monitoring Manual, Different Laws, Implementation 
Monitoring and Evaluation Division Annual Report, Development Project Formulation 
Process document, ERD Handbook, ERD Annual Report, Debt Management Strategy, 
Project Document and many other internal documents of the Governments are procured and 
accessed by the researcher.  
 
Development Partner Documents: 
 
Policy, Planning and Strategic Documents: Country Strategy Paper/Document, Country 
Planning Document, Country Operations Business Plan, Country Partnership Strategy, 
Country Partnership Framework, Resource Plan, Action Plans, National Strategy, Funding 
Strategy and Strategy, Strategic Framework and Planning Document.  
 
Reports: Country Fact Sheet, Performance and Financial Report, Project Progress report, 
Fact Sheets, Development Report, Monitoring Report, Bangladesh Development Update, 
Annual Report, Evaluation Report, Annual Report, and Economic Forecast. 
 
Administrative Documents and Publications: Project Document, Procurement Documents, 
Research Publications, Budget and Spending, Event Brochure, Indicative Plan, News Letter, 




The documents described above, made a significant contribution to this study and helped to 
achieve the following objectives: 
▪ understand Government planning processes related to foreign aid; 
▪ provide information about Government rules and regulations related to foreign aid;  
▪ articulate communication protocols between Government and development partners; 
▪ encounter Government circulars and office orders related to foreign aid; 
▪ detail international declarations on foreign aid; 
▪ compare Government and development partner policies; 
▪ identify policy variation of one development partner relative to another; 
▪ understand development partner policy, focus and strategy; 
▪ understand the gap between policy and the reality; 
▪ examine the information provided by interviewees; and 
▪ check anomalies between documents. 
 
One of the most commonly used sources of evidence in case study research is the interview, 
documentation, archival records, direct observation, participant-observation and physical 
artefacts (Yin, 2014). One of the main characteristics of good case study research is to use 
multiple data collection techniques or sources because no single source has competitive 
advantages over others and multiple sources provide an opportunity to examine issues broadly 
(Yin, 2014). Case study research can be expected to involve in-depth investigation and in doing 
so, one source of data may not suffice (Creswell and Poth, 2018). Therefore, this study adopts 
interview and documentation as sources of data or evidence because it requires both human 
experience and evidence from existing materials to address the research questions. A blend of 
documents and interviews ensures variety and rigor. The combination of data collection 
techniques helped to gather in-depth information in this case study and the combination also 
supports the broader approach of this study (Yin, 2014; Creswell and Poth, 2018).    
 
4.9 Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity and reliability are two important conditions to understand and assess the quality of 
qualitative research (Bryman, 2016). These criteria help to establish trust in research findings 
(Thomas and Magilvy, 2011). The validity of qualitative research has been a debated issue 
over the years in terms of legitimacy (Maxwell, 1992). Validity as a concept is in continuous 
transformation with regard to qualitative research to strengthen its contribution to the 
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development of knowledge (Whittemore et al., 2001). In all researches, validity and 
reliability can be addressed through research conceptualisation, inspecting data collected, 
analysis and interpretation processes and the presentation of findings (Merriam and Tisdell, 
2016). According to Maxwell (2013; p.121): 
 
 „Validity is never something that can be proved or taken for granted. 
Validation is also relative: It has to be assessed in relation to the purpose 
and circumstances of the research, rather than being a context-independent 
property of methods or conclusions.‟   
 
 
Yin (2014) recommends three types of validity; construct, internal and external and reliability to 
ensure the quality of case study research and recommend solutions. These three types of 
mechanism are used in almost all types of qualitative research to understand rigor. Construct 
validity concerns the preconceived notion of a researcher to collect data as s/he fails to take 
adequate operational measures. Construct validity can be achieved using multiple sources of 
evidence, ensuring the chain of evidence at the time of data collection and draft report is reviewed 
by key informants. To confirm internal validity, the researcher needs to establish causal 
relationships correctly. Internal validity may be attained through pattern matching, explanation 
building, addressing rival explanations and using logical methods. External validity refers to the 
generalisation of findings beyond the immediate case using different methods. It can be 
guaranteed using appropriate theory in the research design phase. Reliability means if other 
researchers follow the same procedure, they will reach the same findings without repeating the 
same not replicating the findings of one case in another. The use of case study protocol and the 
development of case study databases can help to achieve reliability.  
 
Miles and Humberman (1994) recommend the use of illustration and diagrams to bring more 
clarity in the analysis phase to help ensure internal validity. Well-articulated research and 
boundaries in research design facilitate generalisation that eventually contributes to external 
validation (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). To ensure „construct validity‟ of this study, data 
are collected using multiple sources: interview and documentation and the study establishes a 
chain of evidence matching data from interviews and documents. Clarification regarding any 
information given by respondents was instantly checked against relevant documents to ensure 
authenticity. The abductive approach of this research ensured good quality data using theory 
matching (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) which asks for back and forth iterations in the data 
collection process to ensure consistency of data with theoretical framework. Thematic data 
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analysis technique also requires back and forth iterations of whole data sets, codes emerging 
from data and data analysis. Therefore, both an abductive approach and thematic analysis 
help to ensure internal validity. Moreover, as suggested by Milles and Humberman (1994) 
qualitative data are presented through illustrations and diagrams that ensure further clarity 
with regard to internal validity. To address external validity, in the research design phase the 
aid effectiveness agenda as a theory was considered in relation to Bangladesh. Following 
Marshall and Rossman (1989), research scope and boundaries are clearly mentioned in the 
research design, which helps to achieve external validity.  
 
This study follows the case study protocol of Yin (2014) to ensure reliability and includes an 
overview of the case study, data collection process, data collection questions and report 
guidelines. Therefore, if future researchers follow such a protocol, s/he may reach the same 
results with regard to Bangladesh as the current study does.   
  
4.10 Ethical Issues 
 
In this study, close attention to ethics was paid from the very beginning as it examines 
sensitive phenomena such as internal mechanisms of government aid management, 
government relationships with development partners, rules of business of different 
government institutions related to the management of foreign aid and efficiency of the 
organisations and people involved in aid. The research questions are designed such that they 
cannot be addressed without human experience. Hence, because of the sensitive nature and 
involvement of people, ethics remain key (Øye and Glasdam, 2016; Berg, 2009; Hennink et 
al, 2011). As part of the University requirement for a PhD award, this study was approved by 
the Business School Research Ethics Committee. According to O‟ Leary (2010), ethical 
guidelines vary between professional codes, discipline areas and institutions but generally 
cover three issues. These are informed consent, no harm to the respondent and ensuring 
confidentiality and anonymity.  
 
Respondents were provided with any facts related to the study and in the document analysis 
process, information collected form sources was cross-checked if any doubts arose. The aims 
of the research were made clear and respondents were not pressured into providing 
information they did not wish to disclose (Silverman, 2013; Bryman, 2016). Respondents 
were approached formally, either through email or letters to participate in the study. Most are 
either Government officers or development partner staff and rest, professionals involved in 
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different trades. They were interviewed to determine many internal issues related to foreign 
aid management and policy implementation such as official decisions, policy, rules of 
business, project proposals, agreement clauses, satisfaction and dis-satisfaction over official 
rules and regulation, reasons for non-achievement and non-compliance, internal and external 
challenges, negotiation policies and style, personal experience of implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation processes, flaws in processes, constraints on executing plans, fiduciary risk, 
corruption and so forth. Therefore, absolute anonymity was given to all respondents to 
protect them from any kind of harm, because qualitative research can sometimes reveal 
personal and political information (Castellano, 2010).  
 
At the same time, the study aims to identify the „who‟, „what‟, „when‟, „where‟, „how‟ and 
„why‟ questions, rather than focus on those who provide data as respondents for the research 
(Saunders et al., 2016). Attention was also paid to respondent privacy at the time of setting 
appointments as well interview locations.  
 
Participants were offered sixty days to withdraw from the study without giving any reason. 
Informed consent was taken from all respondents and they were provided with an information 
sheet beforehand to read and sign a consent form afterwards. All data obtained are stored 
only in the „K Drive‟ of the University system to ensure safety and security (Hennink et al, 
2011). The Economic Relations Division (ERD) is the designated organisation for the 
Government of Bangladesh to deal with all affairs related to foreign aid. Thus, access to ERD 
documents was very important to this study. Written permission was taken from the ERD to 
access their documents and a pseudonym was used to refer to interviewees in the analysis 
section of this study. In the process of research, including interview and data analysis, careful 
attention was paid to avoid bias from researcher personal history, values, religious beliefs, 
educational or professional experiences (Aubrey, 2000). The ethical dimension was always at 
the centre of the study (O‟ Leary, 2010).  
 
4.11 Analytical Method 
 
Qualitative data can be analysed in different ways and there is no single best method, with much 
depending on the purpose of the research (Punch, 2009). Yin (2018) states that analytical tools 
are important but more important, is what a researcher expects from the data collected. This study 
seeks to evaluate the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. It adopts a 
critical realism philosophy, abductive approach and case study strategy to develop a theory. 
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Therefore, it needs a data analysis technique that suits this research philosophy, approach and 
strategy. After reviewing several qualitative data analysis methods, this study opts for thematic 
analysis to analyse data because thematic analysis aligns well with critical realism philosophy, 
abductive approaches and the case study strategy.   
 
Thematic analysis is a process that helps translate qualitative information into data. Data is 
encoded through codes and these generate themes, which interpret aspects of research 
phenomena (Boyatzis (1998). Thematic analysis is a very common qualitative data analysis 
approach (Bryman, 2016) and helps to identify, analyse and report patterns (themes) within 
data. It is flexible in nature and can address a wide range of research questions about different 
research approaches (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
There are two processes to perform in thematic analysis, one inductive and another deductive. 
In the inductive process, themes emerge from data without the influence of existing theory 
and the researcher tries to explore themes relating to research interest. On the other hand, 
deductive thematic analysis is linked to existing theory (Saunders at al., 2016). There are two 
levels to identify themes: semantic and latent. The semantic level identifies themes, 
examining the surface meaning of the data. On the other hand, thematic analysis at the latent 
level identifies themes examining causal ideas, assumptions, conceptualizations of collected 
data and searches out latent meaning (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This study chose an inductive 
process of thematic analysis, adopting critical realism philosophy to examine the underlying 
causes and mechanisms that produce events at empirical levels (Bhaskar, 1989). Therefore, it 
seeks to apply thematic analysis at the latent level, to identify themes which examine 
underlying ideas and assumptions. It takes an abductive approach to developing the theory, 
by conducting „theory matching‟ in case of unanticipated issues, albeit those related to the 
research questions. In this situation, new data collection or insight from documents can help 
to resolve questions. It is going back and forth between the research framework, data source 
and analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). In the same way, thematic analysis requires 
continuous back and forth iterations among the entire data set, codes emerge from data and 
data analysis. Hence, thematic analysis fits well with the current research study as it adopts 
an abductive research approach. Researchers successfully apply thematic analysis techniques 
in case study research in relation to intellectual disabilities, software engineering projects, 
physical activity and diseases, construction of masculinity and find it effective (Daya et al. 
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2011; Cruzes et al., 2015; Cedervall and Aberg, 2010; Manago, 2013). This supports the 
choice of thematic analysis techniques for this case study research.  
 
Thematic analysis is useful for theory building according to Cruzes et al. (2015) and 
according to Saunders et al. (2016), thematic analysis is helpful when working with the large 
and disparate amount of data. It can integrate related data from different data sources, identify 
main themes for more explanation, produce thematic description, develop trial explanations 
of probable thematic patterns, support outline findings and confirm conclusions. All of these 
are applicable to the theory development process in this study, which analyses sixty six 
interviews and numerous documents to generate a large amount of data. Integration of the 
data is required as the study applies two different data collection methods, identifies themes 
for description and draws conclusions. This study takes the following steps for thematic 
analysis as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006, p.87) to generate themes.  
  



















The latent level inductive thematic analysis approach in this study provides an opportunity 
for the in-depth analysis of data to identify gaps in aid policy decision-making, Government 
implementation processes and relationships with development partners.  
 
Qualitative data analysis software is helpful to work with qualitative data and its presentation in 
different ways. For instance, a three-dimensional map of code clusters, the appearance of codes in 
the data through nodes, presentation of familiar codes using different colours, mind maps, world 
clouds and so on (Castleberry and Nolen, 2018). Therefore, this study uses NVivo qualitative 
data analysis software for coding, theme identification and visualisation of findings.  
 
Sixty six interviews and numerous documents are the sources of data of this research. All 
sixty six interviews were physically collected between October 2017 and September 2019. 
Due to abductive approach and case study strategy of the research, a number of interviewees 
were interviewed second or third time via mobile phone or Skype at the time of the data 
analysis. Four different semi-structured questionnaires were used for the interview of the four 
different groups of respondents: Government Officials, Economic Relations Division 
Officials, Development Partners and Professionals. Out of total sixty six interviews, twenty 
three officials are from different ministries, divisions and organisations of the Government 
represented by Ministers, Secretaries, Additional Secretaries, Joint Secretaries/Joint Chief, 
Deputy Secretaries/Deputy Chief and Assistant Secretaries/Assistant Chief. The Economic 
Relations Division (ERD) is the organisation responsible to deal with Government aid related 
matters. It has ten wings. Sixteen Officials of ERD were interviewed including the Secretary 
of ERD and at least one person from each wing including the Wing Chief. Twelve 
representatives of ten development partners of Bangladesh were interviewed which includes 
most of the leading partners. Total fifteen professionals were interviewed who have 
knowledge about the aid management system and practice of the Government of Bangladesh. 
The professional group is represented by Ex-Minister who is now an aid practitioner, aid 
management consultant, aid worker, CSO representatives, think-tank and academics. 
Interviews were conducted in both English and Bangla ( the national language of 
Bangladesh) and interviews were either recorded or noted depending on the comfort of the 
interviewee. However, all interviewees were transcribed in English. 
 
A variety of documents is another data source of this study. The study is able to access a 
number of Government documents which perhaps not yet accessed by any previous research. 
The Government documents include event reports, evaluation reports, project progression 
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report, assessment reports, transcript of speeches, leaflets, web contents, dialogue notes, 
policy papers, policy brief,  laws, key-note paper, concept note, project final report, strategy 
papers, planning documents, review report, project monitoring report, summary note, survey 
report, aid project reports, fact findings reports,  action plans, communiqué, proceedings,    
administrative documents, proposals, minutes of meetings, resolutions, internal office records 
and formal studies. Moreover, the study has also reviewed several documents of the donors 
such as country strategy paper, country partnership strategy, action plans, funding strategy, 
project progression and completion report, economic forecast report, website and so on.  
 
All six steps of Braun and Clarke (2006) are followed in data analysis process. Transcribed 
interviews and documents were read and re-read to note the necessary initial ideas. 
Afterwards, data comprised of transcribed interviewed and documents were coded using 
NVivo. Codes were collated under child-nodes and child-nodes were categorised as parents-
nodes after a number of reviews. Primary themes were developed from parents-nodes, after 
careful examination of patterns, similarity, nature and ability to contribute to the research 
questions. Subsequently, mind-map option of NVivo was adopted to review themes and made 
themes well-matched in relation to research questions. There was a continuous back and forth 
of the whole data set at the stage of organising child-nodes to parents-nodes and parents-node 
to themes. However, use of note and memo options of NVivo were quite helpful in reviewing 
themes. After a critical review, themes were defined and named to address research questions 
and achieve the objectives of the study. Each research question has been addressed with three 
themes and a number of sub-themes in outlining the report in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. Several 
interviewees and documents have been quoted in presenting data in analytical chapters 




This chapter deals with some of the methodological underpinnings of the study. The intention 
is to outline a methodological paradigm, which addresses the research questions. It is very 
important to choose a research philosophy, which provides an opportunity to examine the 
inner mechanisms and structures of a complex issue like foreign aid policymaking and 
implementation and helps to identify flaws in the process. After careful scrutiny of research 
philosophies, critical realism was adopted. A research approach is required to execute a study 
in line with critical realism and therefore an abductive approach was adopted to emphasise 
the continuous back and forth iterations between data collection and theoretical framework to 
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facilitate examination of the inner mechanisms of events. An in-depth case study research 
strategy matches well with the abductive approach because the researcher is well engaged in 
the research process and inconsistencies between the theoretical framework and data, can be 
addressed using „theory matching‟ strategy. The latent level thematic analysis inspects the 
inner levels of the data and also takes a back and forth approach to identify appropriate 
themes. Thus, thematic analysis is an adequate technique to deal with case study data and 
execute an abductive approach. An appropriate philosophical choice, proper selection of 
research approach and correct choice of research strategy and data analysis techniques help to 
address the research questions in this study.  
 








The Government of Bangladesh and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda: 




This chapter reveals that Bangladesh has undertaken a number of policy decisions as well as 
initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. As a part of the commitment to this 
agenda, Bangladesh now has a long-term development plan, supported by a medium-term 
strategy and a short-term execution plan, including development a results framework and a 
medium-term budgetary framework. The country has embarked on a number of reforms in 
public finance management and enacted laws to improve the quality of procurement, audit 
and accounts to increase use of the national system by the development partners. Other 
notable initiatives by the Government include the introduction of an Aid Information 
Management System, a Development Finance Assessment (DFA), an Anti-Corruption Act 
and Anti-Corruption Commission, a Right to Information Act and a National Integrity 
Strategy. Moreover, the Government of Bangladesh has established a dedicated wing, the 
Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW), under the Economic Relations Division to 
undertake all activities related to the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
However, the discussion in the chapter, argues Bangladesh could have reaped greater benefits 
if these initiatives had been implemented more effectively. It outlines a number of issues that 
thwarted implementation and these include a lack of political commitment, poor leadership, 
weak institutions, flawed laws, corruption, capacity constraints of Government officials, 
policies failing to be supported by action, a top-down approach in policy implementation, a 
fear of losing funds, project fund-dependent activities, the absence of co-operation from 
development partner local offices, their lack of authority, the non-binding nature of the aid 
effectiveness principles and framework, development partner political interests and 




It appears from document analysis that Bangladesh demonstrates a highly visible presence in 
international aid and development effectiveness forums. The country has attended all aid 
effectiveness High-Level Forums and Meetings and participated in monitoring surveys and 
all rounds of evaluations. As part of the commitments made in international forums and 
declarations, Bangladesh is continuously striving to address principles, goals, objectives of 
the aid and development effectiveness agenda, introducing policies, formulating strategies, 
creating institutions, platforms and participating in international events.  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that aid effectiveness has received serious 
attention from academia. However, much of the research looks into the issue from a very 
narrow-angle, for example, the implementation of one or two principles or impact in a 
specific sector. Limited evidence is available in relation to the overall experience of recipient 
countries in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. Therefore, to address the knowledge 
gap on the inclusive implementation process of the aid effectiveness agenda, this chapter 
endeavours to respond to Research Question 1: What policy initiatives have the Government 
of Bangladesh developed with regard to the aid effectiveness agenda, how effective have they 
been, and why have they often disappointed? 
 
Four themes are discussed in this chapter: i. the responsibilities of donors and recipients in 
relation to the aid effectiveness agenda; ii. Bangladesh‟s major initiatives to implement the 
agenda; iii. the impact of these initiatives on aid and development administration in 
Bangladesh; iv.  Government approach to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. Section 
5.2 outlines some of the individual and joint responsibilities of recipients and donors in 
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. Section 5.3 lists the Government of Bangladesh‟s 
major initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. Section 5.4 evaluates principles 
of aid effectiveness in terms of the Government of Bangladesh‟s initiatives and their impact 
on aid and the development administration of Bangladesh. Section 5.5 examines the 
Government of Bangladesh‟s approach to implementation from the perspective of the top-








5.2 Allocation of Responsibility to Implement the Aid Effectiveness Agenda  
 
 
The declarations, statements and outcome documents of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
especially the Paris Declaration, clearly categorise the responsibility of recipient countries, 
donors and joint recipient-donors to underpin the objectives of aid effectiveness. However, an 
argument exists that the aid effectiveness agenda is donor-centric. Monitoring surveys and 
evaluation reports reveal donors lag behind in implementation or that the progress of their 
commitments is slow (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Winters, 2012; Gulrajani, 2014). 
Overall, progress is either mixed or slow (Wood et al., 2011; Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; 
Owa, 2011; Keijzer, 2013; Gulrajani, 2014). The responsibilities of recipients, donors and 
joint recipient-donor responsibilities are outlined in an examination of documents of the Aid 
Effectiveness HLF, the First and Second High-Level Meetings of the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) and evaluation documents published on 
behalf of donors and development organisations (OECD, 2003a; OECD, 2008; Busan 
Statement, 2011; Wood et al., 2011; GPEDC, 2014; GPEDC, 2016). As the Paris Declaration 
is still considered the centrepiece of the aid effectiveness agenda, these responsibilities are 











5.3 Implementing Aid Effectiveness: Government’s Major Policy Decisions 
 
Bangladesh was committed to the aid effectiveness agenda prior to the Rome Declaration, in 
fact, from 2001 when the OECD started a donor harmonisation initiative. Bangladesh‟s 
historical engagement with the aid effectiveness agenda has perhaps worked as the driving 
force for implementation. It appears from document analysis that the Government of 
Bangladesh has taken policy decisions to implement aid effectiveness in the country. It‟s 
major policy decisions are presented below in terms of aid effectiveness principles. However, 
it is worth noting that some of the initiatives mentioned below were not implemented with the 
aid effectiveness agenda in mind, rather they correspond well with the principles of the 
agenda. Therefore, these are also included in the table which uses the terms „policy decision‟, 
„initiative‟ and „activity‟ interchangeably.    
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Source: PRS-HAP CELL, 2008, 2008a; AEU, 2010a, 2010b; Nadoll, 2010; AEU, 2011; 
ERD, 2011; OECD, 2011c; USAID, 2014; ERD, 2015c; Bjornestad et al., 2016; 
ERD, 2016, 2016a; ERD/UNDP, 2016; Siddique, 2017 
 
5.4 Evaluation of Government Policy Decisions to Implement the aid 
Effectiveness Agenda and its Impact on the Aid and Development 
Administration of Bangladesh 
 
Subsequent sections of this study evaluate aid effectiveness in terms of major Government 
policy decisions to implement principles of the aid effectiveness agenda and examine the 
impact of these initiatives on the aid and development administration of Bangladesh. 
However, Harmonisation Principle-related activities are not discussed in this chapter because 
the implementation of Harmonisation Principles requires DP initiatives, sincere co-operation 
and goodwill. Therefore, Harmonisation Principle-related policy decisions are discussed in 
chapter six.  
 
5.4.1 Evaluation of Ownership Principle-related Policy Decisions and Impact  
 
The ownership principle of the aid effectiveness agenda suggests an effective, well-
implemented, long-term plan should help achieve recipient development leadership. It 
recommends a long-term plan integrated into a medium-term expenditure framework and 
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annual budget. The ownership principle advocates the formulation of a long-term plan in 
consultation with development partners, CSOs, the private sector, media, stakeholders and 
ensures their participation in the implementation process. It stresses development partner 
support for recipient initiatives to strengthen policy and institutional leadership over 
development. The approach of the ownership principle is considered a paradigm shift from 
the long-standing, donor-driven development initiatives to recipient country-led initiatives 
based on indigenous plans and development strategies (Hayman, 2009; Collins, 2009; 
Molenaers and Nijs; 2011; Swedlund, 2013). It is therefore, crucial for a recipient country to 
take control of development initiatives by implementing the ownership principle. This section 
reflects on Government planning and development related activities to implement the aid 
effectiveness agenda and examines the impact of aid, management and development 
administration initiatives in Bangladesh. The discussion is organised into four segments: 
planning and development strategy-related initiatives and impact, introduction of institutions 
and their impact, initiatives to strengthen institutions and their impact, and aid policy 
challenges.   
 
5.4.1.1 Impact of Planning and Development Strategy-related Policy Decisions 
 
To implement the ownership principle, Bangladesh has formulated a long-term plan and both 
medium and short-term strategies underpinning the economic vision of the country. This 
planning and development process is evolving in line with the continuity of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. One of the main changes in Bangladesh at the initial stages of the aid 
effectiveness agenda was the introduction of a framework for aid disbursement and aid 
negotiations. Historically, Bangladesh‟s aid negotiation for a particular period with donors 
took place in Paris at a High-Level meeting of the Bangladesh Aid Group/Consortium under 
the sponsorship of the World Bank. However, Bangladesh in agreement with donors, 
prepared PRSP-1, titled „Unlocking the Potential: A National Strategy for Accelerated 
Poverty Reduction (NSAPR)‟ for the period 2005 to 2007. This became a framework for 
donors to provide aid to Bangladesh. After the introduction of PRSP-1, aid negotiation 
meetings started taking place in Dhaka from 2005. The first, in the form of the Bangladesh 
PRSP Implementation Forum Meeting (PIFM) took place in 2005. Subsequently, it was 
renamed the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) and organised meetings in 2010, 2015 
and 2018. Formal pledges were not made but the Government‟s economic strategy, future 
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plans, reforms, implementation and progress of aid and development effectiveness were 
discussed (AEU, 2010a; GOB/UNDP, 2012).  
  
5.4.1.1.1 The Aid Effectiveness Agenda in Planning Documents  
 
Document analysis shows that Bangladesh is able to structure its planning process for the 
long, mid and short-term, in line with the ownership principle. The country announced a 
long-term Perspective Plan (2010-2021) to achieve „Vision 2021‟: a middle-income country 
by 2021. Bangladesh is implementing Perspective Plan with two, Five Year Plans (FYP): the 
6th and the 7th. As part of its commitment to create awareness about the aid effectiveness 
agenda at all levels of Government, guidance in planning documents and office manuals is 
available. For the first time, in the 6
th
 Five Year Plan (2011-2015), a “Joint Co-operation 
Strategy (JCS) for Strengthening the Focus on Results through Enhanced Monitoring and 
Evaluation” was included. It also highlighted the JSC‟s main objectives such as 
harmonisation, alignment, predictability and others (GED, 2011, 2011a).  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda is subsequently incorporated into the 7
th
 Five Year Plan (2016-
2020) under the title of “Towards a Synergetic Development Partnership” where an effective 
partnership with development partners has been emphasised and a broader scenario has been 
drawn out for aid effectiveness. An Effective Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), a 
Local Consultative Group (LCG), an LCG Working Group and AIMS have been prioritised 
to address fragmentation, proliferation, alignment and predictability. Capacity enhancement 
of Government officials and co-ordination among Government organisations have also been 
stressed (GED, 2015).  
 
Aid effectiveness is also incorporated into the Economic Relations Division‟s (ERD) 
Handbook. A section of the Handbook briefly outlines the history and principles of the 
agenda. The same section further describes Bangladesh‟s initiatives to implement aid 
effectiveness and the section highlights the importance of implementing principles of the 
agenda for the benefit of maximising foreign aid (ERD, 2015). Furthermore, beginning with 
the National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction-II (NSAPR-II), all development 
plans are now prepared in consultation with CSOs, professionals and DPs (AEU, 2010a, 




However, despite Government efforts, general awareness about the aid effectiveness agenda 
among Government officials is still at a very elementary level, except for Economic Relations 
Division (ERD) officials. However, although most have heard about it, the purpose and 
applications are unknown to them (AEU, 2010a; ERD, 2016a). Mixed comments are noted 
when interviewees were asked about the aid effectiveness agenda: “Line Ministry people 
know a little about the aid effectiveness issue” (Interviewee G10, 2018), “I have never heard 
about aid effectiveness” (Interviewee G 20, 2018 ), “Sometime a paper arrives about the aid 
effectiveness agenda” (Interviewee G14, 2018 ), or even “No one ever communicated with 
me about aid effectiveness” (Interviewee G15, 2018). Interestingly, a development partner‟s 
comment included: “Line Ministry people whom we work with, do not know about aid 
effectiveness” (Interviewee D11, 2018). Awareness among Government departments is 
discussed in detail in Section 5.4.1.2 
 
5.4.1.1.2 Long-term Planning and Implementation Strategy 
 
To ensure leadership over the whole development process, the aid effectiveness agenda not 
only stresses the formulation of long-term planning strategies in consultation with DPs, CSOs 
and other stakeholders but also the integration of plans and strategies in medium term 
expenditure and annual budgets. As discussed above, Bangladesh is currently addressing a 
Perspective Plan (2010-2021) with two long-term, Five Year Plans: 6
th
 (2011-2105) and 7
th
 
(2016-2020). The 6th FYP incorporates a Development Results Framework for the 
measurement of development impact (GED, 2011, 2011a). To implement a long-term plan, 
Bangladesh formulates three year action plans, breaking down long-term FYP objectives, in 
the form of a Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework (MTMF), a Medium-Term 
Budgetary Framework (MTBF) and a one-year Annual Development Plan (ADP). The 
country has also introduced a Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework (MTMF) for the 
projection and assumption of macroeconomic indicators for the current budget year and for 
four other years. The Government introduced a Medium-Term Budgetary Framework 
(MTBF) from the 2005-2006 financial year to four ministries and from 2011-2012 to all 
ministries and divisions. The MTBF established links between policy priorities, resource 
allocation and performance. It is a projection of the current budget year and two further years 
(Talukder and Mobarek, 2018, 2018a). The current budget year encompasses the Annual 
Development Plan (ADP) and this practice enhances sectoral budgetary accuracy and reduces 




However, the current MTBF arrangement fails to establish a link between the FYP and the 
ADP because at present, the MTBF is prepared for three not five years in order to align the 
FYP. So, the plan is for five years, the MTBF three years and the ADP one year, which leads 
to a mismatch between plans and resource allocation (Bjornestad et al., 2016; Interviewee P3, 
2018). Furthermore, the MTBF does not clearly indicate a clear link between policy, resource 
and budget and the format does not indicate which policy or programme is financed in the 
budget.  
 “[……] it is called an objective-based budget for which there will be a 
resource envelop. It is an envelope, not the number, this much is the 
budgetary allocation, yes it is the budgetary allocation for the incumbent 
year but it is with the resource envelope that you have to achieve within this 
framework of these three years and for this, there will be an allocation. If 
you cannot achieve this within this budget year you can actually now 
negotiate it through the adjustment in the next year and the next year and 
thereby it progresses. The departments, units within the departments, 
everybody needs to work like this. But unfortunately when the budget 
development starts nobody looks into this. They actually follow an 
incremental rule. So, the missing link is this budget process is not aligned 
with the objectives; rather it is aligned with the incremental process of the 
budgeting system.” (Interviewee P3, 2018).  
 
 
Therefore, development objectives are not reflected in the budget so when aid money is 
allocated to development, it is not addressing yearly development objectives as well as the 
overall objectives of the FYP. This means foreign aid is not well-aligned or harmonised with 
the yearly development budget, due to a weak link between the ADP and the FYP. When the 
Programme Division (PD) of the Planning Commission of the country prepares the ADP, it 
categorises the economy into seventeen sectors and thirty-one sub-sectors. However, the FYP 
categorises it into fourteen sectors. On the other hand, the Finance Division prepares a budget 
dividing the economy into thirteen sectors. This inconsistency not only creates co-ordination 
problems but also makes resource allocation difficult, hampers planned development and 
produces lower results (GED, 2015; Bjornestad et al., 2016; Interviewee G6, 2018; 
Interviewee D10, 2018). In accordance with planning rules, the Programme Division issues a 
circular for ADP preparation. However, no clear instruction is given to LMs and agencies by 
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the PD on the ADP circular to prioritise criteria or project map with the FYP. Therefore, 
LMs/agencies vaguely align projects with national development objectives and consequently, 
the ADP is populated with projects, project funds remain unspent or spent in haste at the end 
of the financial year and ultimately development objectives are not achieved (Interviewee  
P3, 2018; Interviewee P5, 2018).  
 
The Finance Division (FD) of the Ministry of Finance issues a Budget Circular - (BC-1) in 
November/December with an indicative ceiling to prepare the preliminary budget and submit 
that to the FD in December/January. However, the Programme Division issues the ADP 
circular in February. As a result, LMs/agency preliminary budgets are prepared not knowing 
the sector priority of the year or their alignment with development objectives. LMs and 
agencies try to adjust to this difficulty after receiving a Budget Circular-2 from the FD in 
April/May. However, this inconsistency complicates the whole process and makes meeting 
the tripartite (FD, Programme Division, LM/Division) budget difficult. Moreover, a number 
of studies reveal that ADP execution suffers from numerous problems: more than 80% of 
projects take more time than originally planned and more than 25% of projects result in cost 
overruns. These issues ultimately undercut the economic value of investment and in the end, 
development results are not achieved (Bjornestad et al., 2016).  
 
The revised ADP is a unique system, whereby the FD through a formal circular asks 
LMs/agencies in December/January to add and remove projects in the ADP of the current 
financial year. This causes a serious problem in the implementation of projects as well as 
disbursement of funds by the DP. After declaring the Budget in June, DPs plan disbursement 
but in December/January, when the ADP is revised, they need to change their plans because 
of the removal of some projects. Remarkably, development objectives eliminated by this 
process and how they might be achieved are not considered (Interviewee P3, 2018). This 
revised ADP system also allows project inclusion on political pressure and most projects are 
not aligned with national development strategies. Moreover, in the regular ADP, projects are 
included with Minister/MP/Secretary requests that do not fit well with national planning 
objectives and which create regional inequalities (Interviewee P1, 2018; Interviewee G13, 
2018).  
 
Government policymakers have a different view, believing flexibility is required in the 




 “Right at the moment, we are okay with the planning process. But in the 
future MTBF may create an obstacle for the commission or speedy 
implementation of the projects, there we will have to be little flexible [……..] 
based on the situation of the case or need of the project we might be flexible 
and even with outside the line of MTBF.” (Interviewee G2, 2018). 
  
 
5.4.1.1.3 Development Finance Assessment 
 
A Development Finance Assessment (DFA) was conducted with the support of the 
„Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012-2016)‟ project as the first 
of its first kind in Bangladesh. It was called the “Strengthening Finance for the 7th Five Year 
Plan and SDGs in Bangladesh”. The report examined financial options for Bangladesh 
including foreign aid to achieve the 7th FYP objectives and proposed a framework to achieve 
the 7th FYP objectives (Bjornestad et al., 2016). This report was submitted to the ERD in 
2016 and although interviewees of the Finance Division, the ERD and the Planning 
Commission were asked about the use of the DFA, none were able to provide any 
information (Interviewee GE1, 2017, Interviewee G15, 2018).   
 
The Government has undertaken a number of initiatives to implement the ownership principle 
and it is noteworthy that the aid effectiveness issue is now formally incorporated into 
planning documents. However, the level of awareness amongst government officials is not 
satisfactory and this thwarts implementation of the agenda. The country now has a structured 
plan supported by mid and short-term implementation strategies. However, there is a lack of 
synergy between long-term plans and implementation strategies, which are a predicament for 
the effective utilisation of aid money. The Government has also failed to take advantage of 
the Development Finance Assessment (DFA) in mobilising funds. It might have been more 
productive for the country to explore financial options to underpin objectives of the 7th FYP 
as well as the SDGs.   
 
5.4.1.2 Introduction of Institutions and Impact  
 
The ownership principle of the aid effectiveness agenda promotes effective leadership of 
recipient countries in development activities. Establishment of effective institutions helps to 
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establish leadership. The quality of institutions requirement is a much-discussed issue in the 
aid management literature (Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Copestake and Williams, 2014; 
Asongu, 2015). A number of activities show that as part of its commitments to the aid 
effectiveness agenda, the Government of Bangladesh is striving to strengthen existing 
institutions and has already established new institutions to drive the aid effectiveness agenda 
forward.  
 
Following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the PRS-HAP (Poverty Reduction 
Strategy-Harmonisation Action Plan) Cell was created by the Government of Bangladesh in 
the ERD in 2006, to co-ordinate Poverty Reduction Strategy related activities, liaise with 
donors and to implement the commitment of the Rome, Paris and Accra agreements. In May 
2009, the cell was renamed and upgraded to the Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) under the Co-
ordination Wing of the ERD to undertake aid effectiveness agenda related activities at 
national and international levels. The unit was predominantly funded by development 
partners.  
 
On 22 September 2015, the Government of Bangladesh approved a Development Effectiveness 
Wing (DEW) as a fully-fledged Wing of the ERD, underlining the country‟s commitment to the 
aid and development effectiveness agenda. The DEW combined the Aid Effectiveness Unit 
(AEU) and an External Policy Branch to implement the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh 
through research, policy formulation and implementation (Nadoll, 2010; AEU, 2010a; ERD, 
2015d, 2016b). Most initiatives of the Government listed in Table 5.2 relate to ownership and 
harmonisation principles. Initiatives related to alignment, managing for results and mutual 
accountability are undertaken by the AUE/DEW. In addition, other initiatives are executed by 
different ministries and divisions. The DEW is currently headed by a Senior Joint Secretary and 
Branches are headed by either a Joint Secretary or a Deputy Secretary. Current officers‟ 
strength of the Wing is eleven except the administrative and support staffs (ERD, 2019).The 
objectives of Development Effectiveness are:  
 
■ advisory support to ERD wings and line ministries/agencies for the effective use of foreign 
assistance and guarantee Bangladesh‟s interest globally. 
■ help equip Bangladesh Government officials for favourable negotiation with development 
partners providing education and training. 
■ train government officials for participation in international forums with skill and expertise.  
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■ strategic and policy coordination of Government organisations, development partners and 
international forums.  
 
DEW‟s objectives are focused on promotion and policy coordination of aid effectiveness 
matters locally and internationally. The objectives give more stress on training and skill 
development of ERD and LM officials for negotiation and effective use of foreign aid. Thus, 
it is expected that the wing not only creates awareness in entire internal aid administration 
about the aid effectiveness agenda but also trains ERD, LM and PC officials to apply the 
principles practically for the greater interest of the nation. However, close scrutiny of the 
functions of the three branches of the wing exposes multi-disciplinary engagements and 
assignments. The engagements and assignments are more intensive to international activities 
and relationship maintenance with development partners than awareness creation and skill 
development of the officials and organisations related to aid administration.  
 
Branch-1: External Economic Policy (EEP) is responsible for foreign assistance related 
policy formulation and implementation, and collection of information on international 
economy and international economic relations, research on economic and development 
policy, coordination and communication with international organisations such as ECOSOC 
Second Committee-UNGA, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Istanbul Programme of 
Action (IPoA), UN ESCAP, World Economic Outlook, Commonwealth Secretariat, Colombo 
Plan, NAM and SAARC (ERD, 2107).  
 
Branch-2: Development Partnership Management and Aid Information Management System 
(AIMS) is responsible for the effective use of foreign aid for national development, 
coordination with GPEDC, Asia-Pacific Development Effectiveness Facility (AP-DEF), 
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and South-South Institute and other related 
organisations. The branch also performs activities related to the Local Consultative Group 
(LCG), the Secretariat, the Aid Effectiveness Working Group (AEWG) and the Bangladesh 
Development Forum (BDF). AIMS communicates decisions taken in international forums on 
aid or development effectiveness to all concerned ministries and agencies together with 
formulation and co-ordination of various national plans such as the Joint Co-operation 




Branch-3: Innovative/Climate Financing and Research is expected to undertake research on 
aid and development co-operation, publish research and help other ERD wings with research, 
training, workshops on aid and development effectiveness. The branch works for internal 
surveys for development effectiveness and inputs to the Five Years Plan and other plans. It 
also provides secretarial support for the Climate Fund and SDG related initiatives and deals 
with SDGs, South-South Co-operation and innovative finance (ERD, 2017).  
 
These functions are more focused on international engagement and day to day activities. 
Therefore, DEW‟s ten year-long efforts (including AEU) in creating awareness and providing 
training to Government officials, especially at the ERD, the Planning Commission and Line 
Ministry officials on the aid effectiveness agenda remain limited. If officers involved in aid 
and development administration are not aware of the importance of the aid effectiveness 
agenda and do not know what to apply and how to apply it, aid effectiveness principles 
cannot be converted into application. Over the years, mainly with the support of aid 
effectiveness projects, the AEU and DEW organised training and workshops to create 
awareness among Government officials to apply aid effectiveness principles in day-to-day 
works, in dealing with development partners and in representing Bangladesh at international 
forums. The DEW represents Bangladesh at international forums and events. The Wing 
facilitates international surveys in Bangladesh, publishes studies and evaluates reports on aid 
and development effectiveness. It is expected that almost ten years of endeavours by the AEU 
and DEW will bring substantial change in aid and development administration in Bangladesh. 
However, interviewee responses were unsatisfactory when they were asked to evaluate DEW 
activities or its impact as an institution implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and 
findings from international surveys and monitoring reports indicate the same (OECD, 2011c; 
GPEDC, 2016a; Interviewee GE2, 2017; Interviewee P5, 2018; Interviewee GE6, 2017). 
 
The Planning Commission (PC) is the approving authority of aid and the Government‟s own 
funded projects. So, the PC controls aid and is not a simple user of aid. Furthermore, PC 
officials regularly come into contact with DPs for aid and aid-related discussions (ERD, 
2016a). Therefore, an awareness about the aid effectiveness agenda is crucial for Planning 
Commission (PC) officers. An interviewee of the Programme Division of the PC said that he 
was aware of the aid effectiveness agenda but he did not know what the implications were in 
his day to day works (Interviewee 13, 2018). Sector Division officers of the PC scrutinise 
development projects and recommend their inclusion in the Annual Development Plan 
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(ADP). However, it seems that Sector Division officers are not entirely aware of the aid 
effectiveness issue and its effects on aid management. A respondent of the Sector Division 
comments:  
 “No one ever communicated with me about aid effectiveness. I am here for a 
long time but never heard anything about aid effectiveness agenda. I know 
there is a wing in ERD and they undertake aid effectiveness related activity.” 
(Interviewee G15, 2017). 
  
 
The same impression was received from Line Ministry (LM) Planning Wing/Branch/Unit 
officials involved in development planning, project formulation, DP co-ordination and 
evaluation and monitoring of aid project. In addition, LM officials are directly linked with all 
aid effectiveness principles and objectives. Seven Government officials from six ministries 
were interviewed and six of them said that they did not know about the aid effectiveness 
agenda or had never come  across it with DEW people or programmes or engaged in any 
form of discussion (Interviewee G10, 2018; Interviewee G11, 2018; Interviewee G14, 2018; 
Interviewee G18, 2018; Interviewee G19, 2018; Interviewee G20, 2018; Interviewee G21, 
2018). However, one officer said that he did know and made the following comment:  
 
 “Importance is not given to aid effectiveness issue. Sometimes some paper 




A number of development partners and professionals also confirmed the fact that from their 
working experience with LM officials, they understood that LM officials were not aware of 
the ethos of the aid effectiveness agenda, although they heard about it (Interviewee D10, 
2018; Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee D12, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee 
D9, 2018).  
 
 “People of DEW only know aid effectiveness issue but LM people do not 
know but we work with LM people. It is the duty of ERD to inform LM about 
aid effectiveness issue, as far I know it is the duty of ERD to educate LM. As 
LM people are not aware of it how they can understand its importance.‟‟ 
(Interviewee D9, 2018).  




But in reality, they do not know. Another thing is that if a person even knows 
about aid effectiveness, it is difficult to apply it in the real situation, in the 
project. There are so many things to consider in applying aid effectiveness 
principles. If the people related to the project can apply aid effectiveness 
principles the result of the project can improve. It is a dilemma, though they 
know the principles it would be hard to apply.” (Interviewee, D12, 2018). 
 
Project Directors (PD) appointed mainly from LMs or LM agencies, are responsible for the 
management and implementation of the entire project. This is a key position for 
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda as PD functions correspond with ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability principles. Two 
PDs from two different agencies were interviewed. One of them had heard about the aid 
effectiveness agenda from a colleague but none of them were aware of the whole issue as 
well as its importance (Interviewee G22; Interviewee G23, 2019). DPs and ERD officers who 
work with PDs and also Professionals, stated PDs were not aware of the aid effectiveness 
agenda and they admitted PDs should know about it as they are key in implementing the 
principles (Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee D6, 2018, Interviewee GE6, 2017; Interviewee 
P15, 2018; Interviewee P6, 2018).  
 
The IMED role is crucial in monitoring and evaluating aid projects and is directly linked with 
managing for results and mutual accountability. It was also observed that there was a serious 
lack of awareness among IMED officials. For example: 
 
 “We (IMED) do not have any communication with DEW of ERD regarding 
aid effectiveness. There is no discussion with us to implement or address the 
principles of aid effectiveness agenda. We have heard about it but do not 
know our role about the aid effectiveness agenda. I can recall a circular to 
attend training on the effective use of foreign aid but I did not hear about 
any circular for training in the last few years.” (Interviewee 16, 2018). 
 
 
Thirteen officials including three wing chiefs representing nine wings of ERD were also 
interviewed. Most knew about the aid effectiveness agenda but did not really understand the 
importance or significance in aid negotiation with DPs, project selection, monitoring and 
evaluation (Interviewee GE15, 2017; Interviewee GE3, 2017). DPs also confirmed the fact 
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that when they interacted with ERD officials, they rarely referred or raised aid effectiveness 
issues with them (Interviewee D10, 2018; Interviewee D5, 2018). A sense prevailed among 
ERD officers that the DEW owns responsibility for dealing with aid effectiveness issues and 
they had nothing to do with it. ERD officials also believed that for different reasons, it was 
difficult to enforce or implement aid effectiveness principles.   
 
 “Bangladesh has aid dependency and trade relations with DPs or other 
interest, it is difficult to do hard negotiation with them or enforce aid 
effectiveness principles (Interviewee GE9, 2017). Aid effectiveness issue 
doesn‟t come when we negotiate aid agreement with DPs. Aid effectiveness 
issue comes as a discussion topic in ERD meeting (Interviewee GE15, 2017). 
DPs have their own Agreement Template and we review it and sign. Difficult 
to see aid effectiveness issue [……..] as long as ERD has no role in project 




A poor understanding of LM officials about the aid effectiveness agenda was also reported in 
the „Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Phase – II, Country 
Evaluation Bangladesh: Final Report, 2010‟. The report stated that „there exists a serious lack 
of awareness and ownership of the commitments of the PD and AAA amongst line ministry 
officials‟ (ERD, 2010a; p.ii). Moreover, ERD‟s own assessment reports confirm a lack of 
awareness and understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda among LM and PC officers 
(ERD, 2016a). Independent studies reveal the limited awareness of LM officials and PDs too 
(Nadoll, 2010).  
 
The DEW, previously the Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) from 2012 to 2016, had organised a 
number of training programmes with financial support from the „Strengthening Capacity for 
Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh‟ project. Around three hundred officials had been trained on 
the aid effectiveness agenda with a vision to create awareness as well as implement the 
principles of managing aid. However, due to transfers and promotion, those officers now 
have different responsibilities. The transfer and promotion of officers results in a loss of skills 
and seriously hampers DEW initiatives to create awareness and develop officials 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee G12, 2018). Nevertheless, the arrangement of 
intermittent training programmes, a lack of follow-up and a generally disjointed effort from 
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the DEW are perhaps contributing to poor awareness and a lack of motivation amongst 
Government officials to own the aid effectiveness agenda and to apply it in the aid 
management system (AEU, 2010a; Interviewee GE6, 2017). The AEU and DEW chose 
training as the only means to create awareness, without a comprehensive awareness campaign 
or outreach strategy. No manual or checklist on aid effectiveness is prepared and no circular 
is provided with guidelines such as what needs to be implemented or when, or how aid 
effectiveness principles might be implemented (Interviewee P12, 2018; Interviewee GE7, 
2017).  
 
Currently, an inactive LCG-WG (Local Consultative Group-Working Group), a discussion 
forum between LMs and DPs, also contributes to the lack of awareness of Government LM 
officials because if the LCG-WG had been active, LM officials might have been engaged in 
discussion with DPs and that would help enhance their awareness (Interviewee P1, 2018). It 
is observed that AEU and DEW initiatives are very project centred. The „Strengthening 
Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh‟ project ended in June 2016 and it appears that 
DEW activities are reduced with the end of the project (Interviewee P5, 2018; Interviewee, 
GE6, 2017). The DEW is currently conducting a training programme on development 
effectiveness and one hundred officials have already been trained (Amin, 2019). It is trying to 
create an officers pool who should stay longer in the same position and if someone is 
promoted, s/he would be positioned in a section or desk related to aid or development 
administration (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee GE6, 2017; Interviewee G12, 2018).   
 
Bangladesh‟s participation in international forums and events is very visible. The country 
regularly organises events and presents reports and case studies to showcase its performance 
and efforts to the international community. Bangladesh is currently the Co-Chair of the 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), Chair of the Asia 
Pacific Development Effectiveness Facility (AP-DEF), the Vice-Chair of the International 
Aid Transparency Institute (IATI) and a Member of the Global Partnership Steering 
Committee (GPSC) amongst other international engagements. Bangladesh actively 
participated in all four High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness: Rome, Paris, Accra and 
Busan and signed the declarations. The country also attended both the Mexico City and 
Nairobi High-Level Meetings of GPEDC in 2014 and 2016 respectively. The country has 
participated in all aid and development effectiveness surveys and monitoring rounds of the 
OECD-DAC as well as GPEDC. The DEW at present undertakes all activities related to 
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international participation and organisational engagements as the AEU did previously. There 
is an understanding that the DEW is more focused on international engagements than country 
level initiatives with regard to the aid effectiveness agenda (Interviewee D11, 2018; 
Interviewee D4, 2018). The following statement by a policymaker supports this:   
 
 “[……..] we have set up a unit, Development Effectiveness Unit. It is 
honouring international custom and practice. DEW prepares reports on aid 
effectiveness and etc. [……].” (Interviewee G1, 2018). 
 
 
One of the senior aid management consultants of the Government also pointed out that 
Bangladesh‟s image was very positive in the international arena but the results of country 
level initiatives was less than expected:   
 
 “Bangladesh has been able to expose in the international forum in a positive 
manner as the leader of the aid effectiveness agenda or the development 
effectiveness agenda. But the failure is they cannot expand their horizon both 
in terms of the implementation of the agenda from ERD to outside and at the 
same time, ERD in particular.” (Interviewee P3, 2018). 
 
 
Setting up a dedicated wing in the ERD - the Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW) - to 
deal with the aid effectiveness agenda perhaps demonstrates the Government‟s commitment 
to the agenda. The DEW is not able to create considerable awareness among Government 
officials though it waves the Bangladesh flag at international aid related forums. However, it 
appears from the above discussion that despite achievements in introducing policies, training 
and active participation in international forums and events, integration of aid effectiveness 
principles in national development activities such as planning, programming, budgeting and 
implementation is very limited. The international focus of the DEW probably contributed to a 
minimum country level effort, which has reduced further with the completion of the 
„Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh‟ project in June 2016.  
 
5.4.1.3 Initiatives to Strengthen Institutions and Systems and their Impact 
 
The ownership principle of the aid effectiveness agenda stresses strengthening of institutions 
with the help of development partners to establish leadership over development. This 
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strengthening implies reform of institutions and capacity development. The Government and 
DPs symbolise co-operative efforts to strengthen institutions through capacity development 
for the implementation of aid effectiveness. A number of projects have been implemented but 
there is a big question mark about their outcomes.    
    
The DEW of the ERD, with assistance from development partners undertook two decisive 
projects to implement aid effectiveness in Bangladesh. The first was, „Support for Enhanced 
Programme Co-ordination based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness‟, which had 
been implemented from September 2009 to September 2010. The objective of the project was 
to help the Government to implement aid effectiveness principles in country planning. There 
were three components of that project: strengthening the AEU, strengthening the LCG and 
formulating the JCS. The DFID and DANIDA funded USD 0.54 million and the UNDP and 
DFID jointly implemented the project with the ERD. The project largely helped to 
consolidate the Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU), shaped up Local Consultative Group (LCG) 
mechanisms and outlined the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) document (Nadoll, 2010). 
Immediately after that, an aid effectiveness project titled „Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh‟ was undertaken from 2012 to 2016. It was funded by the DFID, 
DANIDA and AusAid, executed by the UNDP and worth USD 3.20 million. It is worth 
mentioning that all initiatives of the Government to implement the aid effectiveness agenda 
were attempted under the auspices of this project.  
 
Under Component-1, the integrated Aid Information Management System (AIMS) was 
launched in 2013. A number of actions were undertaken surrounding Component-2, such as 
the integration of the Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) in the ERD‟s mainstream structure as a 
Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW). The ERD‟s capacity assessment, final draft of the 
National Policy on Development Co-operation (NPDC), preparation of the Development 
Finance Assessment (DFA) for the 7th FYP and GPEDC monitoring survey participation, 
rapport building meetings, discussion sessions with CSOs and think tanks. As part of 
Component-3, the LCG structure was reviewed, priorities were identified and the LCG 
Secretariat was housed in the ERD. Capacity assessment of six ministries/divisions: Planning 
Commission, Ministry of Education, Power Division, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
and the Ministry of Social Welfare was undertaken in line with Component-4 (ERD/UNDP, 




Both projects had diverse components and a number of initiatives were undertaken during 
their tenure. Some initiatives such as Capacity Assessment of the ERD and Line Ministries, 
Development of AIMS, DFA and GPEDC Survey participation and rapport building efforts 
with CSOs and think tanks are examined under ownership principle-related initiatives of the 
Government. JSC and LCG-related activities are reviewed in Chapter 6.  
 
With a vision to assert ownership over development initiatives, Bangladesh continued its 
effort to strengthen institutions related to aid management. With support from „Strengthening 
Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012-2016)‟ project, two capacity assessment 
reports were prepared. One on the ERD and another on six Line Ministries and Divisions: 
Planning Commission, Ministry of Education, Power Division, Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare Ministry of Social Welfare. The objectives of the ERD‟s Capacity 
Assessment study were to assess strengths and weaknesses and prepare an action plan so that 
i) the ERD could apply aid effectiveness principles to improve aid management practice, ii) 
the organisation could comply with global commitments for the implementation of the aid 
agenda and iii) the ERD could effectively drive the agenda in providing guidance and 
assistance to line ministries applying aid effectiveness principles (ERD/UNDP, 2011). ERD‟s 
operational issues such as capacity constraints, lack of co-ordination among wings, 
motivation among staff, frequent transfers of staff, absence of aid negotiation strategies, poor 
negotiation skills, lack of research on DPs and an absence of a legal wing, have been revealed 
in studies and also mentioned by interviewees (AEU, 2010a; Ernst and Young, 2014; 
Interviewee D10, 2018; Interviewee GE10, 2017; Interviewee GE17, 2017; Interviewee GE6, 
2017; Interviewee GE3, 2017; Interviewee GE9, 2017).  
 
Ernst and Young were appointed to prepare a capacity assessment report submitted to the 
ERD in March 2014. The report consisted of two parts: A- Capacity Assessment and B- 
Capacity Development Programme. The report recommended short and long-term plans 
organised as Structure, Process and People. Overall, the main recommendations were: to 
enhance support functions such as ICT, FABA, knowledge management, HR, research and 
legal cell in the ERD, IT-based management, mapping role requirements, skill matrices 
identifying KPIs, economic sector alignment of ERD wings and development of sectoral 
focal points (Ernst and Young, 2014). The ERD has not taken any initiative to date to execute 
any of the recommendations of the report. At the time of interview, ERD officials related to 
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the study and officials who might have taken initiatives to implement the report were asked 
about the present state of play. They made the following comments:  
 
 “Capacity assessment report is prepared but no recommendation is 
implemented. Probably, no one even sees it (Interviewee GE6, 2017). […..] 
capacity assessment report was given to coordination wing to implement 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017). [……..] but no step has been taken (Interviewee 
GE2, 2017). According to the report an initiative was taken to establish a 




However, the ERD with support from the UNDP is implementing a project entitled 
„Knowledge for Development Management (K4DM) (2012-2019)‟ to facilitate knowledge-
based decision making at the ERD (UNDP, 2019). The project is similar to a 
recommendation of the capacity assessment report: Knowledge Management of the ERD but 
no intimation is found that the project was implemented as a part of the execution element of 
the capacity assessment report. Another recommendation of the report was to set-up a 
Development Research and Analysis Cell, which has not been implemented, but a Section 
has been set-up within the DEW as Research on Development Co-operation (ERD, 2017).   
 
Line Ministry (LM) officials formulate and implement projects and therefore, aid 
effectiveness awareness is crucial on their part. In order to enhance their capacity to apply the 
principles of aid effectiveness and play a pivotal role in the LCG-WG at an economic sector 
level, a Capacity Assessment Report of five line ministry/divisions was prepared by a 
Bangladeshi consultancy firm: Infrastructure Investment Facilities Company (IIFC). 
Ministries/divisions involved included the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Education, 
the Power Division, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and the Ministry of Social 
Welfare. The report was submitted to the ERD in June 2016 and a number of issues were 
identified in implementing aid effectiveness principles. The major issues included a lack of 
dialogue with DPs, individual DP procedures, absence of aid effectiveness-related capacity 
development frameworks and training, deficiency, an absence of sector oriented aid 
effectiveness implementation plans, frequent transfers, vacancies in positions, extra duties 




The report emphasised effective training, ownership development and awareness creation in 
relation to the aid effectiveness agenda. It also recommended the introduction of a certificate 
course, awarding participants as „Aid Effectiveness Certified Professionals‟. The report also 
included customised aid effectiveness training modules for each ministry/division. As a long-
term plan, the report suggested Governmental institution mapping, donor process mapping, 
Government aid administration process mapping, standardisation of forms and templates, 
developing a national capacity building programme and a standard curriculum for aid 
effectiveness (ERD, 2016a). At the time of data collection, both LM and ERD personnel were 
asked about the status of implementation of recommendations from the report and both 
replied that no action had been taken to implement recommendations (Interviewee GE1, 
2017; Interviewee G12, 2018). It was disappointing to note this even though the report 
revealed a number of issues in line ministries when it came to implementing the aid 
effectiveness agenda.   
 
Bangladesh has undertaken various steps with the support of development partners to reform 
and strengthen institutions related to aid and development administration but it appears that 
reform and strengthening activities have failed to provide dividends as expected due to the 
lack of enthusiasm among related ministries/divisions to undertake the recommendations of 
studies and assessments.    
 
5.4.1.4 Aid Policy Dilemma 
 
Bangladesh does not have a consolidated aid policy as yet. Foreign aid is managed by rules, 
procedures, practices, directives and office orders issued every now and then (AEU, 2011; 
ERD, 2011; Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee P3, 2018). However, an aid policy with 
guidelines such as provisions for aid and preferred aid modalities, principles to follow in 
mobilising aid, procedures and corresponding roles, responsibilities for provision and co-
ordination and the management of aid can be an effective instrument for the Government to 
assert leadership over development, ownership and country level implementation. Studies 
find that a fragmented and unco-ordinated recipient policy regime cannot help to achieve 
ownership over development and is not helpful for the implementation of the aid 




The aid management organisation of the Government, the ERD, has a handbook that only 
contains guidelines for aid mobilisation. It appears from document analysis that the country 
started drafting an aid policy in 2010 (AEU, 2010a; AEU, 2010b). According to Government 
officials, a draft was prepared in consultation with DPs and signed by the Minister of Finance 
on 4 September 2017 and included in a Cabinet Meeting for review. It was subsequently to be 
presented in Parliament for approval (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee GE6, 2017). 
Unfortunately, the draft has not yet been included in any Cabinet meeting. Nevertheless, the 
draft aid policy is available on the ERD website, entitled „National Policy on Development 
Co-operation (NPDC)‟. The NPDC was one of the expected outcomes of the „Strengthening 
Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012-2106)‟ and the project was also financed 
for the consultation process of the policy (ERD/UNDP, 2011). 
 
Government officials were asked how they could manage aid without an aid policy. One 
senior official replied:  
 
 “At present we follow the Finance Minister‟s budget speech, ERD Handbook 
and other office orders given time to time to manage aid, and focus is to 
align aid with 7th FYP. But there is no clear idea of which area to address, 
from which DPs to take a loan and what type of loan to receive.‟‟ 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017).  
 
 
However, both Government officials as well as DPs understand that an aid policy can help 
co-ordinate aid management, establish dialogue mechanisms with the government and 
address long-standing issues such as harmonisation, fragmentation, proliferation, reduction of 
transaction costs and duplication of efforts (Interviewee GE7, 2017, Interviewee GE6, 2017; 
Interviewee D12, 2018). Over the years, the importance of an aid policy has been noted in 
studies and reports on ownership by the government over aid and a comprehensive 
application of the aid effectiveness agenda (AEU, 2010a; AEU, 2010b; Nadoll, 2010; AEU, 
2011).  
 
After a series of discussions over 2012-14 between Government agencies related to aid and 
development administration, DPs, CSOs, NGOs, private sector representatives and other 
stakeholders, the Government prepared the current draft of aid policy, entitled the National 
Policy on Development Co-operation (NPDC). The goal of the NPDC is stated as „to ensure 
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that foreign assistance follows national development priorities as determined by national 
development plans and strategies and supports the country‟s development efforts to bring 
economic and social benefits to the lives of the people‟ (ERD, 2017a; p. 2). The draft policy 
is divided into four parts. Part-1 is the introduction, which mentions scope and applicability, 
management of policy where the ERD is responsible for executing policy and communication 
mechanisms with DPs. Part-2 notes key strategic principles to be practised in development 
co-operation, with an emphasis given to ownership, alignment and harmonisation, 
transparency and sustainability. Part-3 relates to development co-operation and management 
and includes aid modalities, programme-based approaches, aid mobilisation processes, 
effective utilisation of aid, management of technical assistance, emerging development 
actors, the role of the private sector, CSOs, NGOs, stakeholders, accountability for results, 
transparency and predictability. Part-4 covers partnership and co-ordination mechanisms 
(ERD, 2017a).  
 
It was observed at the time of interviews that most leading DPs considered the NPDC draft to 
have been prepared in a way that favoured Government control over them. Some clauses in 
the draft contradicted their policies and therefore they could not accept the draft. They 
believed being dependent on foreign aid and considering the current level of capacity, the 
Government could not introduce such aspirational and stringent policies (Interviewee D4, 
2018, Interviewee D5, 2018; Interviewee D7, 2018; Interviewee D8, 2018; Interview D9, 
2018). 
  
 “By aid policy the Government of Bangladesh likes to establish greater 
control. ERD is looking forward to establishing more control […….] ERD 
can‟t become boss of DP. We are accountable to our people. We can‟t give 
our money to them. If they make it hard for us to do we would do it opposite. 
Nation Policy on Development Cooperation (NPDC) looks to ensure 
national ownership but we do not think it is real ownership.” (Interviewee 
D7, 2018).  
 
“Development partners felt that it placed too much limitations on 
development partners [……] too much control went to the hand of the 
government of Bangladesh […….] it is almost like just give us the money and 




Bangladesh operate now or want to operate in future. We very much want to 
be in a partnership with the Government because we think we have 
something to offer that not just financial resources. We like to think we have 
expertise in our own organization; we also have access to wide range of 
expertise within the UK and beyond. So, we can bring in technical 
assistance, we can bring in policy advice.” (Interviewee D8, 2018).  
  
DPs also believed that they were not appropriately consulted in the drafting process. In July 
2016, they sent a letter to the ERD after consultation in the Local Consultative Group DP 
Plenary, outlining their concern about project size, consultant appointments, excessive ERD 
involvement and similar issues (the interview was conducted on March 2018) without 
receiving a response from the Government. DPs also requested the Government to call a 
meeting discussing these issues but the authorities did not entertain this (Interviewee D5, 
2018; Interviewee D7, 2018; Interviewee D8, 2018).   
 
One policy maker questioned about DP concerns over Government control through aid policy 
said the Government did not intend to control DPs through aid policy, rather it drafted policy 
to ensure consistency in the aid management system and ensure aid was more effective. A 
draft NPDC was prepared in line with the spirit of the aid effectiveness agenda and a number 
of consultation meetings took place between the Government and DPs in 2014. Three/ to four 
observations on DPs were noted, all of which were believed to have been included in policy 
for sensible reasons. Draft policy required single projects except the TA to be in excess of 10 
million USD in order to be considered. Small projects would come under a project-based 
approach. It emphasised the appointment of local consultants whose costs should not exceed 
25% of the project cost. The policy also encouraged the use of Government procurement 
systems and Development Results Framework (DRF), prepared in consultation with DPs. The 
draft policy also encouraged budget support for aid and discouraged the Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU). He continued by saying that he did not see any problem in the 
inclusion of these points and believed they would solve long-standing issues associated with 
foreign aid. However, he also added that the draft was a living document and depending on 
the situation, could be amended. In response to the question, „why have they not enacted the 






However, it can be understood from discussions with Government officials that a fear of 
losing funds means the Government is not enacting policy at the moment (Interviewee G12, 
2018). The current approach is that since the aid is coming,  let it come. There is no need to 
control it (Interviewee P4, 2018). Despite global change, DPs believe they are at the giving 
end and should enjoy privileges, prerogatives and not be ruled by policy; it is a political 
position. Therefore, it might be argued that even if the Government introduces a policy 
without consensus, DPs will not adhere and this might be an embarrassment for the country 
(Interviewee GE6, 2017; Interviewee GE7, 2017). There is also a mind-set among leading 
donors that whatever policy the Government prefers, if it conflicts with their own policies, 
they will have to uphold it. This attitude is a threat to the Government. On the other hand, a 
DP representative believed most DPs do not like to see an aid policy in place because it‟s 
absence allows them to provide finance arbitrarily and enjoy the advantage of implementing 
their own objectives (Interviewee D12, 2018). Nevertheless, it might be argued Bangladesh is 
in dire need of aid policy for ownership and leadership over aid and implementation of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. Strong leadership can push aid policy forward, engaging DPs and 
making them understand the needs of policy (Interviewee GE7, 2017; Interviewee Ge12, 
2018, Interviewee P3, 2018 ERD, 2016a; Dristy, 2016).  
 
This discussion provides the impression that the Government vision to introduce an aid 
policy is in limbo. Government and DP positions are quite the opposite and DPs still hold a 
superior attitude as providers of aid, entirely against the spirit of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
The reality is that without such a consolidated policy, it is difficult to establish ownership 
over development and implementation of the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda to 
make aid effective.  
  
5.4.2 Evaluation of Alignment Principle-Related Policy Decisions and their Impact  
 
The alignment principle of the aid effectiveness agenda asks development partners to provide 
support to recipient development strategies, institutions and procedures related to aid 
management. From a micro perspective, it is fundamentally the use of country systems but 
that is not limited to public finance management, auditing, accounting or procurement. Rather 
it is the whole system of Government related to aid and development management. The 
principle encourages recipient countries to develop an efficient country system with the help 
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of development partners through continuous review and emphasises the use of that system by 
DPs as much as possible (Rahaman and Khan, 2010; Booth, 2011). Use of country systems is 
crucial for recipients because if they work with 50 DPs and if 50 DPs ask the recipient to 
follow their own systems, it creates a serious challenge for recipients such as huge transaction 
costs (Interviewee P3, 2018). The alignment principle also stresses simplification of DP 
procedures, untying aid, avoiding the PIU, funding for SWAP and budget support, recipient 
national strategies for country systems development and so on. The alignment experience of 
various countries is mixed and overall progress has been slow (Wood et al., 2011; Cameron 
and Low, 2012). There is a suggestion that DPs are not supportive in implementing the 
alignment principle by recipients (Cameron and Low, 2012) and DP procedures, internal 
requirements and limited local authority experience are a predicament to implementing the 
alignment principle (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011; Habraken et al., 2017).  
 
Scrutiny of documents and interview information reveal that Bangladesh has undertaken 
some initiatives to implement alignment principles over the years. Major initiatives of the 
Government-related alignment principle include: financial reform, the Public Money and 
Budget Management Act of 2009, the Procurement Act of 2006, the Procurement Rules Act 
of 2008, establishment of the Central Procurement Technical Unit (CPTU), e-Government 
procurement (e-GP), Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts (FABA) of the ERD and the Project 
Processing and Approval Manual, 2016. However, use of comprehensive country systems by 
DPs is still very limited.  
 
The GPEDC 2016 monitoring survey provided a more disappointing picture as presented in 
Table 1.3. The 2010 OECD-DAC survey showed that alignment of aid flows against national 
priorities was 100% but the GPEDC 2016 Monitoring Survey reported that it is now 89%. 
The GPED 2016 Monitoring Report showed a decrease in development co-operation in the 
budget which was 23% in 2016 and in 2013 it was 62%. A significant decrease was reported 
in the use of the procurement system; 42% in 2013 and now 21%. Use of the audit system 
was 87%, then 91% in 2013 (GPEDC, 2016a). DPs raise a number of issues including 
fiduciary risk and corruption as the main reasons for their very limited use of country 
systems. Corruption is also considered the main reason for less budget support and more 
emphasis on the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). However, the Government believes the 
country system has improved and DPs due to their institutional requirements, do not use it 
(EIP, 2015; EIP, 2016a; AEU, 2010a).   
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5.4.2.1 Public Finance Management Reforms   
 
It seems Bangladesh has undertaken a number of projects to strengthen the Public Finance 
Management system. Two long-term projects: Public Financial Management, Reforms in 
Budgeting and Expenditure Control, RIBEC (1992-2002) and the Financial Management 
Reform Programme, FMRP (FY 2002-2010) have already been implemented. The Finance 
Division, Ministry of Finance is currently implementing the „Strengthening Public 
Expenditure Management in Bangladesh (2007-2021)‟ project with the assistance of the 
DFID and the „Strengthening PFM Government Program to Enable Service Delivery (2019-
2024)‟ funded by the World Bank. With the assistance of the World Bank and other donors 
contributing to a trust fund, the Government has also conducted Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) reviews.   
 
These projects help Bangladesh to develop a Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF) and 
online budget systems iBAS++ (Integrated Budget and Accounting System). The MTBF 
provides an opportunity to link development indicators into the budget, which was not 
possible in traditional expenditure management budgets. It was found that the Government 
financial system is now computerised. Upazila and District level financial offices for 
example, are now connected to the national network. Financial rules and regulations have 
been consolidated and manuals help to run day to day activities. Financial information 
disclosure has also significantly improved as most budget information is on the Finance 
Division‟s website.  
 
It might be argued enactment of the Public Money and Budget Management Act, 2009 
changes many of the dynamics of the public finance management system. It makes the budget 
process more participatory and transparent, involving Parliament and CSOs. The Financial 
Management Academy (FIMA) is also established under the Office of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (OCAG) for capacity enhancement of key PFM staff. However, as most 
reforms are Ministry of Finance (MoF) focused, only the MoF benefits. LMs do not receive 
direct benefits from these initiatives (AEU, 2010a; EIP, 2016a). Nevertheless, in spite of a 
number of efforts, academic studies reveal the quality of the public finance management 




5.4.2.2 Procurement  
 
According to the norms of the aid effectiveness agenda, DPs should use country procurement 
systems and not ask for special or additional requirements for procurement works. 
Bangladesh has taken substantial initiatives to improve the procurement system with the help 
of DPs but the use of procurement system by DPs is low. DPs argue that it is difficult and 
costly for them to comply with each recipient‟s procurement system. It can also cause 
anomalies and complications. Therefore, as their procurement systems are internationally 
accepted, they encourage recipients to use these instead. However, the problem for recipients 
is if they work with 50 DPs they have to deal with 50 different procurement systems  
(Interviewee P3, 2018).  
 
The Government enacted a Public Procurement Act in 2006 (PPA), introduced Public 
Procurement Rules (PPR) in 2008 and established a Central Procurement Technical Unit 
(CPTU) in 2002 under the „Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED)‟, 
Ministry of Planning. It is understood that currently, the Government is trying to implement 
e-Government procurement (e-GP) and officials believe the Procurement Act and Rules 
contain features at international standards. They also mention that the CPTU has now 
published bid notice and contract award information on their website. Moreover, it is 
continuously providing training to Government officials involved in procurement to enhance 
their capacity (Interviewee G9; ADB, 2016; CPTU, 2017). Despite these initiatives, only few 
DPs use the Government procurement system for local procurement and for international 
procurement, all use their own systems (EIP, 2016a; Interviewee GE2, 2018). It was also 
reported in the GPEDC 2016 monitoring round that the use of country procurement systems 
had fallen from 42% in 2013 to 21% in 2016 (GPEDC, 2016a) 
 
Two major issues have been identified by different studies: efficiency of the procurement 
process and contract management and gradual amendments of the 2006 Procurement Act, 
which discourage DPs from using the Government system (AEU, 2010; EIP, 2016a; 
Interviewee P4, 2018; Interviewee D2, 2018). One DP representative said:  
 
 “After the enactment of procurement law, the use of country system has been 
increased. But the law was amended afterwards which brings changes like 




competitive bidding regardless of local or international. So, the Government 
has moved away from the original law, hence, we are saying that we can‟t 
use it. Now, the thumb rule is if any conflict arises in the procurement our 
rule will sustain, we tell that upfront.” (Interviewee D2, 2018).  
 
However, Government policymakers admitted to making a little amendment in the 
Procurement Law, increasing the ceiling of procurement up to 2 Crore Bangladeshi Taka with 
the minister‟s approval. However, they believed only for this small amendment, that DPs 
should not reject the whole procurement system (Interviewee GE1, 2017).  
 
Corruption is one of the main reasons for DPs to use their own systems instead of 
Government systems (Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee D12, 2018) and there is no 
significant measure for mis-appropriation (Interviewee D4, 2018). DPs perceive amendment 
of Procurement Rules over time has increased the scope of corruption (Interviewee P4, 2018). 
Furthermore, Government officials lack familiarity with DP procurement systems and 
capacity constrains take a long time to execute a procurement deal. This demotivates DPs to 
use Government systems. However, there is a view that DP approval of different stages of 
procurement together with the limited authority of local offices causes delays. This increases 
complications, which ultimately contribute to delayed implementation (AEU, 2010a). The 
Effective Institutions Platform organised a dialogue with DPs on the „Use and Strengthening 
of the Country System‟. DPs recommended a number of confidence building initiatives for 
the use of Government procurement systems. For example, translation of the amendment of 
the Procurement Act, 2006 into English, engaging in discussion with DPs over the next 
course of action, strict enforcement of PPA and PPR, annual post procurement review by the 
implementing agency and CPTU, involvement of stakeholders in the tender process, 
publishing of tender information online and publication of audit information on the CPTU 
website (EIP, 2016). One policymaker was asked about Government plans to execute DP 
recommendations and said the Government was reviewing all recommendations but he was 
doubtful that even if the Government implemented all DP recommendations, DPs may not 
use Government procurement systems due to their organisational requirements, where the 





5.4.2.3 Accounts and Audit  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda encourages DPs to use recipient government account and audit 
systems and do not impose additional requirements in terms of financial reports. It is 
expected that DPs should use national Treasury or banking channels such as the Bangladesh 
Bank for funding. However, the ground reality is different as stated by one interviewee:   
 
 “[……….] whatever resources coming in it has to be put into the treasury of 
the Government. You spent the money in your own way; for project purposes, 
for Government‟s purposes, for whatever purposes, anything and everything 
collected for the Government activities within the budget has to go to the 
treasury. But many of the development partners do not like to process the 
budget through the treasury. They put the money to the project. The 
development partners negotiate with the government into so many ways.” 
(Interviewee P3, 2018).  
 
 
The alignment principle stresses DPs should not use separate audit systems but in practice, 
DPs in Bangladesh ask for additional financial reports and hire private audit firms to audit 
project expenditure (Interviewee G4, 2018; Interviewee G11, 2018). The Foreign Aided 
Project Audit Directorate (FAPAD) of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(OCAG) is the dedicated body of the Government entrusted to audit all foreign aided projects 
and funds. The FAPAD was established in 1983. It presents Audit Inspection Reports (AIR) 
to the Secretary (Principal Account Officer) of the respective Ministry and DPs with proper 
accounting and use of resources (Khan, 2019). According to Development Credit 
Agreements, DPs are supposed to accept audit reports without objection (AEU, 2010a) but 
DPs believe FAPAD has a lack of independence and the timeline of audit is an issue in its 
audit process (EIP, 2016). It seems that during the last few years, the Government has 
endeavoured to improve the quality of the audit, computerise the system and prepare 
manuals. Currently, 64 District Account Offices including most of the Upazila Accounts 
Offices have a computerised system and offices are linked with Central Data Processing Unit 
(CDPU) of Controller General of Accounts headquarter. The Foreign Aid Budget and 
Accounts (FABA) wing of the ERD is responsible for foreign aid budgeting, data 
management and debt servicing in conjunction with the Bangladesh Bank and OCAG (ERD, 
2017). Document analysis reveals that the ERD has undertaken a number of capacity 
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development programmes for FABA officials. FABA uses an international aid data 
management system called the „Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS)‟ 
but a home-grown version called the Foreign Aid Management System (FAMS) is in the final 
stages before launch (ERD, 2017). However, despite these initiatives, the 2016 GPEDC 
monitoring round stated that the use of audit systems had reduced from 91% in 2013 to 87% 
in 2016 (GPEDC, 2016a). 
 
In recent years DPs have raised questions about Government audit quality, believing the audit 
system to be corrupted (Interviewee D4, 2018). Two DP interviewees opined that:  
 
 “When the project is finished an audit team came, saw all the documents and 
said there were lacking in the documents, you have to resolve those 
complains. Somehow we „managed‟ that and then report was good 
(Interviewee D12, 2018). We tried to use the GoB audit system but people 
are corrupted. An auditor raised audit objection and then ask to fund his 
local Mosque to resolve the obligation”. (Interviewee D4, 2018). 
 
 
However, the Government believes that due to head office requirements, DP local offices 
cannot accept Government audit reports. They ought to report to head office in certain 
formats which they are unable to change (Interview G12, 2018) and as the Government is at 
the receiving end and needs money, it cannot raise it‟s voice (Interviewee GE16, 2017). 
However, in education and health SWAPs, DPs have agreed joint budgeting, accounting and 
reporting processes (AEU, 2010a). A conclusion here from document analysis and interviews 
might be that different modalities exist in terms of use of the overall country system and that 
DPs and the Government are divided in their opinions. Some DPs use both Government and 
own systems (Interviewee G4, 2018). Another interesting modality is that DPs use their own 
systems with the permission of the Government (Interviewee D6, 2018). Few DPs use 
Government systems, except for international procurements (Interviewee D3, 2018; 
Interviewee D10, 2018; Interviewee D11, 2018). However, most DPs suggest Government 
systems are weak, there is a fiduciary risk and to be accountable, they use their own systems 
(Interviewee D12, 2018; Interviewee D5, 2018; Interviewee D8, 2018).  
 
Moreover, DPs also think that aid effectiveness declarations are not legally binding, rather 
they are a mere commitment and they need not comply with each and every component 
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(Interviewee D5, 2018). Conversely, one Government policymaker argued that a number of 
reforms as prescribed by DPs have been undertaken and if they still consider the system to be 
weak, it should be their responsibility because they fail to undertake reforms successfully and 
must find ways to use country systems. Otherwise, international commitment is irrelevant. 
Two major DPs [anonymous] and [anonymous] historically funded and designed reform 
programmes for public finance management but both of them used country systems on rare 
occasions, preferring to use their own systems because of convenience. He further added that 
the Government raised this issue at international forums but no improvement was seen at the 
country level and this is where the aid effectiveness agenda failed (Interviewee GE1, 2017).   
 
In summary, Government efforts at implementing the alignment principle bring few positive 
changes in public finance management and country systems. Nevertheless, most efforts are 
disjointed and there is no national strategy for country system development with the intention 
of enhancing efficiency of the whole system. On the other hand, DPs are not fully committed 
and still prefer to use their own systems due to their internal rules and procedures.   
 
5.4.3 Evaluation of Managing for Results Principle-related Policy Decisions and their 
Impact  
 
Managing for results emphasises aid money management and implementation in a way that 
produces desired development results and produces information to help improve decision 
making. It is expected that recipient countries will link national development strategies with 
budgets and formulate annual development plans for implementation. Recipients develop a 
Development Results Framework (DRF) in agreement with DPs, drawing indicators from 
national development priorities and goals to monitor progress of development against set 
targets (AEU, 2014a). DPs are expected to follow recipient DRFs aligning their performance 
management frameworks as far as possible (OECD, 2008; Busan Statement, 2011). It is 
found that aid effectiveness increases if it is well-linked with clear and simple outcomes 
(Habtom, 2016). However, the 2016 GPEDC survey found that the application of domestic 
monitoring and evaluation systems was only 52% (OECD/UNDP, 2016a). Progress of the 
managing for results principle is weak or low in Bangladesh (Welle et al., 2009; AEU, 2010a; 
ERD, 2016a) but the Government and DPs jointly measure MDG progress following 
international criteria, indicators and current SWAPs as examples of joint evaluation and 




The Government has a dedicated organisation called the „Implementation Monitoring and 
Evaluation Division (IMED)‟ under the Ministry of Planning for monitoring and evaluation 
of both Government and foreign aided projects. IMED conducts field visits to inspect 
progress of projects and submits reports to the President and concerned Ministers 
(Hamiduzzaman, 2014; Cabinet Division, 2017). Moreover, the LMs Planning and 
Development wing and the ERD also oversee project implementation.  
 
It was understood from conversations with IMED officials as well as from document 
analysis, that IMED performs 4 types of project monitoring and evaluation. Firstly, IMED 
monitors select, on-going projects from over a thousand projects implemented under the 
Annual Development Plan (ADP). Recently, it has taken initiatives to monitor all ADP 
projects but struggles to do so because of a serious shortage of human resources. Secondly, 
IMED evaluates the LM Project Completion Report. Thirdly, progress monitoring of a few 
projects already implemented and IMED engages a third party for this. 24 projects were 
monitored in the 2017-18 financial year. Finally, IMED also conducts an Impact Evaluation 
of those projects, which are implemented three years previously or considers their importance 
two years before hiring third parties. However, IMED conducts three-month evaluations of 
national, fast-track projects and sends reports to LMs, the National Economic Council (NEC) 
and the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC). These facts show 
that IMED project monitoring and evaluation is limited to few projects and due to the 
shortage of officers, (44 officers in May 2018 at the time of the data collection) it engages 
third parties for monitoring and evaluation. However, IMED is planning to introduce the 
Project Management Information System (PMIS) (Interviewee G9, 2018; Interviewee G16, 
2018; Cabinet Division, 2017) and general findings of IMED monitoring and evaluation 
include: funds allocated for one head being spent for another head, surplus funds not 
refunded to the Treasury, tenders not following Public Procurement Rules, bills paid to 
contractors before completion of work and contracts given to personal contacts. Nevertheless, 
IMED reports are not legally binding for LMs and therefore consideration of IMED reports 
depends on the will of LMs or concerned divisions (Interviewee G16, 2018; Interviewee G10, 
2018). A policymaker was asked about IMED evaluation processes and the quality of reports, 




 “[…….] as we are in the pathway of development there have to be gaps until 
and unless we are developed, bottlenecks will be there [………] IMED can‟t 
take LM to court for not considering their report. But we can bring it to the 
Prime Minister‟s notice. In each year in NEC meeting there is a slot for 
IMED to present their observation about LM projects. It is a good way to 
draw the Prime Minister‟s attention to this.” (Interviewee G2, 2018).  
 
 
Line Ministries also monitor the progress of their projects in the form of monthly project 
evaluation meetings where project progression reports from respective Project Directors are 
examined. However, Project Directors are responsible for the overall implementation of 
projects and if they prepare project reports, there is always a chance they will be biased. 
Hence, LM planning wing officers sometimes monitor selected projects. LM officers and DPs 
also jointly conduct field visits (Interviewee G10, 2018; Interviewee G16, 2018; Interviewee 
G12, 2018), the ERD monitors projects where disbursement is slow and organises a tripartite 
meeting with LM and DPs to understand the progress of projects (Interviewee GE12, 1017; 
Interviewee GE14, 2017).  
 
Document analysis shows that with an intention to implement Managing for Results 
principles, the Government for the first time in consultation with DPs and other stakeholders, 
introduced a goal, target and indicator-based Development Result Framework (DRF) in the 
6
th
 FYP. There were 35 indicators jointly developed by the Government and DPs, which 
provided a great opportunity for the Government and DPs to jointly monitor and evaluate 
development results for mutual accountability (GED, 2011; 2011a). However, although this 
initiative of the Government was appreciated by DPs, most of them did not use the 6
th
 FYP 
DRF. It appears that 35 indicators were indicative in nature and not representative of 
development targets. DPs observe that the DRF was prepared using the wrong data but 
Government understanding is that DPs were enthusiastic in developing and referring to a 
DRF rather than using it (AEU, 2014). There is a tendency among DPs to use individual log 
frames for programme monitoring or international online platforms based on the OECD 
standard Monitoring for Development Results (MfDR) to see outcomes and outputs of their 
development initiatives (AEU, 2014). 
 
The Government introduced a comprehensive and well-articulated DRF in the 7
th
 FYP with 
measurable indicators to monitor implementation progress with a vision to achieve 
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development objectives maximising the use of resources. There are 88 indicators to measure 
the development result of 14 economic sectors (GED, 2015). The 7
th
 FYP‟s DRFs are 
prepared in consultation with DPs but DPs still use their own DRFs to evaluate projects 
(Interviewee D12, 2018). For example, the World Bank and Asian Development include 
DRFs in their country partnership frameworks. They have incorporated few targets and data 
from the Government‟s 7trh FYP DRF and designed their DRFs considering their own 
priority areas (World Bank, 2016; Asian Development Bank, 2016). Given the use of 
different DRFs, outcomes of a project are reported differently by the Government and DPs. 
The DRF as a concept, is very new to Government officials and at the time of interview, 
many said that they were trying to acquaint themselves with it (Interviewee G12, 2018; 
Interviewee D4, 2018).  
 
However, on many occasions projects included in the Annual Development Plan (ADP) did 
not match with the FYP‟s priorities and therefore measuring the outcomes of those projects 
using a DRF creates a mismatch (Interviewee G8, 2018). It is evident that the Government 
has taken some initiatives to implement the Managing for Results principle, especially the 
incorporation of the DRF in the FYP and a decision to introduce a Project Management 
Information System (PMIS). Increased use of a DRF provides a dividend to the Government 
but DPs are not using a Government developed DRF. It is perhaps also true that the current 
monitoring and evaluation system is unable to provide information for effective development 
decision making.   
 
5.4.4 Evaluation of Mutual Accountability Principle-Related Policy Decisions and 
Impact  
 
Mutual accountability is a great paradigm shift as it does not only make recipients 
accountable for the ineffective use of aid but equally makes DPs responsible for failure. It 
stresses disclosure of information to recipients and DPs, and also disclosure to recipients for 
development planning, inclusion of different stakeholders in the development process, 
elimination of corruption, transparent public finance management and so on (OECD, 2008; 
Busan Statement, 2011; Monye et al., 2010; Booth, 2011). However, different studies and 
surveys find that the overall progress of the mutual accountability principle in recipient 
countries is slow. The GPEDC (2016) monitoring reports show mutual assessment review 
scores of recipient countries were 46% out of a target 100% (OECD/UNDP, 2016a). They 
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indicate Bangladesh has taken many initiatives to implement the mutual accountability 
principle such as involvement of people and parliament in planning processes, disclosure of 
information, enactment of laws and introduction of institutions.  
 
5.4.4.1 Inclusion of People and the Parliament and Disclosure of Information  
 
It is evident that as part of the accountability procedure, the Government is encouraging 
participation of stakeholders including CSOs and parliamentary oversight. Starting from the 
National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction-II (NSAPR-II), the Government is 
trying to involve all stakeholders in a consultation process and afterwards placing the 
planning documents in Parliament for debate and approval (GED, 2009). Moreover, the 
Government is trying to make the budget process participatory, accountable and transparent. 
It now places the budget before Parliament with a resource allocation plan including foreign 
aid and Parliament approves it after debate. Immediately after the announcement of the 
national budget, the Finance Division makes budget information available on its website. 
According to the Public Money and Budget Management Act (2009), the Finance Minister 
needs to place a quarterly review of the budget to Parliament (Talukder and Mobarek, 2018). 
Document analysis shows that Parliamentary Standing Committees of different ministries 
review implementation of the budget and the Auditor General‟s report on foreign aided 
projects is examined by the Public Accounts Committee. The Finance Ministry also engages 
select Members of Parliament, especially the Standing Committees‟ Chairmen in the 
consultation process. Recently, the Finance Ministry organised consultation meetings with 
think tanks, economists and CSOs before preparation of the budget. But oversight of think 
tanks and CSOs in budget and ADP implementation is limited and CSOs and think tanks 
organise pre and post-budget discussion events, express reactions and suggestions and 
organise events for ADP implementation and resource use (AEU, 2010a). Furthermore, to 
increase accountability of the Annual Development Plan (ADP) execution, the Government 
has taken initiatives to enhance Parliamentary oversight, is making procurement information 
public through the CPTU website and moving towards e-Government Procurement for more 





5.4.4.2 Anti-Corruption Initiatives  
 
Bangladesh enacted the Anti-Corruption Act in 2004 and subsequently, an Anti-Corruption 
Commission was established in the same year. Bangladesh ratified the UN Convention 
against Corruption in 2007 and the 2012 National Integrity Strategy is another example of the 
fight against corruption. However, the credibility of Government anti-corruption initiatives is 
yet to be proven (EIP, 2016a). 
 
5.4.4.3 Aid Information Management and Disclosure  
 
The Foreign Aid Budget and Account Unit (FABA) wing of the ERD is a Government 
incoming aid flow management organisation. It releases data through an annual publication: 
the Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh. FABA officials said they collected monthly 
information from DPs using a spread-sheet that includes information such as project details, 
previous disbursement, disbursements for the previous four quarters and disbursed amounts 
not liquidated (Interviewee GE12, 2018). FABA shares this information with the Government 
and internal bodies but has difficulties accommodating off-budget flows including NGOs 
finance, data on projected activities and includes entry errors (USAID, 2014). On the other 
hand, some DPs do not provide timely disbursement reports and although Project Directors 
report to DPs on project expenditures, sometimes they do not report to FABA (Interviewee 
GE12, 2018).  
 
The ERD has introduced an online aid management platform called the Aid Information 
Management System (AIMS) with support from the „Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012-2106)‟ project. The main objective of the Aid Information 
Management System (AIMS) is to create a common platform that facilitates Government, DP 
and other stakeholder access to real-time aid information. This supports efficient management 
of aid, increases alignment, transparency and accountability (ERD, 2015). The Government 
introduced AIMS on 24 October 2014 updating it continuously since (USAID, 2014). At 
present, AIMS provides data related to agreement signing, project approval, implementation 
status, planned completion, disbursement, exchange rates and aid effectiveness (ERD, 2015).  
AIMS requires DPs to enter activity and disbursement data, follows the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI) standard and can import data from IATI. AIMS produces 
more information than FABA, publicly sharing real-time data (USAID, 2014; ERD/UNDP, 
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2016). According to the Final Evaluation report of the “Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh” project, 39 DPs out of 47 were providing aid data on AIMS 
(ERD/UNDP, 2016). With financial support from “Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012 to 2016)” project, thirty DP focal points and thirty-three 
ERD focal points along with DEW staff were trained to ensure the smooth operation of 
AIMS (ERD/UNDP, 2016).  
 
Figure 5.1 Bangladesh AIMS General Concept  
 
 
Source: ERD, 2015b 
 
Remarkably, the ERD is one entity that co-ordinates all aid related matters of Bangladesh but 
has two different systems for aid data management: FABA and AIMS and this is 
counterproductive (Interviewee GE6, 2017; Interviewee D4, 2018). There is no link or 
information sharing between the two systems (Interviewee D6, 2018) and therefore, it is very 
difficult for DPs to provide aid information. In addition, there are three more Government 
systems where aid data is incorporated and mismatched: the Finance Division, the Bureau of 
Statistics and Bangladesh Bank (Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee P5, 2018). AIMS is 
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considered a DP initiative and the ERD compromised to get funding (Interviewee GE2, 2017; 
Interviewee GE6, 2017).  
 
The ERD expects DPs will input data but they do not know data entry frequency nor does the 
Government enter data properly (Interviewee D5, 2018). It is the perception of the ERD that 
OECD guidelines encourage DPs to enter data but some Government officials believe the 
decision to enter data by DPs was not appropriate (ERD, 2015; Interviewee GE7, 2018). For 
instance, some DPs provide monthly reports to AIMS (Interviewee D6, 2018), some quarterly 
(Interviewee D12, 2018), others twice yearly (Interviewee D10, 2018) and some not at all 
(Interviewee D1, 2018). DPs identify a number of difficulties in data entry such as the 
probability of double-counting in case of collaborative projects, entry of the same 
information by different donors, little scope to detect double counting, too many fields to fill 
in, use of different platforms and complexity of disbursement data reporting (Interviewee D4, 
2018; Interviewee D1, 2018; Interviewee D5, 2018; Interviewee D7, 2018; Interviewee D8, 
2018; Interviewee D12, 2018). Understanding these weaknesses, the Government reached an 
agreement with two DPs [anonymous] but their local offices lacked co-operation 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017). However, at the moment AIMS is not connected with the ministry 
information system (ERD, 2016a) and to increase acceptability and transparency, it would be 
appropriate to link AIMS systematically to IATI (EIP, 2016). 
 
5.4.4.4 Right to Information Act, 2009 
 
Government officials believe the Right to Information Act (2009) provides an opportunity to 
access aid data of Government entities (Interviewee GE1, 2017). However, the cumbersome 
procedure to process formal requests discourages people from doing so (USAID, 2014). The 
Government also introduced the National Integrity Strategy, 2012 for accountability of 
officials. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C and AG), including FAPAD submit their 
reports to the President and if the President wishes, the report is sent  to Parliament. Audit 
reports however, are not made public (AEU, 2010a).  
 
5.4.4.5 Development Partners’ Information Disclosure  
 
Donor disclosure of aid information to the public is still limited to online declarations of total 
cost, press releases, social media accounts and project launch events (USAID, 2014). 
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Disclosure of information and access to it is crucial for aid effectiveness but unfortunately, 
both the Government and DPs are not able to ensure either of these (Interviewee P3, 2018; 
Interviewee P5, 2018).   
 
 “[…….] they think that this is too much of the internal domain […..] to be 
looked upon by external people.” (Interviewee P9, 2018).  
 
   
It appears most Government initiatives in relation to the implementation of mutual 
accountability are not accomplished fully. The Government tries to ensure in-country 
accountability by engaging people and Parliament, disclosing information and taking steps to 
combat corruption. However, a true reflection of mutual accountability is far from reality 
because DP understanding is:  
 
 “We have our own accountability system and we are accountable to our 
people and the Parliament.” (Interviewee D11, 2018). “[However,] Mutual 
accountability is the super element of the entire cooperation but in order to 
achieve the mutual accountability the respective parties need the element of 
this accountability.” (Interviewee P3, 2018)  
 
   
5.5 Government Approach to Implement the Aid Effectiveness Agenda  
 
A scrutiny of Bangladesh‟s initiatives demonstrates that the country has applied a top-down 
policy model to implement principles and guidelines of the aid effectiveness agenda 
consistent with the top-down, upstream policy approach of the aid effectiveness agenda 
(Kharas, 2007; OECD, 2008a; Wood et al., 2008; Owa, 2011; Dabelstein and Patton, 2013). 
It is noteworthy that the Government by convention applies a top-down approach in 
implementing policies (GED, 2015) and the top-down implementation model advocates 
policy should be formulated at the top and implemented through strong command and 
supervision (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Parsons, 1995). It is understood from 
discussions that the ERD takes responsibility for policies in relation to the aid effectiveness 
agenda and uses different instruments such as a gazette, office orders, circulars and notices to 
communicate policy matters to all organs/institutions related to aid effectiveness for the 
execution of aid effectiveness principles. It is evident that Government initiatives on many 
occasions remain unsuccessful and fail to create an impact on internal governance of aid 
development and administration. The ERD‟s actions are restricted to policy formulation and 
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implementation with training sessions organised albeit without instruction materials or 
manuals provided to trainees.  
 
The ERD perhaps lacks political support from LM policymakers, guidelines to set-up an aid 
effectiveness wing or at least desks in LMs given political and organisational factors are 
important in top-down policy implementation (Elmore, 1979). It does not appear from 
discussions that the ERD assigns specific roles to officials or LM planners to implement aid 
effectiveness principles and it does not formulate well-developed plans such as step-by-step 
control mechanisms for the execution of policy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Most of the 
ERD‟s approach seems disjointed but under top-down policy implementation, a strong link is 
required between policy, implementation processes, a „good chain of command‟ and a 
„capacity to co-ordinate and control‟ (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Parsons, 1995; p.465).  
 
ERD efforts are mostly confined to circulars or training and lack implementation design, 
monitoring or linkages with LMs and divisions. However, these criteria are crucial for a 
successful top-down model (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1983, 1984). Analysis of Government 
processes indicates more focus on enacting laws and regulations, circulation of orders and 
publication of a Gazette rather than implementation and this approach has created an 
implementation gap. This finding is similar to Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Dunsire 
(1978). The Government has also overlooked strong participation from different 
organisations in implementation and also bureaucracy inside Government that seriously 




This chapter identifies Government initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and 
examines the impact of those on the internal governance of aid. The discussion responds to 
the first research question: Government initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda 
and its impact on the aid and development administration of Bangladesh. The chapter 
addresses the gap in the literature in relation to the recipient country‟s initiatives to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. It appears that as a part of its commitment, 
Bangladesh has undertaken a number of initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. 
For example, Development Effectiveness Wing, public finance reforms, procurement law, a 
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central procurement unit, e-procurement systems, development result framework and aid 
information management system.   
 
However, this chapter argues these achievements could have been more effective if all 
initiatives had been properly implemented as planned. In fact, most initiatives do not make it 
across the finishing line. A long-term plan exists but it is not clearly linked to the Medium-
Term Budgetary Framework (MTFB) and the Annual Development Programme is not 
properly aligned with the MTBF. The National Policy on Development Co-operation (NPDC) 
has been in draft stage for seven or eight years. Furthermore, the Development Effectiveness 
Wing of the Economic Relations Division has failed to create real awareness and know-how 
about implementing aid effectiveness agenda. The DEW is busy in undertaking and 
promoting development effectiveness agenda-related activities nationally and internationally. 
The „unfinished business‟ of the aid effectiveness agenda perhaps is not a priority.  
 
Few capacity assessment studies have been conducted, especially of the ERD and five Line 
Ministries, but where recommendations have been made, these are not implemented. With its 
limited capacity and resources, the Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Department 
(IMED) is unable to conduct extensive monitoring and evaluation of development projects. 
Moreover, LMs and ERD‟s monitoring and evaluation is not yet robust enough. Aid 
information is still considered a matter of the „internal domain (Interviewee P5, 2018)‟ of 
both DPs and Government. DPs still bear an attitude that they are only accountable to their 
people and Parliament (Interviewee D11, 2018). Therefore, mutual accountability is far from 
reality in Bangladesh.  A number of laws have been enacted and reforms have been 
undertaken such as the Procurement Law to increase use of country system. However, DPs 
argue Government systems are not yet reliable enough to use due to flaws in laws, 
amendments, fiduciary risk and corruption. On the other hand, the Government considers 
systems competent - DPs do not use them for their internal official procedures and systems. It 
appears the Government considers initiatives are not backed by political commitments and 
leadership lacks motivation to give a hard push and take such initiatives over the finish line. 
For example, aid policy can be a catalyst for implementing principles of the aid effectiveness 
agenda but it is in draft stage for last seven/eight years.  
 
A closer look at Government initiatives suggests core aid effectiveness-related initiatives are 
undertaken by project support and after the conclusion of the Strengthening Aid Effectiveness 
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Project in June 2016, very insignificant country level activities were initiated. This raises a 
question about Government ownership of the aid effectiveness agenda. On the contrary, DPs 
are supportive to Government initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda by 
providing funds through projects. However, due to political interests, internal rules and 
procedures, they show reluctance to execute the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda and 
fulfil commitments made in internal forums.  
 
This chapter indicates that although the Government has taken a top-down policy 
implementation approach to implement aid effectiveness, it misses some basic requirements 
to be successful. For instance, a well–developed plan, an effective chain of command, 
organised supervision systems and step-by-step control. As a result, although the Government 
is highly motivated to implement aid effectiveness, values of the agenda are still very much 







Government and Development Partner Implementation of the Aid 
Effectiveness Agenda: Collaboration and Impact 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter argues collaborative efforts by the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners (DP) to implement principles of aid effectiveness fail to create a 
considerable impact on the delivery and management of foreign aid. This is due to a number 
of issues in the implementation process. Very few achievements have been made as a result 
of joint efforts, for example, creation of awareness among Government and DP staff about 
aid effectiveness principles, formulation of the development results framework for the Sixth 
and Seventh Five Year Plan, capacity enhancement of Government officials and reform of the 
public finance management system. However, several long-standing aid effectiveness issues 
require significant co-operation from development partners. For instance, harmonisation, 
fragmentation, alignment, predictability, use of the country system, untying aid and budget 
support. These have not improved.  
 
The discussion here identifies reasons behind the poor performance of collaborative efforts, 
such as weak leadership and incapacity of the Government of Bangladesh, a lack of respect 
towards Government leadership by DPs, a dominating attitude, competing interests, political 
interests, internal systems, procedures and lack of authority in country offices. Furthermore, 
DPs intend to provide finance for activities related to the implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. However, when it comes to the execution of a decision, principle or 
indicator, which affects their business process, they show reluctance. Moreover, Government 
and DPs become active and perform different activities before international events, probably 
due to visibility, to showcase country level activities in international forums and confirm their 
commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
The PD Responsibility Distribution table in Section 5.2 shows that successful implementation 
of aid effectiveness principles requires individual as well as joint recipient and DP initiatives. 
Therefore, a continuous dialogue and comprehensive action plan are required under an 
effective partnership approach for the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 
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establishment of an effective dialogue mechanism and action plan, together with their 
successful operation is challenging because recipients and donors have their own priorities 
and interests and each donor has individual priorities and interests. However, without 
effective collaboration a recipient country cannot implement aid effectiveness principles. 
Especially harmonisation to ensure donor co-ordination and the eradication of long standing 
issue such as proliferation of donor and fragmented aid. Nevertheless, academic research, 
Government and international reports find proliferation of projects and donors, fragmented 
aid, lack of division of labour and donor co-ordination as the major challenge for Bangladesh 
to ensure aid effectiveness (Welle et al., 2009; AEU, 2010a, 2011; Thornton et al., 2010; 
Rahaman and Khan, 2010; OECD; 2011c; ERD, 2016a; Ahmed, 2017). Perhaps realising the 
importance of the collaborative approach for implementing harmonisation, the Government 
after the Rome Declaration in 2003 proactively tried to develop collaboration with DPs. They 
on the other hand, gradually showed interest to work together in implementing aid 
effectiveness in Bangladesh because of their international commitments.  
 
Chapter 2 shows aid effectiveness has been extensively discussed in existing foreign aid-
related studies from different perspectives, including implementation experiences of different 
countries. The existing literature however, provides little evidence about joint efforts between 
recipient and DPs in implementing aid effectiveness agenda at country level, along with the 
implementation of harmonisation and its indicators for effective donor co-ordination. 
Therefore, this chapter responds to research question 2: what are the collaborative efforts of 
the Government of Bangladesh and its development partners in relation to the aid 
effectiveness agenda, how effective have they been, and why have they often disappointed? 
The discussion helps to reduce the knowledge gap on joint initiatives between recipients and 
donors in implementing aid effectiveness principles, in managing aid and in flaws in the 
implementation process. It also further explains the implementation process of harmonisation 
and the difficulties in executing indicators. Importantly, the discussion unveils the experience 
of Bangladesh as a leading aid recipient country. Few studies have examined Bangladesh‟s 
experience in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
Four themes guide the discussion in this chapter: i. collaborative instruments between 
Government and DPs to implement the aid effectiveness agenda; ii. collaborative 
arrangements; iii. impact of collaborative arrangements on aid management; iv. collaborative 
policy implementation process. Section 6.2 outlines collaborative instruments and 
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arrangements. Section 6.3 examines the reality of collaboration and Section 6.4 assesses the 
impact of collaborative mechanisms on aid administration. Section 6.5 inspects collaborative 
policy implementation processes from the perspective of the top-down approach to public 
policy implementation. A conclusion to the chapter is presented in Section 6.6.  
 
 
6.2 Collaborative Instruments  
 
Collaboration between the Government of Bangladesh and its development partners is 
undertaken through two instruments: the Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) and a Joint Co-
operation Strategy (JCS). The HAP was signed in 2006 and the JCS in 2010. Government-DP 
collaboration, initiatives and evaluation are presented in subsequent sections.  
 
6.2.1 The Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) 
 
It appears from document analysis, that donor co-ordination efforts in Bangladesh began 
immediately after the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, when the Government envisioned 
an action plan for the implementation of the Rome commitments (AEU, 2010a). A task force 
was formed in 2003 under the Chairmanship of the Secretary, Finance Division. In December 
2004, the task force finalised and sent the draft to the ERD for consultation with development 
partners and Government line ministries before completing the consultation process. A PRS-
HAP Cell was also established by the ERD on 4 June 2006 to co-ordinate harmonisation 
related activities (ERD, 2007).  
 
 
It is also understood from document review that as the HAP finalisation process was going 
on, the Paris HLF on Aid Effectiveness convened in February 2005 and the Task Force 
decided to incorporate the Paris Declaration‟s commitments (ERD, 2006). After this, the task 
force was renamed and reconstituted on 2 March 2006 (ERD, 2007) as the Harmonisation 
Implementation Task Force under the Chairmanship of the ERD Secretary. The Finance 
Division (FD), Planning Division, Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division 
(IMED), the General Economic Division (GED) Secretaries, Development Partner (DP) 
representative Japan, the World Bank, the ADB, the Netherlands, Norway, USAID and the 
DFID were members of the task force (ERD, 2006). After a series of consultations with DPs, 
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line ministries and divisions, the HAP was finalised and approved by the Minister of Finance 
on 28 August 2006 (ERD, 2006). It had two major objectives: i) local adaptation of 
harmonisation and creation of awareness in ministries and divisions and ii) publicising the 
core message of harmonisation for effective donor co-ordination.  
 
An examination of the HAP document indicates clearly identified priorities, outline actions, 
expected outcomes, timelines for each action and distributed responsibilities for Government 
organisations and DPs. The document was structured into five sections: issues, actions, 
outcomes, timing and lead actors. In total, 32 issues were listed to be addressed by the HAP, 
including formulation of a Development Results Framework (DRF), increased co-ordination 
among DPs for awareness and implementation, alignment of DP assistance to planning 
documents, capacity enhancement for aid management and HAP implementation. The HAP 
moreover, included issues such as procurement framework preparation in consultation with 
DPs, common standardised documents for programme/project related activities, a 
programme-based approach and sector-wise priority alignment of DPs and the Government. 
Issues such as the reduction of transaction costs by joint missions, avoiding the Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU), disclosure of aid information by Government and DPs, making 
of aid policy and procedures transparent and review of implementation progress were also 
included in the HPP.  
 
The Harmonization Implementation Task Force, with the support of the PRS-HAP Cell was 
responsible for implementation, monitoring and reporting of HAP progress (ERD, 2006). 
However, the distribution of responsibility in the HAP was generic among Government 
organisations and the lead was not mentioned. In assigning DPs tasks, HAP only mentioned 
„DPs‟ but not specific DPs assigned to particular tasks. Out of 32 issues, only 8 came with 
time-bound targets but for the other 24, these were either „on-going‟ or „2005 and beyond‟ 
(ERD, 2006).  
 
With the approval of the ERD Secretary, the HPA was introduced in August 2006 and 
adopted by the Finance Minister of Bangladesh in the same month. The PRS-HAP Cell 
organised a couple of workshops to create awareness among Government officials and 
motivated them to implement the HAP but no progress was reported (ERD, 2007). However, 
there was no formal endorsement by DPs in signing the document or by means of a Local 
Consultative Group‟s (LCG) resolution. It was perhaps an aspirational document for donor 
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co-ordination and implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda because it had little impact 
on aid practices. The lack of ownership of the document and absence of an institutionalisation 
process of the action plan may be attributed to non-compliance of the HPA (AEU, 2010a). 
Afterwards, the HAP was assimilated into the Joint Co-operation Strategy.  
 
6.2.2 The Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) 
 
Perhaps as a testimony to the commitment made in international forums, the Government and 
DPs signed a Statement of Intent in August 2008 to develop the Joint Co-operation Strategy 
(JCS) with a vision to improve aid delivery and management that would ultimately contribute 
to economic growth and poverty reduction. The Government undertook a number of activities 
before signing the JCS. Between August 2008 and June 2010, the ERD organised three civil 
society workshops and a series of further workshops for over 200 senior civil servant officers. 
Participants stressed DP lack of alignment with Government development strategies, 
unnecessary conditionality, cumbersome systems and procedures and the division of labour to 
include and address through the JCS.  
 
In May and September 2009, the Government organised two High-Level Consultation 
Meetings with DPs for their input in the draft JCS. Ministers of Finance and Planning and DP 
country level senior officials were present. The Government organised a High-Level 
Bangladesh Development (BDF) Forum in February 2010, which endorsed the JCS process 
and committed to finalise it in the BDF Agreed Action Point. The Government held a final 
High-Level Consultation meeting on 9 May 2010 where Ministers, MPs, DPs and civil 
society representatives endorsed the draft with some observations (AEU, 2010b).  
 
Finally, the Government and its 18 out of 51 development partners including UN 
Organisations, signed the JSC in June 2010 for the 2010 to 2015 period. An action plan to 
implement the principles of aid effectiveness was also agreed; ownership, harmonisation, 
alignment, managing for results and mutual accountability with a special focus on 
strengthening country ownership, inclusive partnerships and mutual accountability. 
Development partners who signed the JCS included the UK, USA, UN, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, Japan, EU, Korea, Germany, Islamic Development Bank, Denmark, 
Australia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands and Canada. Evaluation of the 
JCS document demonstrates that a robust and participatory approach was adopted to develop 
188 
 
the JCS, placing emphasis on partnership. The HAP was also integrated into the JCS. It is 
believed that the JCS was a document to underpin aid effectiveness in Bangladesh with a 
slogan: how to work more effectively together to deliver real development outcomes. The 
main purpose stated in the JCS was the institutionalisation of an efficient mechanism that 
held Government and DPs accountable to each other for tangible and measurable progress for 
greater aid effectiveness in Bangladesh (AEU, 2010b; ERD, 2017b; Bjornestad et al., 2016).   
It appears from document analysis and information provided by interviewees that the pace of 
activities related to the implementation of the aid agenda increased just prior to or 
immediately after the international High-Level Forums or other aid-related events. Without 
exception, one month before the Accra HLF, the Government and DPs signed a Statement of 
Intent in August 2008 to outline a Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS). Similarly, the 
Harmonised Action Plan (HAP) was drafted before the Paris HLF in 2005 and was 
introduced after the Paris HLF in 2006, but no tangible action was taken to implement the 
HAP. Although the JCS was signed by the Government and DPs in June 2010, most activities 
commenced after the launch of the „Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in 
Bangladesh (2011-2016)‟ project in September 2011, three months before the Busan HLF.   
 
It was significant that the Government and DPs admitted to a number of aid effectiveness 
challenges in the JCS and promised to change the way they were doing aid business. The 
challenges identified in the JCS were: use of DP‟s own systems instead of the Government 
system, use of PIU, a limited programme-based approach, fewer joint missions, a variety of 
funding mechanisms with many DPs operating individually, fragmentation, the absence of a 
joint development results framework with specific measurable indicators and very slow 
progress of mutual accountability. In the JCS, the Government and DPs made the 
commitment to change their way of managing aid by addressing these issues. The 
Government committed to implement national development strategies in an inclusive way 
involving all relevant stakeholders, established linkages between FYP and ADP and 
continued reforms for the development of a country system. DPs also committed to respect 
Government leadership, extended support for the development of a country system, aligned 
aid with Government priorities and disclosed aid information. Very specifically, DPs 
committed to support a national development strategy, use the country system as much as 
possible, increase predictability, reduce PIU, reduce conditionality, explore a Government-






6.2.2.1 Mechanisms for Implementing the JCS       
 
The JCS adopted two mechanisms for the successful implementation of commitments: 1) 
Collaborative Dialogue and 2) the JCS Action Plan. 
 
6.2.2.1.1 Collaborative Dialogue 
 
There already existed three dialogue and co-ordination forums, chosen as a platform to drive 
the vision and implementation of the JCS: the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), the 
Government-DP Local Consultative Group (LCG) Plenary and the Government-LCG 
Working Group (AEU, 2010b). The Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) was identified 
as the highest forum to review development progress and the JCS Action Plan and outline 
priority and reforms for the coming years. It was also identified as a platform for DPs to 
announce their support for Bangladesh‟s development endeavours and make their 
recommendations for aid and development effectiveness (AEU, 2010a; AUE, 2010b). The 
second level was the Government-DP Local Consultative Group (LCG) Plenary, a 
mechanism for Government and DPs to engage in regular discussion regarding development 
challenges and progress of implementation of the JCS. The LCG Plenary is co-chaired by the 
ERD Secretary and the Chair of the DP Executive Committee (ExComm). The ExComm is 
the executive body of the DP plenary group. The third level was the sector-wise Government-
LCG Working Groups (LCG-WG). The LCG-WG is co-chaired by Government and DPs to 
work in sectoral and thematic areas except the Aid Effectiveness Working Group (AUE, 
2010b; GoB/UNDP, 2012).  
 
The LCG Working Group was given responsibility to agree on joint development results 
targets and a monitoring framework, define priority reform areas, discuss sectoral 
development priorities, facilitate alignment of aid with Government sectoral development 
strategies, co-ordination and co-operation to implement the aid effectiveness agenda for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The LCG-WG was considered the main forum to 
ensure harmonisation through joint programmes, share analysis and evaluation to enhance aid 
effectiveness, avoid duplication of efforts and encourage complementarity in programming. 
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The LCG-WG was supposed to provide regular feedback to the LCG plenary (AEU, 2010a; 
AUE, 2010b; GoB/UNDP, 2012).  
Government sector-specific officers and DPs involved in the sector constitute the LCG-WG. 
The LCG-WG is led by two co-chairs, one from Government and another from DPs. The DP 
co-chair is nominated for one or two years by DPs who are members of the respective LCG-
WG. Both co-chairs have a mandate to call meetings as needed and sectoral DPs or sectoral 
Government agencies can hold a meeting separately. The LCG-WG has authority to request 
an expert or Government agency officer to attend the meeting for opinion (AEU, 2010b, 
GoB/UNDP, 2014).  
 
Figure 6.1 JCS Dialogue Structure  
 
 
Modified following: AEU, 2010b 
 
It is noteworthy that the BDF, LCG and LCG Working Group are the long existing 
mechanisms restructured and re-emphasised in the JCS. Moreover, these types of 
mechanisms and forums evolved across aid recipient countries along with evolvement of the 






6.2.2.1.2 The JCS Action Plan 
 
The JCS document includes an Action Plan where actions were outlined and deadlines and 
responsibilities allocated to achieve milestones. It was said that progress of the Action Plan 
would be reported at the annual BDF. The Action Plan was a „living document‟ that would be 
reviewed, monitored and updated with changing priorities and achievements. The 
Government-LCG Aid Effectiveness Working Group was assigned to monitor the progress of 
the Action Plan and told that responsible parties would develop a detailed implementation 
mechanism and these were assigned for each activity. It was their responsibility to prepare a 
bi-annual report on the implementation and produce that to the Government-LCG plenary. 
On the basis of the reports, the Aid Effectiveness Working Group prepared an annual 
progress report for the BDF and an Action Plan for the following year. Government 
participation in the LCG was led by the then Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) and the LCG 
plenary was responsible for the review of the report and approved it following the JSC Action 
Plan (AUE, 2010b).  
 
Figure 6.2 JCS Action Plan Cycle  
 
 
`  Source: AEU, 2010b 
 
The JCS expired in 2015 and it was understood from document review and interviews that 
over the previous four years, the Government had been trying to formulate a 2
nd
 JCS. This 
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had been discussed in a couple of LCG meetings and a Joint Task Force of Government and 
DPs had been formed to prepare a draft (DEW, 2016; Interviewee GE1, 2017).  
 
6.3 Assessment of Government-DP Collaborative Efforts 
 
As one of the leading aid recipient countries, Bangladesh and its development partners have a 
historical collaborative arrangement for dialogue to take forward the development endeavours 
of the country. This collaborative arrangement evolved and transformed over time. The 
collaborative mechanism of the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), the Government-DP 
Local Consultative Group (LCG) plenary and the LCG Working Group are long-standing 
mechanisms, admired by the international community. However, the impact of these 
collaborative mechanisms generally remains trivial due to poor co-ordination coupled with 
capacity constraints and a lack of commitment from Government as well as DPs. An 
expectation emerged after the signing of the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS), the central 
instrument of aid and development co-ordination after 2010, as the JCS has upheld these 
three mechanisms: BDF, LCG Plenary and LCG-WG for the successful underpinning of the 
JCS Action Plan. Under the support of the „Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in 
Bangladesh (2011-2016)‟ project, a number of initiatives were taken to strengthen 
collaboration between GoB and DPs such as past experience review of LCG-WG, support to 
relocate LCG Secretariat, review of individual LCG-WG, re-structure LCG in line with 6
th
 
FYP and training for effectiveness of LCG mechanism (ERD/UNDP, 2011). This section 
examines the performance of collaborative mechanisms after the signing of JCS and support 
from the aid effectiveness project.    
 
6.3.1 Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF)  
 
Due to its historical position and High-Level representation, the Bangladesh Development 
Forum (BDF) was probably entrusted as the highest level dialogue platform by the 
signatories of the JCS to review progress, evaluate existing strategies and determine future 
priorities. Traditionally, the Government used to unveil its development strategy in front of 
DPs at the BDF, seeking their opinions and recommendations on effective implementation. 
DPs had the option of commenting on Government initiatives and pronounce their co-
operation. Hence it was perceived that the discussion of aid effectiveness at the BDF not only 
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notified High-Level representatives but also provided an opportunity to solicit their support 
for implementation of aid effectiveness agenda.    
 
A review of documents suggests the Bangladesh Aid Group (BAG) was the dialogue 
platform between Government and donors and also known as the Bangladesh Aid 
Consortium (BAC). It was renamed the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) in 1999. 
High-Level aid consultation at the BDF was used to convene in Paris under the auspices of 
the World Bank. The BDF was represented by a ministerial-level delegation of Government 
and High-Level DP officials to discuss country development progress and DPs made their 
views on future co-operation known (AEU, 2010a). After the formulation of the PRSP-1: 
„Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (NSAPR) 
(2005-2007)‟ and changing the dynamics of the donor-recipient relationship because of the 
influence of aid effectiveness agenda, aid consultation meetings started taking place in 
Dhaka. The first High-Level dialogue forum between Government and DPs convened in 
Dhaka on November 2005 in the form of the Bangladesh PRSP Implementation Forum 
Meeting (PIFM) alongside discussion of the PRSP implementation, Paris Declaration and 
Accra Agenda for Action implementation strategies. The next High-Level dialogue forum 
held on February 2010 was the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), which committed to 
implementing the JCS and discussing Bangladesh development strategy and future assurance 
of aid. A follow-up meeting from the 2010 BDF took place in November 2010 (AEU, 2010a; 
GoB/UNDP, 2012). Subsequently, two more BDFs were held in 2015 and 2018.  
 
It was declared in the JAS that the Government would organise a BDF every year to assess 
progress of the JAS Action Plan and determine the next year‟s actions (AEU, 2010b). A total 
budget of USD37,500 was included in the „Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in 
Bangladesh (2011-2016)‟ project to support the ERD for organising a BDF every year from 
2011 to 2015 (ERD/UNDP, 2011). Regrettably, the BDF did not convene every year and only 
two BDFs have been organised since 2010: the BDF 2015 and 2018 (GoB, 2015; BDF, 
2018). Therefore, the review of the JAS Action Plan and progress monitoring of the overall 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda remained unsupervised. It was also stated in 
the „Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh‟ project document that the 
ERD would follow-up BDF decisions and recommendations. However, the only follow-up 
meeting of the 2010 BDF was held on November 2010 but no follow-up was held after 2015 
or 2018. Thus, there is doubt whether BDF recommendations were properly addressed or not 
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(AEU, 2010a; Interviewee G12, 2018; Interviewee P3, 2018). The ERD organised meetings 
and undertook initiatives to implement the 2010 BDF communiqué. However, initiatives 
taken after 2015 and 2018 are not visible.  
 
Because of the consultation and agreement on the 2010 BDF and the signing of the JCS, DPs 
expected to be consulted on organising the BDF and finalising the agenda. Moreover, it was 
clearly mentioned in the JCS that the Government and LCG plenary would work together for 
the preparation of the BDF but after 2010, DPs neither consulted for the date nor asked for 
their input to finalise the agenda. At the time of the 2015 BDF, the then LCG plenary Co-
chair noted DPs were not consulted and the agenda was not agreed with them. The ERD 
Secretary and another Co-chair of the LCG plenary said that he did not think the Government 
made any mistake in doing so. The debate continued to such an extent that many people felt it 
impacted the 2015 BDF and also influenced the whole operation of the LCG plenary 
(Interviewee D4, 2018). Nevertheless, the Government interpreted this as the old dominant 
and superior attitude of donors, which undermined Government ownership and leadership 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017). This mind set over the period had contributed to the effectiveness 
of the BDF and overall progress of the JCS.  
 
The BDF was a platform for DPs to express their concerns to the Prime Minister, Ministers 
and senior officials about aid and development co-operation. There was a view that being 
afraid of the accountability issue, the Government hesitated to organise the BDF regularly 
and that accountability included both development practice and governance (AEU, 2010a; 
Nadoll, 2010; Interviewee P10, 2018; Interviewee G17, 2018). An interviewee expressed his 
opinion in the following way about the irregular BDF: 
 
 “[…….] the government has tremendously failed in organising the BDF, the 
discharge of their true accountability by placing them for critical review by 
the DPs, civil societies and academia […..] where there were issues of 
reporting, there were issues of governance, there were issues of continuous 
failure in terms of implementing projects.” (Interviewee P3, 2018) 
  
 
DPs observed proceedings of the BDF and talked frankly, exchanging views on core aid and 
development issues. However, they believed that the BDF was a good arrangement for both 
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the DPS and the Government to come closer. An interviewee of a development partner 
expressed his participation experience in the 2018 BDF as follows:   
 
 “The closest we go probably the BDF. There is no scope for discussion. 
Even the way the BDF was planned, the logical would have been to work 
through LCG […..] they invited a few Development Partners [……] it was 
weird [….] it could (impact) if it were done properly. Certainly, I do not 
think last one did, it was quite a funny event. The opening part was heavily 
political. PM spoke in Bangla, we got the translation. She addressed the 
nation than the DPs [……..] we were really keen [……] to see a proper 
discussion about Bangladesh is becoming a middle-income country, what 
does that mean? How do we need to plan now? How development 
relationship does look like? How do we need to plan? GoB was like that they 
do not want to do that there is a real sense that no, no, no. We wanted a 
proper discussion on child marriage, what can we do? What can be done to 
eliminate child marriage in Bangladesh? But the government, because they 
passed Child Marriage Restraint Act and there are issues there and again 
this is all political […..] I did not find this BDF terribly effective.” 
(Interviewee D8, 2018). 
 
 
The BDF was identified as the highest forum, resolved in the JCS and agreed at the time of 
the 2010 BDF, to discuss progress of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda and 
also to define future actions. However, an examination of BDF documents and observations 
of interviewees shows a different story. Discussion of the aid effectiveness agenda and its 
implementation was the most discussed issue in the 2010 BDF. In the 2015 BDF, the aid 
effectiveness agenda featured strongly in the deliberation of the Minister of Finance where he 
mentioned a number of challenges for aid effectiveness in Bangladesh. For example, 
proliferation of stand-alone projects, fragmentation, poor alignment due to the poor 
functioning of the LCG Working Group at the sectoral level, little harmonisation or use of the 
country system, Government incapacity and implementation lags. Nevertheless, he spoke 
positively about Government-DP collaboration and the JCS, LCG and LCG-WG 
mechanisms. The Minister also re-affirmed Government commitment, citing the example of 
AIMS, DEW and Draft Aid Policy (ERD, 2015f). A thematic session entitled: “Governance 
and Development: Strengthening Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation” was 
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delivered. Presenters of the session emphasised the use of a country system, a programme-
based approach, joint programmes and harmonisation and implementation of all aid 
effectiveness principles. They also stressed updating the JCS in a way that helped to achieve 
the SDGs (ERD, 2015e; Interviewee GE1, 2017).  
 
From seven thematic sessions at the 2018 BDF however, none included discussions on aid 
effectiveness. Moreover, no speaker including the Co-chairs of the Local Consultative Group 
plenary mentioned aid effectiveness except the Finance Minister who very briefly talked 
about the stand-alone project, use of a country system and capacity enhancement. 
Furthermore, a single sentence was included in the communiqué: „pursue all relevant 
international declarations and principles of aid effectiveness‟ (ERD, 2018; p.3) and follow-up 
meetings after BDFs did not take place. This situation revealed that the discussion about aid 
effectiveness had gradually been reduced at the BDF and no discussion was taking place 
about the execution of last JCS (2010-2015) or formulation of the next one. One reason could 
be the continuous amendments of the aid effectiveness agenda as well as the principles of 
international forums including the shift from aid to development effectiveness.  
 
With the recognition of the JCS, the BDF might have been a mechanism for the Government 
to establish leadership over development and engage with senior DP representatives for 
commitment and support in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda and aligning their 
priorities with the Government. Also, an effective BDF might have been a paradigm shift for 
Government ownership where DPs did not offer ready-made development packages, instead 
of soliciting DPs to support the development agenda. However, a myriad of issues affected 
the effectiveness of the BDF such as leadership conflict, Government fear of accountability 
and change in the aid effectiveness agenda. Therefore, it might be argued that the BDF failed 
to reach its full potential.  
 
6.3.2 Government-DP Local Consultative Group (LCG) Plenary 
 
A review of the document shows that the Local Consultative Group (LCG) was initiated as an 
informal group by the World Bank in the mid-seventies to help country  level co-ordination 
and dialogue between Government and DPs on development issues and economic reforms. 
Development of the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) and a follow-up of the 
memorandum of understanding signed at the Paris Meeting (aid allocation meeting for 
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Bangladesh) on key reform targets fixed for the coming years were the main undertakings of 
the LCG. It has evolved over the years in terms of its scope and importance and eventually 
became the main platform for Government and DPs to engage in dialogue and work together 
on economic development and poverty reduction. However, recognition of the forum for 
discussion and decision making in relation to aid and development effectiveness and 
implementation of development strategy by the Joint Co-operation strategy had increased the 
importance of the LCG (GoB/UNDP, 2012). The LCG Secretariat is located in the 
Development Effectiveness Wing of the ERD that supports the LCG plenary, DP plenary, DP 
ExComm and LCG-WG. It was established at the ERD with the support for “Strengthening 
Capacity for Aid Effectiveness” project. Apart from these platforms, DPs in Bangladesh are 
co-ordinated among themselves through a development partners plenary, which has a seven-
member Executive Committee (ExComm), three permanent members: WB, ADB and UN 
and four that rotate on an annual basis. The main objective of the DP plenary is to promote 
constructive discussion among DPs to contribute efficiently to the LCG-WG, LCG plenary 
and the BDF (Government/UNDP, 2014). 
 
The Local Consultative Group (LCG) plenary, a joint platform of DPs and Government, had 
been identified as the second highest forum in the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) signed 
by the Government and DPs. The BDF was prioritised as the highest forum for strategic 
decision but the LCG plenary was the forum for regular dialogue and determination of 
activities to implement the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda as well as the 
formulation of action plans for the overall improvement of the development administration. 
Very specific responsibilities as stated in the JCS included development challenges, national 
development plans and strategies, prioritising development initiatives and arrangement of the 
BDF. The LCG plenary also oversaw activities of the LCG working groups, directed and 
advised on specific issues and reported to the LCG plenary. With reference to the partnership 
approach of the aid effectiveness agenda, the Government and DPs agreed in the JCS that the 
LCG plenary would be co-chaired by the Government and DP representatives (AEU, 2010b; 
GoB/UNDP, 2014). The LCG plenary by convention, expected representation from 
Government Secretaries and Heads of Mission or Agency in meetings. The LCG was 
supposed to meet quarterly, however, the LCG plenary meeting could be held as required 




Document analysis and interviews reveal that JCS recognition had helped established the 
LCG as a core forum for the discussion of aid effectiveness and development challenges. 
Moreover, a revised structure from donor only to joint platform had given legitimacy and 
acceptance to the LCG (AEU, 2010a; ERD/UNDP, 2016; Interviewee P3, 2018). The LCG 
tried to address a number of issues through constructive dialogue and some eventually 
became actions such as the modified Development Project Proforma (DPP)/Technical Project 
Proforma (TPP) format for project approval, similarly, the ERD‟s tripartite field visit for 
project monitoring and evaluation or review exercises of LCG-WG activities. Additionally, 
priority identification and successful participation in international aid effectiveness events, 
surveys and contributions to the 6th and 7th FYPs. In particular, preparation of the 
Development Results Framework (DRF) formulation (GoB/UNDP, 2014).  
 
However, after the expiry of the JCS and the end of the “Strengthening Capacity of Aid 
Effectiveness” project, LCG activities have significantly reduced. In fact, they are now 
limited to infrequent meetings called by the Government on specific issues of interest. This 
gives the impression that owing to support from the “Strengthening Capacity of Aid 
Effectiveness”, it became active but failed to become institutionalised. Currently, it is not 
functioning as it should be and a number of studies report that from its inception, the LCG 
failed to reach its full potential (Nadoll, 2010, AEU, 2010a). After the signing of the JCS, it 
was expected that it would be fully functional and contribute to implementing the aid 
effectiveness agenda and help improve aid and development administration. Nevertheless, 
perhaps the LCG failed to create an impact as expected.   
 
Interviewees, Government officials, development partners and professionals, expressed 
different views about an ineffective LCG. Analysis of their views suggests weak Government 
leadership, capacity constraints, a lack of enthusiasm, fear of facing DPs for accountability, 
dominating DP attitudes as patrons, change in leadership and Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) were the main reasons behind a relatively ineffective LCG. Interviewees also 
suggested that as there was no Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and nothing mentioned 
in the JCS or the TOR of the LCG plenary about the procedure to call a meeting, it was 
totally to the Government when to call a meeting and for what purposes (Interviewee D9, 
2018; Interviewee D6, 2018). An initiative before the signing of the JCS to formulate 
„Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)‟ for the LCG was undertaken and a note was agreed 
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in a meeting of Government and DPs on 15 June 2009, titled “Note on Ways of Working of 
the Local Consultative Group”. However, the SOP was not formally approved and 
afterwards, a brief operational guideline was included in the JCS (GoB/ERD, 2014).  
 
There was also a suggestion from DPs that Government did not like to call LCG meetings 
regularly, rather when they needed. This, despite Government and DP agreement that regular 
quarterly meetings of the LCG would take place (AEU, 2012; Interviewee G12, 2018; 
Interviewee D5, 2018) rather than Government calling a meeting or cancelling. It seems 
evident from LCG plenary meeting minutes that the issue of irregular meetings was 
continuously raised by DPs and three future dates were fixed: May, the second half of August 
and October or November (AEU, 2013). However, the May and August meetings did not take 
place and only the November meeting was held (AEU, 2013a). DPs interpreted this as a lack 
of sincerity by Government in implementing aid effectiveness agenda, which caused doubt 
over commitment and discouraged them to become enthusiastic about Government initiatives 
(Interviewee D5, 2018).  
 
There were issues with DPs as well, who had their own country positions and sectoral 
interests at heart. Therefore, it was sometimes difficult for them to respect LCG decisions and 
ultimately they lost interest in attending meetings or avoided them intentionally (Interviewee 
D4, 2018). Nevertheless, a Government policymaker mentioned the dominating attitude of 
DPs and raised questions about the non-acceptance of Government leadership, which was 
against the spirit of the aid effectiveness agenda:  
 
 “It is not functional because of the attitude problem of the DPs. If an 
officer/country head of a DP makes any commitment in writing then can his 
successor disregard/change that commitment? […….] One institution but 
under the leadership of two different persons or for change of leadership it 
can‟t be two faces or totally two different types. As an organisation, they 
can‟t do that [……..] It is happening among DPs. We talk about country 
leadership and country ownership, but to implement this you have to accept 
my ownership and leadership, DPs do not accept this […….] LCG Co-Chair 




meeting or a message somewhere or news of international events, we 
participated, and to put that news in the LCG website […….] So, you do not 
accept my leadership.” (Interviewee GE1, 2017) 
  
He also continued by saying that attitude, commitment and behaviour vary from one LCG co-
chair to another and there were examples where LCG meeting minutes were approved by the 
co-chair in one week but took three months for approval of LCG meeting minutes by another. 
Due to such delays, meeting minutes were circulated late and DPs condemned them for it 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017).   
 
Few respondents believed that Government officials did not like to face DPs in formal forums 
such as the LCG plenary where accountability issues might arise. DPs could raise questions 
about project approval and implementation, corruption, governance or human rights 
(Interviewee P7, 2018; Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee G17, 2018). However, if 
Government cannot resolve these issues and is afraid to face DPs, the objectives of the JCS 
will be difficult to achieve (Interviewee P7, 2018). Professionals and academics who were 
interviewed had different interpretations about the non-functional LCG plenary such as the 
formation of the LCG, donor self-interest, unequal relationships and so on:  
 
 “There are two types of participation: tokenism and realism. LCG is nothing 
but a tokenistic participation […] you will find one coordination which is 
auto-coordination among the donors […..] I have my own development 
agenda […..] the money I will put to other countries, the project I will bring to 
other countries should be subservient to my own country‟s interest […..] they 
will try to maximize their own interest. I do not think there is any altruism in 
this, no altruism, altruism never works, it does not work, it is not altruism. 
Even if you say, in this, I see altruism then this altruism is equivalent to 
difference between grant and loan in our context. A grant is a precondition for 
a future loan under unfavourable condition [….] it is never joint, it is always 
patron-client in that patron-client patrons are very much united. So, its a form 
of „participation‟ its a form of „democracy‟, and this participation is more of 





“These are part of global capitalism. This is the highest that we are doing, 
more can‟t be done. You cannot prepare a round shaped cake with a square 
shaped format.” (Interviewee P5, 2018). 
 
“I feel, it is not functioning anywhere, in any part of the developing world 
because the negotiating partners are not equal. The recipient countries and 
the donor countries, there is huge inequality in the power and control in this 
process […..] objective is fine, objective is to give them parity or more voice 
but I am afraid, these are not functioning well and the objectives are unmet, 
it will remain unmet.” (Interviewee P8, 2018).  
 
It was understood from interviewees that the DP plenary also did function well because of the 
non-functional LCG. DPs routinely sat among themselves once a month for networking and 
sharing information. Various discussions took place but not in any formal way (Interviewee, 
D10, 2018), nor were they very effective (Interviewee D1, 2018) and neither did any 
ExComm meeting take place (Interviewee D4, 2018):  
 
 “No agenda, very casual, discuss whatever pops up […….] problem is DPs 
do not have a common agenda.” (Interviewee D11, 2018). 
“There has been discussion about National Policy on Development 
Cooperation; there have been discussions about harmonisation but they are 
not very conclusive discussions [……] the LCG ExComm, smaller group of 
people, trying to arrange discussion with the government [……] there is no 
sense that anything is changing quickly [….] same items pop into the agenda 




It seems an inactive LCG had also contributed to the causal approach of the DP plenary 
(Interviewee D11, 2018) and donors interpreted Government inaction differently. For example:  
 
 “At the same time, Government does not want to see the donors are in a group, 






However, one of the leading policymakers believed that DPs would never change their 
dominating attitude. The LCG was a DP idea to give them the satisfaction that they were on 
an equal footing with DPs but the reality was different. 
 
 “[…] it has to be inactive; it was never effective as far as I know. It was a 
choke. It was made by the so-called donors to keep us happy. It has no 
purpose.” (Interviewee G3, 2018). 
 
 
6.3.3 LCG Working Groups (LCG-WG) 
 
Document analysis suggests the LCG subgroups were launched in 1997 as a donor only 
group to discuss and address sectoral level issues and that the LCG subgroup. (GoB/UNDP, 
2012). At the time of JCS signing in 2010, there were 22 working groups but these had been 
restructured and reduced to 18 in line with the priorities of the 6
th
 FYP. Initially, the LCG and 
most of the LCG working groups organised meetings to evaluate development issues as well 
as progress of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda (GoB/UNDP, 2012).  
 
The LCG working groups (LCG-WG) had been defined as the central body for aid co-
ordination and implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. Eighteen 
sectoral and thematic working groups were formed to underpin the objectives of the JCS 
(GoB/UNDP, 2014). The JCS outlined the purpose of the LCG-WG as “to provide forums for 
directed and practical consideration of specific development sectors or themes, serving as a 
locus for information exchange, analysis, co-ordination and cooperation” (AEU, 2010b; p.6). 
It was stated in the JCS that the objective of the LCG-WG would be helpful to implement 
national policies in effective and co-ordinated ways at the sectoral level through results-based 
monitoring. The JCS also defined the scope of the LCG-WG, which included sectoral level 
co-ordination of the JCS, upholding harmonisation and alignment, avoiding duplication of 
efforts, complementarity in programming, promoting sectoral or thematic area based mutual 























Source: GoB/UNDP, 2014 
 
A review of the LCG-WG conducted by an independent research organisation in 2014, 
reported that with close monitoring from the then Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) and support 
from the “Strengthening Aid Capacity” project, the LCG-WG started institutionalisation. In 
2014, seventeen working groups were able to outline their TORs, eleven formulated work 
plans, each working group was meeting and posting minutes on the LCG website and 
working groups were including academic, researchers and experts in their teams. The review 
also stated that a process of the establishment of the LCG-WG was going on and Government 
officials and DPs were trying to work together closely. However, because of prolonged 




6.3.3.1 Issues in Operation of the LEC-WG 
 
It was noted from interviewees and the review report of the ERD, that in the consolidation 
process, Government and DPs started to understand the purpose of working groups 
differently. DPs saw it as a platform for the exchange of information on development 
activities, policy dialogue and achievement of results. Government officials on the other 
hand, considered it a forum for understanding DP views and activities and eventually 
engaged in discussions for fundraising. However, DPs did not believe that it was a 
fundraising forum. Government officials also believed that the working group should 
facilitate discussion on fragmentation, duplication of efforts, alignment, predictability of 
funding, harmonisation, simplification of procedures, joint mission and joint analytical 
works. However, DPs did not show interest in these issues and their interest in policy 
dialogue was interpreted as interference in internal Government matters by officials.  
 
Government officials also felt that DPs intended to make them accountable through the 
working group, whilst considering themselves accountable to the Bangladesh Parliament 
only. However, it seems they were ready to work with DPs on a project level accountability 
framework and officials therefore became confused about DP understanding about the 
purpose of the LCG-WG, which was totally different to their understanding 
(Government/UNDP, 2014). It appears from LCG meeting minutes that the misunderstanding 
was mentioned by DPs in the LCG-WG and plenary co-chairs meeting in March 2014 and it 
was decided that the ERD would organise an „LCG Orientation‟ programme for Government 
officials (ERD, 2014). However, the meeting requested working groups to emphasise core aid 
effectiveness issues such as co-ordination among donors, division of labour and 
harmonisation (ERD, 2014).  
 
There was an argument that Government representation in the working group was less than 
DPs and restricted to the ministry level - agency level officers were not included. However, 
there were working groups that dealt with cross-cutting issues, where representation from 
other ministries was required, such as health. For example, representation from the Finance 
Division or procurement department could help effective decision making in the health sector 
LCG-WG. Furthermore, to balance representation, the Government intended to include a 
member from ministry agency-level officials which ensured wider participation and 
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contributed to decision making. This was due to the low number of Government members in 
the group, which made it look like a „donor only group‟. (GoB/UNDP, 2014).  
 
Another operational issue that LCG-WGs encountered was the level of seniority. The 
Government co-chair of most of the working group was the secretary of a ministry, the 
senior-most operational position in the ministry. However, the DP co-chair was usually the 
relevant officer or someone who had sectoral or thematic knowledge. However, the 
Government expected the DP co-chair should be someone close to the rank and profile of a 
secretary such as a head of mission or agency. On the other hand, DPs felt expertise should 
be a criteria for a co-chair, not the official position. DPs‟ senior-level co-chair representation 
in policy-related working groups was crucial to Government (GoB/UNDP, 2014).  
 
It appears from the ERD‟s LCG review report that the transformation of working groups from 
the level of co-ordinated discussion and information sharing to co-ordinated actions remained 
inadequate. For example, most of the working groups failed to develop indicators to link 
development outcomes for results management, which could contribute to alignment, 
predictability and development effectiveness (GoB/UNDP, 2012, 2014). Inclusion of CSOs, 
NGOs and experts in the LCG-WG meetings was insignificant (GoB/UNDP, 2012, 2014; 
Interviewee P5, 2018). Some LCG-WGs remained inactive due to leave and transfer of both 
DP and Government co-chairs. Moreover, most Government officials perhaps failed to 
understand the importance of the LCG-WG. Therefore, in most cases ownership was lacking. 
Government officials furthermore, were not well coached to reap the benefits of LCG-WG 
ownership and leadership over development (GoB/UNDP, 2012; Interviewee P3, 2018). 
 
It was believed that the LCG-WG was the mechanism for aid co-ordination and 
implementation of effectiveness agenda. However, the general perception was that LCG-WG 
effectiveness in terms of aid co-ordination and policy dialogue varied due to leadership and 
dialogue opportunities. It was observed that the LCG-WG was not as fully explored as a 
mechanism to achieve alignment and harmonisation at the sectoral level. Most LCG-WGs 
were focused on donor co-ordination and information sharing rather than policy dialogue, 
implementation of the agenda or the results of monitoring (GoB/UNDP, 2012). In terms of 
achievement through policy, dialogue was limited and two policies had been pushed by the 
LCG-WG to be formulated: Social Protection and the Labour Act. Both Government officials 
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and DPs felt the LCG-WG was not a place to discuss all policy issues, especially sensitive 
ones for cultural reasons. They believed the LCG-plenary could engage at the ministerial 
level for discussion of sensitive issues (GoB/UNDP, 2014).  
 
It appears from a review of documents and interviews that a poor relationship existed 
between the LCG plenary and the LCG-WG and between LCG-WGs because of lack of co-
ordination and the absence of standard operating procedures (GoB/UNDP, 2012; ERD, 
2014). However, there were cross-cutting issues among LCG-WGs and an exchange of 
information and discussion was important. For example, the Water Management Working 
Group had a link with Climate Change and Environment. A lack of linkage between thematic 
and sectoral LCG-WGs also resulted in a duplication of efforts, especially in multi-sectoral 
areas such as gender or poverty (GoB/UNDP, 2012, 2014). Reporting to the LCG plenary by 
the LCG-WGs remained very occasional although they were supposed to report bi-annually. 
On the other hand, working groups considered their reports were not appreciated by the 
plenary and they also expected a bigger role to be played by the LCG plenary in policy 
settings (GoB/UNDP, 2012; ERD, 2014; Interviewee D11, 2018). 
 
The performances of each LCG-WG depend on the motivation of leadership in the absence of 
standard operating procedures (SOP). Change in leadership over time had also contributed to 
the performance of a specific working group. It is observed that previous DP leadership was 
also more motivated. Also, the change in co-chair positions at both ends because of transfers 
or promotion affected the regular flow of meetings (GoB/UNDP, 2014; Interviewee P3, 
2018).  
 
6.3.3.2 The Aid Effectiveness Working Group 
 
According to decisions made by the JCS, the Aid Effectiveness Working Group (AEWG) 
was responsible for the monitoring of overall implementation of the JCS Action Plan. It was 
also assigned to prepare the consolidated Annual Progress Report, accumulating information 
from LCG-WEGs and the JCS Action Plan for following years (AEU, 2010b). The Aid 
Effectiveness Working Group, as a functional working group tried to hold regular meetings 
and address aid effectiveness related issues. Evaluation of the meeting minutes of the AEWG 
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from 2011 to 2014 demonstrates that it held a number of meetings and contributed to matters 
such as Aid Effectiveness Surveys, the draft National Policy on Development Co-operation, a 
Concept Paper prepared for the Division of Labour with the assistance of the EU, the 
“Strengthening Aid Capacity” project‟s commencement and formulated the development 
results framework. The AEWG also prepared the JCS Action Plan Progress Report, drafted 
JCS Action plans, provided input to AIMS and LCG website preparations, organised the BDF 
and participated in GPEDC HLFs. However, despite a number of meetings it took almost 
three years from the signing of the JCS to finalise the AEWG terms of reference, which was 
unanimously endorsed in a meeting on 8 June 2014. Also, the AEWG failed to present a 
concept note on the division of labour that was one of the main targets to achieve through the 
JCS and JCS Action Plan progress report (AEU, 2011a; 2014b).  
 
6.3.3.3 Current Status of the LCG-WGs  
 
Due to issues such as Government and DPs ambiguity about the objectives of the LCG-WG, 
contending interests of Government and DPs, leadership conflict, irregular meetings, more 
dialogue and fewer outcomes, unequal representation, capacity constraints of Government 
officials such as English language proficiency, greater dependence on leadership in the 
absence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Government frustration over a lack of 
interest amongst DPs to discuss core aid effectiveness issues such as the division of labour, 
alignment and co-ordination challenges, a large number of LCG-WGs influenced the 
motivation levels of both Government officials and DPs to proactively engage and advance 
the LCG-WG (GoB/UNDP, 2012, 2014; Interviewee G12, 2018; Interviewee D8, 2018; 
Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee D9, 2019; Interviewee P12, 2018, Interviewee G11, 
2018). It also seems that a lack of monitoring and engagement of the Aid Effectiveness Unit 
and the Aid Effectiveness Working Group, coupled with an irregular BDF, inadequate 
activities of the LCG and the expiry of the “Strengthening Aid Effectiveness” project further 
contributed to the inactiveness of LCG-WGs (Interviewee G12, 2018). Above all, after the 
expiry of the JCS in 2015, no new co-operation strategy emerged between the Government 
and DPs. This released the obligation of both parties to remain active in the LCG-WG and as 
a result, all LCG-WGs are now inactive including the Aid Effectiveness Working Group. An 
exception is those LCG-WGs which operate under a sector-wide approach (SWAP) for 
example, education and health (Interviewee D8, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018). Thus, there is a 
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perception that the LCG-WG could have been more effective if the number of SWAPs had 
been increased (Interviewee D8, 2018).  
 
At the time of the interview, some DPs said that they had tried to push the Government to 
continue the LCG-WG forums for sectoral benefits:  
 
 “As long as [name of the ministry remains anonymous] is not interested in 
having a sectoral Working Group, you can‟t. We approach the Minister 
twice in three years but they are not interested.” (Interviewee D10, 2018). 
 
 
However, Government officials claimed that DPs disregarded their requests and removed 
incentives from the LCG-WG:   
 
 “If six DPs are in a project their missions come differently at a different 
time. We tell DPs for the joint mission, joint evaluation and joint reporting 
and joint work with the government. But we are not able to do so.” 
(Interviewee G12, 2018). 
 
 
6.3.4 The JCS Action Plan  
 
The JCS action plan was one of the mechanisms along with collaborative dialogue to 
implement the objectives of the Joint Co-operation Strategy. Two action plans were 
formulated between 2010 and 2015 during the JCS. The first one was for 2010 to 2011 and 
the second for 2012-2014 and later extended until 2015. The action plans outlined milestones 
and action points against five aid effectiveness principles and distributed responsibilities to 





Table 6.1 First Joint Cooperation Strategy Action Plan (2010 – 2011) 
 
 




















Source: AEU, 2012 
 
Although not within a target timeline of between 2010 and 2014, it appears from document 
analysis that a number of milestones were achieved through the “Strengthening Capacity for 
Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2011-2016)” project. However, the real impact, 
effectiveness and sustainability of these milestones are questionable. Under the ownership 
principle, the 6th FYP was consulted and approved with DPs and implemented through the 
Medium-Term Budget Framework. However, it was not fully functional and two capacity 
assessment reports were prepared to implement the aid effectiveness agenda: an ERD 
Capacity Assessment and a Line Ministries Capacity Assessment. An aid policy was then 
drafted, turnover of project directors did not fall, transparency and information management 
capacity was enhanced due to reform of the Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts (FABA) and 
the introduction of an Aid Information Management System (AIMS). Among the alignment 
principle‟s milestones, the procurement system was reformed including improvements in 
project approval and implementation. A notable feature included a standard format for the 
Development Project Proforma (DPP)/Technical Project Proforma (TPP). The approval 
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situation remained static in terms of non-governmental project implementation, public 
finance management was strengthened through the Medium-Term Budget Framework 
(MTBF) and iBAS++ (Integrated Budget and Accounting System), the PIU did not decrease, 
DP use of the country system was limited and a social protection strategy was formulated. In 
terms of harmonisation principle related milestones and actions, donor mapping was not 
accomplished, a concept note on the division of labour was drafted but not finalised and a 
new project-based approach was taken in health and education. However, a new partnership 
arrangement in new sectors did not progress and different aid delivery approaches were not 
reduced. In reference to the managing for development results principle, the LCG structure 
was revised and efforts were made to make it functional. A sector-related development results 




 FYP and an 
annual review against the DRF was not undertaken. Among the milestones and actions of the 
mutual accountability principle, the Bangladesh Development Forum is taking place but not 
regularly. An Aid Effectiveness Working Group was established, the country evaluations of 
the Paris Declaration were undertaken, DAC surveys were successfully conducted and a JCS 
progress report was submitted to the LCG plenary. LCG plenary meetings did not take place 
regularly and a country level aid effectiveness monitoring mechanism did not develop (AEU, 
2011a; AEU, 2014b; ERD/UNDP, 2016).  
 
Perhaps out of enthusiasm for success in the first JSC action plan, the Government and its 
development partners introduced the second JCS action plan for 2012 to 2014 with 
diversified targets and an optimistic time-line. Therefore, it seems that the success rate of the 
first action plan was perhaps higher than the second. This was raised in a meeting of the Aid 
Effectiveness Working Group on 8 June 2014 and it was decided that in future the JCS action 
plan should be formulated more realistically (AEU, 2014b). In addition, to increase the rate 
of implementation of the JCS action plan, in a LCG meeting on 17 September 2017, it was 
unanimously agreed that a mid-term rather than annual review of the JCS action plan would 
be introduced (AEU, 2014c).  
 
The above discussion shows that a good number of milestones were addressed. However, a 
closer look at these reveals implementation under Government in most cases rather than DPs. 
In particular, the division of labour, the use of a country system, a reduction in the number of 




Undoubtedly, the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) was a unique example of a collaborative 
arrangement to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. It was able to accommodate both the 
Government of Bangladesh and its development partners in the hope that many, mutually 
beneficial things could be achieved at the country level. The JCS helped reform aid co-
ordination, the LCG plenary, DP plenary and the LCG-WG. Moreover, an evaluation of JCS 
action plans indicates through constructive dialogue between the LCG-WG, LCG and the 
BDF, the Government and DPs were able to bring change to the aid and development 
administration of Bangladesh. For example, the introduction of a tripartite meeting as part of 
managing for results, mutual accountability, reform of project approval processes, aid 
information management, procurement and public finance management reform.  
 
However, from the Government perspective it was anticipated that the JCS would ensure 
harmonisation, division of labour, resolve core aid issues such as fragmentation, proliferation 
and duplication of efforts, alignment and use a country system and so on. Furthermore, it was 
expected that the LCG and LCG-WG would be institutionalised and the Government would 
achieve long-term benefits. Nevertheless, none of the platforms became institutionalised, 
perhaps because of Government-DP contending interests, DP preferences for own procedures 
and systems, priority of country strategies and interest, absence of standard operating 
procedures (SOP), weak Government leadership and the dominating attitude of DPs. With the 
end of the “Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2011-2016)” project 
as well as a lack of motivation, Government and DPs activities on all platforms were 
significantly reduced.  
 
 “The idea (JCS) was excellent for aid coordination and aid transparency 
and reduced unhealthy competition between donors. But it remains symbolic 
and both GoB and DPs are equally responsible” (Interviewee P4, 2018). 
"For effective aid mobilisation in 2009 a Joint Cooperation Strategy was 
taken to create a platform of both the GoB as well as the DPs to remain 
seriously active and vigilant in the development initiatives of the government 
as well as the participation of the development partners but somehow it lost 







6.4 Impact of Government-DP Collaborative Efforts on Aid Administration   
 
An examination of the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) document reveals that the 
Government and DPs were committed to undertake a number of initiatives to implement the 
aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. To implement the initiatives, two mechanisms were 
introduced: regular collaborative dialogue and an action plan. However, an evaluation of the 
collaborative dialogue mechanism, the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), the Local 
Consultative Group (LCG) plenary and the LCG Working Group in Section 6.2 of this 
chapter demonstrates that dialogue mechanisms were not as successful as expected. For 
instance, contending interests of Government and DPs, DPs preferences for own systems and 
priorities over country/organisation strategies and interests, absence of operating procedures, 
DP dominating attitudes and weak Government leadership. As a part of the commitment 
made in the JCS, Government and DPs implemented two action plans between 2011 and 
2015.  
 
However, an analysis of the execution of these Action Plans in Section 6.2.4 suggests mixed 
performance. This section examines the current situation of the core aid effectiveness issues 
such as division of labour to avoid fragmentation and proliferation, alignment, a programme-
based approach and budget support, predictability and untying aid, which are supposed to be 
executed through a collaborative approach where DPs as providers take initiatives and 
Government as recipient facilitates the process. As understood from the JCS document as 
well as from interviews with Government policymakers and officials, the Government 
considered the JSC an instrument to address the above mentioned core aid issues. The signing 
of the JCS document by DPs made them more confident.  
 
6.4.1 Division of Labour  
 
Particular importance has been attached to the division of labour of donors in all aid 
effectiveness declarations to address two crucial issues that impede aid effectiveness: 
fragmentation and proliferation, which means „too little aid from too many donors‟ (OECD, 
2011a; p.3;) and too many stand-alone projects. The ultimate result of fragmentation and 
proliferation is a huge transaction cost and most importantly, serious administrative burdens 
on recipients in meeting the requirements of each donor and many projects. Therefore, under 
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the harmonisation principle of the aid effectiveness agenda, division of labour is highly 
recommended as the solution to avoid fragmentation, proliferation and most importantly, it 
has been promoted as a tool to enhance complementarity and reduce transactions (OECD, 
2008). 
 
A survey conducted by the OECD in 2009 showed that the average donor presence in 71 aid 
recipient countries was 21. However, in Asian and African countries, the average donor 
presence was 26 (OECD, 2011a). According to the ERD website, Bangladesh hosts 51 donors 
including the UN organisations but the Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts (FABA) Wing of 
the ERD codes 68 donors in its Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS). 
FABA‟s record shows that 33 donors made contributions in the 2017-2018 financial years to 
development projects (ERD, 2017b; ERD, 2019). Furthermore, an examination of the Annual 
Development Plan (ADP) of 2019-2020 shows that the Government implemented a total of 
1,564 projects in the current financial year. Out of 1,564 projects, 89 were Government 
funded and the rest were entirely or partially aid funded. All of 17 sectors have aid 
dependency and 13 are „donor-darling‟ sectors and 4 „donor-orphan‟ sectors (MoP, 2019, 
2019a).  
 
Table 6.3 below shows the density of 45 DPs in major areas of economic development in 
Bangladesh and is prepared using different sources (ERD, 2017c; World Bank, 2016, ERD, 
2017b). Education has 20 DPs, Health 13, Skills Development 20, Environment, Climate 
Change and Disaster Management 20, Water and Natural Resources, Water Transport and 
Clean Water 15, Infrastructure 11, Governance 10, Energy, Energy Infrastructure, Renewable 
Energy and Power 15 and agriculture sector has 15 donors. Where the world average is 21 
donors in one country and Asia and Africa average 26, only the education sector of 
Bangladesh hosts 20 donors. Furthermore, out of 20 areas of co-operation, Japan provides 
funds in 15 areas, EU 14, the World Bank 13, the UK 11 and the ADB 10. Moreover, an 
examination of the Annual Development Plan (ADP) exhibits that Bangladesh in the last 
three financial years on an average, implemented  more than 1,300 development projects. It 
can be concluded from this information that aid is fragmented in Bangladesh along with the 
proliferation of projects. These data show how challenging it is for Bangladesh to co-ordinate 
around 50 donors and 1,300 projects every year. A recent study on “Aid Fragmentation in 
Bangladesh and Its Consequences” supported by the Social Science Research Council of the 
Ministry of Planning concluded that fragmentation is very high in Bangladesh, thus, the 
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expected result of aid is not achieved and projects become supply- driven. The Report has 
identified a lack of harmonisation among DPs as the main cause of aid fragmentation along 
with poor co-ordination between Government and DPs (Ahmed, 2017). This information 
underlines the importance of harmonisation or division of labour for the country.  
 














Therefore, Bangladesh and its DPs included implementation of the harmonisation principle in 
the „Scope of Work‟ of the LCG Working Group section of the JCS (AEU, 2010b). Realising 
the importance of the division of labour to harmonise donor actions, the Aid Effectiveness 





AEWG meeting minutes and interviews that a task force was formed to take necessary steps 
and prepare a concept paper on the division of labour and donor complementarity. 
Eventually, in 2011 a concept paper was prepared with the support of the EU and shared with 
AEWG members for their feedback. After review, AEWG members recommended more 
work on the draft and made certain changes. However, the issue did not move further ahead 
(AEU, 2010c; AEU, 2011a). The person responsible on behalf of the Government, also a 
Task Force member, was asked about progress and responded: 
 
 “Concept paper was finalised on Division of Labour and Donor 
Complementarity. All EU Members were happy to have division of labour 
and work in three sectors and if any DP likes to work in more than three 
sectors that DP needs to provide the fund in budget support or join in a 
SWAP. But big DPs like Japan, World Bank, ADB and other said that they 
have hundreds of projects, they work in many areas and they have their own 
priority areas and sectors so it is difficult for them to stick to three sectors 
only and it is difficult for them if government tells them to work in specific 
sectors which they are not interested to work because of their 
country/headquarter policy and strategy. So, except EU none agreed to 
division of labour. On the other hand, the government could not take a 





However, immediately after the Rome Declaration, four major donors the WB, ADB, Japan 
and the UK, conducted a review of donor co-ordination and harmonisation and formulated a 
Joint Strategic Framework (JSF) in 2005. They later formulated country strategies on the 
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basis of the JSF but did not implement it because of the absence of agreed practical steps to 
select specific sectors and a common monitoring framework (AEU, 2010a). A point to note is 
that DPs undertook the initiative of the JSF in 2005, the year of Paris Declaration, which 
again was linked with an international event.  
 
Thus, both Government and DP initiatives remained unsuccessful in implementing 
harmonisation and division of labour in Bangladesh. Previous research on donor co-
ordination in Bangladesh reached the same conclusions (Welle et al., 2009; Rahman and 
Khan, 2010). Government officials, DP representatives and professionals provided different 
views at the time of interview. However, all commonly identified two DP issues as 
predicaments to implementing the division of labour; a) donor country strategy or 
political/strategic agendas, and b) competition among DPs. Interviewees responded in 
relation to these views as follows:  
 
 “[…] the problem is every DP has his own agenda. Like [name of the DP 
remains anonymous] is under the MoFA that‟s why government thinks that 
foreign aid is one way of diplomacy […..] harmonization among the DP is 
not the reality. We do not see sprit among the DPs to implement 
harmonization because everybody has own agenda/ country strategy and 
they need to report to headquarter. They have their mandate from their 
government and we have our mandate from our government. So there is no 
scope of harmonization.” (Interviewee D12, 2018). “DPs have their own 
agenda, policies and strategies which drive them. So, it is simply not a case 
that we neatly put everything behind the GoB Five Year Plan […..] there 
were lots of discussions among EU partners about division of labour, no EU 
partner should involve in more than three or four sectors but that did not 
happen because everybody had their own agenda/interest.” (Interviewee D8, 
2018) 
 
[……….] we are our competitors […….] in the operational divisions our 
primary business is lending. We are a bank, we are a lending institution. 
Operation divisions‟ performance is assessed. How many projects did you 




[…….] it is project-based. Although I know it is supposed to be done by 
[name of the DP remains anonymous] but I would like to do it to become 
sector leader, for my credit. [……… ] I would like to take the project, I will 
not think that [name of the DP remains anonymous] in working in this area 
so let me not go there. As SWAP system is not in place I will try to do as 
much project as I can.” ( Interviewee D2, 2018).  
 
An aid management consultant talked about the dominating attitude of the major donor and 
said:   
 “DPs also has not been able to develop consensus among themselves to 
flagging their interest because there is also the play of muscles we see in 
Bangladesh there are five big muscles: [name of the DP remains 
anonymous] and small DPs have their dissatisfaction with the foul play of 
this big five. One, they want to get involve in every sector and they all want 
to involve in the construction sector where big money is involved. They leave 
no room for small DPs to raise their voice or get involved in the basic 
sector.” (Interviewee P3, 2018) 
  
 
Although some interviewees recognised SWAP as the solution to division of labour 
(Interviewee D9, 2018), most of them believed without head office or Government decisions, 
country level implementation of division of labour or harmonisation is not possible 
(Interviewee D12, 2018; Interviewee P8, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee D11, 
2018). Some interviewees mentioned that most DPs and perhaps Government understood that 
the division of labour or harmonisation was not possible, thus, although some discussion had 
taken place in the past, no discussion had taken place recently (Interviewee D6, 2018). 
 
However, some interviewees argued aid policy could address the issue of harmonisation and 
division of labour but due to weak Government leadership and non-cooperation from DPs, it 
was not approved. They believed that LMs could work with limited DPs comfortably and 
there would not have been any need for the ERD to engage in donor co-ordination. Hence, 
Government could relieve itself from the huge expenditure of 500 staff salaries, infrastructure 
facilities, cars and so on. Instead, funds could be invested for development projects 




6.4.2 Alignment of Aid with Bangladesh’s Priorities  
 
Alignment of aid with recipient country priorities is one of the very important criteria 
promoted in the aid effectiveness agenda. The whole idea developed as a solution to donor- 
driven, fragmented, ineffective aid (Khatun, 2008; Rahaman and Khan, 2010; Booth, 2011). 
A review of the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) document shows that both Government 
and DPs admitted to poor alignment of aid with national development priorities and 
committed to increasing alignment (AEU, 2010b). Therefore, after the signing of the JCS, it 
was expected that DPs would prepare their country strategy papers after deep consultation 
with Government and reach a consensus about priority areas of investment in signing the JCS 
(Interviewee P3, 2018). However, the consultation process did not take place and one 
policymaker stated the situation in the following way:   
 
 “Our voice is not reflected in Country Strategy Paper of DPs. They are 
following their old style. They come to us with a ready-made paper and just 
ask for our opinion but they do not involve us in preparation steps/stages. 
They bring a ready-made thing for discussion/input […….] time has come 
when DPs should identify what methods they like to use to align their county 




Furthermore, one respondent stated DPs had their own country priorities and strategies and 
these were the main driving force when formulating a country strategy paper. However, they 
would word that very carefully and say that strategy was aligned with the Government‟s 
Vision 2021, without mentioning which section or specific action of Vision 2021 was 
aligned. It meant they kept things vague (Interviewee P8, 2019). A scrutiny of some major 
DP country strategy papers supports this view but no specific alignment is shown in the 
documents. For example, the Asian Development Bank in its country partnership strategy 
(2016-2010) states that, “ADB assistance is strongly aligned with the Government‟s Vision 
2021 and its Seventh Five-Year Plan‟ (Asian Development Bank, 2016; p.1). USAID, in its 
country development co-operation strategy (2011-2019) mentions that, 
“USAID/Bangladesh‟s CDCS is based on Government of Bangladesh designed national 
plans, including the Sixth Five-Year Plan for 2011–2015‟ (USAID, 2011; p.5).” The World 
Bank says, “consistency with the Government‟s 7th Five Year Plan to ensure strong country 
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ownership” (World Bank, 2016; p. iii) and DANIDA‟s Bangladesh country programme just 
mentions, “the country programme is aligned with the priorities set out in Bangladesh‟s 
national development plans.” (DANIDA, 2014; p.1).  
 
Another view is that the way DPs are currently aligning their projects, is more of an 
alignment with the broader agenda of the Government than actual alignment with the 
priorities, which are outlined in the Five Year Plan (Interviewee P3, 2018). A recent study 
reveals that due to the lack of proper alignment currently, aid is not truly demand-driven, it is 
demand-driven in the sense that it falls under the wider requirement of the Government but if 
it is examined from the Five Years Plan‟s objectives, it is not perfectly demand-driven. This 
type of demand-driven aid is not well co-ordinated either (Ahmed, 2017).  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda considers budget support and a sector-wide approach as a good 
mechanism for alignment. However, the GPEDC (2016) monitoring report stated that 
development co-operation on budget decreased to 75%, which was 80% in 2010 and 84% in 
2013. The flow of external resources (2016) also mentions the decrease of budget support as 
shown in the Figure 6.4. However, DPs have different opinions about budget support and due 
to issues with Bangladesh Government systems, are not confident about providing budget 
support.  
 
 “If you look back few years ago [name of the DP remains anonymous] was 
massive provider of Budget Support, it is not all about the aid effectiveness 
agenda, it was about ownership and harmonization and use of country 
system. But accountability is not there, discussion of reformed was there but 




DPs believe that Government is not ready to take ownership of development and do not like 
to hand over money directly to them, believing Bangladesh can‟t use money effectively 




Figure 6.4 Aid Flow as Budget Support 
 
Source: ERD, 2016c 
 
Regrettably, although DPs made a strong commitment to increasing SWAPs in the JCS, the 
number of SWAPs did not increase. Currently, two SWAPs are functional as they were 
before the signing of the JCS. Moderately functional LCG mechanisms, the BDF, the LCG 
plenary and the LCG-WG probably failed to improve alignment of aid. At the same time, 
budget support decreased and SWAPs remained static.  
 
6.4.3 Predictability of Aid 
 
The aid effectiveness agenda stresses the predictability of aid under the harmonisation 
principle because unpredictable aid impacts planning and project implementation of the 
recipient country. Thus, the importance of predictability was clearly stated in the JCS vision 
that „we also commit to increasing multi-year predictability of aid flows‟ (AEU, 2010b; p.4). 
According to the GPEDC (2016) monitoring report, year-to-year predictability of aid 
increased from 61% in 2013 to 84% in 2015. A multi-term predictability target was almost 
achieved - 99% and 64% in 2013. However, disbursement beyond schedule stood at 54% 
(GPEDC, 2016a). Few interviewees expressed concern about beyond scheduled disbursement 
because it not only delayed project implementation time but also reduced grace periods and 
increased commitment charges (Interviewee P7, 2018).  
 
The ERD‟s recent report shows that the percentage of disbursement has increased by 1.6% in 
2018 compared to 2017. However, DP disbursement against commitment is still a great 
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concern and as a result of slow disbursement, in June 2018 USD 44.46 billion in foreign aid 
is now in the pipeline (ERD, 2019). Government and DP interviewees expressed different 
views at the time of interview. DPs said Government bureaucracy, corruption and poor 
implementation of the Annual Development Plan (ADP) were the reasons behind the delayed 
disbursement of aid money (Interviewee D11, 2018). In the 2017-18 financial year, the ADP 
implementation rate was 66% and the aided project implementation rate was 86%. DP 
disbursement depends on the utilisation of allocated funds, so slow ADP implementation 
impacts on late disbursement (IMED, 2019). On the other hand, Government officials and 
professionals believed DPs conditionality and bureaucracy including communication gaps 
between local and head offices were the main reasons for delayed disbursement (Interviewee 
G4, 2018; Interviewee P13, 2018, Interviewee P5, 2018).  
 
However, DPs felt conditionalities were agreed and incorporated in the agreement, so the 
Government had to implement these for smooth disbursement (AEU, 2010a). Since aid 
agreements are not made public either by Government or DPs, conditionalities become public 
when a failure to comply is reported in the media or some other public means. This creates a 
negative impression about Government and DPs, adversely impacting on DP-Government 
relationships, sometimes causing a delay in disbursement (AEU, 2010a). Although not 
significant, differing financial years of Government and DPs sometimes create problems in 
recording data and making disbursement plans (PRS-HAP Cell, 2008). Issues such as 
predictability or delayed disbursement require close relationships and continuous discussion 
between DPs and recipients. The JCS gave an opportunity to Government and DPs to take 
pragmatic actions but because of poor implementation of the JCS, predictability and 
disbursement did not improve as expected.  
 
6.4.4 Aid Modalities and the Tying of Aid  
 
Due to the absence of policy, aid flow in Bangladesh is donor-driven. DPs determine 
modalities such as project aid, pooled finance, programme based aid, buyers‟ credit, 
suppliers‟ credit, blended finance and climate finance through budget support (AEU, 2010a). 
The choice of sectors and modalities are also determined by DPs (AEU, 2010a). At the time 
of interview, a number of development partner representatives said that according to the 
rules, the Government was supposed to design projects and ask for aid from DPs. In reality, 
DPs prepared projects analysing Government priorities and asked the Government whether 
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they would like to take this project or not, which was outlined as a priority in the Five Year 
Development plan. Due to such practices, DPs were able to feed projects in their preferred 
sectors and determine aid modalities that suited them best (Interviewee D2, 2018; 
Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee D5, 2018; Interviewee D12, 2018; Interviewee D6, 2018).  
 
However, Government official sometimes felt that kind of practice happened but Government 
accepted DP proposals and aid modalities, afraid of losing funds (Interviewee GE1, 2017; 
Interviewee G12, 2018). Government officials also said that in the same way, DPs also tied 
aid and pushed Government towards a “take it or leave it” position. Furthermore, aid is not 
yet channelled to the Government treasury in all cases. One aid consultant to the Government 
said:  
 “[……..] this is peoples‟ resources, people want to know how they are being 
brought, how they are being expended but unfortunately the Government 
could not implement this. […….] but many of the development partners do 
not like to process the aid through the treasury. They (DP) put the money to 
the project. The development partners negotiate with the Government in so 
many ways [……] for bilateral donors, it comes to Standard Chartered Bank 
and for the Bangladesh‟s own budget Bank of America to Bangladesh Bank. 
For the bilateral donors‟  they actually issue a beneficiary cheque to project 
director through Standard Chartered Bank.” (Interviewee P3, 2018). 
 
 
DPs argue that being scared of corruption and a misuse of funds, they determine the best 
possible option to channel their funds, including creating pooled funds operated by UN 
organisations such as the UNDP. However, Government officials said donors like to use fund 
channel options to impose conditionality or tying. A DP representative said that tied aid still 
exists but in different forms as in the case of her country:  
   
 “DPs very smartly make aid tied although they always talk about untied aid. 
[Name of the development partner remains anonymous] in aid agreement 
mentions about technology or product which is not available anywhere in the 
world, so its look untied but practically tied. [……….]. Another example 
could be bidding process. Aid agreement will say that bidding is open but 




biding requirements […….] we have to remember that DPs will not provide 
money without their interest.” (Interviewee D5, 2018). 
 
Nevertheless, the JSC with its mechanisms such as the LCG and the LCG-WG‟s effective 
implementation and strong Government leadership may reduce aid modalities and tied aid but 
the situation remains the same as it was earlier. 
 
6.5 Collaborative Policy Implementation Process 
 
The Bangladesh Government and its development partners adopt a top-down policy 
implementation approach to implementing aid effectiveness, in line with the top-down, 
upstream policy implementation approach of the Paris Framework or the aid effectiveness 
agenda. This chapter suggests Economic Relations Division (ERD) officials, especially 
officers of the Aid Effectiveness Unit and later the Development Effectiveness Unit, in 
association with DPs, formulated necessary policies to implement collaborative mechanisms 
such as the Local Consultative Group and the Sector Working Group. Sometimes, the ERD 
included the Planning Commission in the policy formulation process but not line ministry or 
executing agency officials except few consultation meetings. The Government of Bangladesh 
by convention, applies a top-down policy implementation model to execute national 
development plans (GED, 2015). 
 
The top-down public policy implementation approach requires strong command and 
supervision (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Parsons, 1995). Policies formulated in 
consultation with Government stakeholders and DPs was  executed through office orders and 
circulars but responsibility for distribution among line ministries and agencies was designed 
by the ERD alone. Line ministries and agencies were later asked to implement policy with 
one or two days of orientation training without proper guidelines for implementation. The 
ERD, as a wing of the Ministry of Finance is a policymaking body and does not have the 
authority to command other ministries to execute policy. Moreover, the ERD does not have 
enough human resource to supervise around fifty line ministry activities. Therefore, the ERD 
failed to command other executing ministries and was neither able to supervise them. 
However, a strong Government commitment could be helpful for the ERD in applying a top-
down policy implementation approach and perhaps that commitment was missing. This is 
crucial in the top-down public policy implementation process (Elmore, 1979). As a result of 
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poor supervision, lack of training and appropriate guidelines, the ERD probably failed to 
provide a proper understanding of policies to the LMs and divisions.  
 
An examination of the March 2014 meeting minutes of Local Consultative Group (LCG) 
plenary and LCG-Working Groups (LCG-WG) demonstrates line ministry officials‟ 
misunderstanding about the purpose of the economic-sectoral LCG-WG. They thought the 
LCG-WG was for discussion of core aid effectiveness issues such as fragmentation and 
harmonisation but DPs considered it policy discussion and results management. That 
misunderstanding eventually impacted the operation and the forum became non-functional 
(ERD, 2014).  
 
The ERD also did not request the line ministry to appoint or assign an officer to oversee aid 
effectiveness related activities or mechanisms and the presence of development partners at 
line ministry-level forums such as the LCG-WG made the implementation process more 
complex in the absence of a proper distribution of responsibilities and rules of business. It 
also seems the ERD was an incoherent but strong link between the policy and implementation 
process. Together with stakeholder participation, this is very important in the top-down 
approach (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Parsons, 1995). The ERD has also overlooked Gunn‟s (1978) 
suggested preconditions for successful top-down policy implementation, for example a 
complete understanding of the objectives to be achieved, task specification, effective 
communication protocols and strong leadership for compliance. Therefore, not only do the 
Government donors have contending interests, Government incapacity or donor non-co-
operation contributed to the non-functionality or poor performance of collaborative 
arrangements. In addition, poorly designed and inefficiently executed top-down policy 







This chapter reveals that there has been a surge in interest among DPs and Government 
because of the commitments made at international level to undertake collaborative efforts to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. The discussion of this chapter corresponds to the 
second research question: collaborative efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda and impact of collaboration. 
The chapter minimises the knowledge gaps in relation to the joint effort of donors and 
recipient in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. It appears that Government‟s 
obligation to formulate an action plan, international commitment of both donors and 
recipients and peer pressure of some DPs to others perhaps contributed to signing of the Joint 
Co-operation Strategy (JCS) as a means of collaborative implementation of the aid agenda. 
The JCS was structured with four components: the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), 
the Local Consultative Group (LCG), the LCG Sector Working Group (LCG-WG) and the 
JCS action plan.  
 
A few objectives of the JCS was achieved that contributed to the aid and development 
administration of Bangladesh. For example, the jointly prepared and agreed Development 




 Five Year Plans, reform of public finance management, 
introduction of the Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF), a tripartite meeting for aid 
project progress monitoring and participation in international aid effectiveness surveys.  
However, the Government expected the JCS would help address fundamental issues related 
to aid effectiveness such as harmonisation, division of labour, alignment, predictability and 
disbursement and use of country system, which did not progress at all.   
 
The chapter unveils the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) was identified as an apex 
body for approving strategy and overseeing implementation of the collaborative efforts but it 
became irregular and ineffective. The Local Consultative Group (LCG) was recognised as the 
main platform for decision making and execution of decisions on aid effectiveness, however, 
eventually it became non-functional.  Furthermore, economic sector-level LCG working 
groups were created to deal with aid effectiveness issues at the sectoral-level, introducing 
effective policy and strategy and effectively managing appropriate projects but the LCG-
WGs was unsuccessful. Two action plans were formulated under the JCS, one for 2010-2011 
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and another for 2012-14. A scrutiny of the action plans shows that among the addressed 
actions, most were accomplished by the Government. For example, the inclusion of a 
Development Results Framework (DRF) in the Five Year Plan, Medium-term Budgetary 
Framework (MTBF), Project Proposal Format and Social Protection Strategy. However, 
planned actions requiring DP co-operation or support were not accomplished, for example, 
the division of labour, donor mapping, use of a country system and a reduction of the Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU).  
 
Evaluating Government-DP collaborative mechanisms, the BDF, LCG, LEC-WGs and action 
plans under the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS), this chapter suggests collaborative 
mechanisms were difficult to implement effectively, due to a number of reasons. These were 
the contending interests of DPs, a preference for own systems and procedures, prioritising 
country strategies and interests, differing interpretations of aid effectiveness principles, an 
absence of operating procedures, a lack of respect for Government leadership, a dominating 
attitude, weak leadership and capacity issues in Government. In addition, weak co-ordination 
among mechanisms and systems, and hunger for fund (Green and Curtis, 2005) and a fear of 
losing fund, reluctance to face DPs for accountability reasons and also the continuous change 
in the aid agenda at the international level. However, the aid effectiveness agenda clearly 
emphasises collaborative arrangements and partnerships, and principles are outlined in a way 
that they cannot be achieved without collaborative arrangements or true partnerships. 
 
The chapter also considers that the initiatives of collaboration and country level activities are 
international event-centric and demonstrate a visibility tendency. For example, the 
Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) was drafted just before the Paris HLF and was signed after 
the event. Likewise, a Statement of Intent to prepare the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) 
was signed in August 2008 and the Accra HLF convened in September 2008.  
 
The top-down policy implementation approach of the Government of Bangladesh in 
implementing collaborative instruments or mechanisms with development partners has not 
been found to be effective. A number of issues contributed to this, for example poor 
programme design where no link is established between stakeholder organisations, a lack of 
comprehensive guidelines and supervision, an absence of dedicated officials, task 
specification and organisations, effective communication and strong leadership for 
compliance. The presence of development partners at line ministry level forums such as 
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sector working groups made the function difficult in the absence of proper rules of business. 
A relatively ineffective top-down policy implementation approach had also contributed to the 









The chapter suggests the Government of Bangladesh and its development partners (DPs) are 
not striving hard enough to implement core aid effectiveness principles and indicators. 
Similarly, little enthusiasm is observed in activating mechanisms such as the Local 
Consultative Group (LCG), the Sector Working Group (LCG-WG) and the Aid Effectiveness 
Working Group (AEWG). A number of reasons are identified in the following discussion for 
this situation. For example, the impact of international change on the aid effectiveness 
agenda: from aid to development effectiveness, the inclusion of aid effectiveness principles, 
the framework of „unfinished business‟, the non-binding nature of the GPEDC framework 
and a lack of international initiatives at country level. Local officials believe the aid 
effectiveness agenda is no more a priority, there is an absence of project funds and 
implementation of some principles and targets has not been effective. Most interestingly, it 
appears from document analysis and interviews, that although there are no such activities at 
country level to implement aid effectiveness principles, Government and DPs are promoting 
previous mechanisms and initiatives in their publications and in international forums in such 
a language that aid effectiveness implementation mechanisms are still functional and both 
parties are still endeavouring to implement aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
Chapter 2 presents information about the impact of international change on the aid 
effectiveness agenda at countrylevel and the implementation status of „unfinished business‟. 
This chapter responds to the third research question, What is the current implementation 
status of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh and, why do the Government and 
development partners appear unwilling to implement it further? It aims to reduce the 
knowledge gap in understanding the impact of international change in aid effectiveness at 
country level and the current initiatives of recipients and development partners to implement 
„unfinished business‟. Furthermore, the chapter sheds light on a leading recipient country for 
foreign aid and co-chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
(GPEDC); the organisation responsible for aid and development effectiveness related 
activities. Most importantly, to the best of the writer‟s information, this is the first extensive 
documentation of Bangladesh‟s initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda as well 
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as the “unfinished business” of the agenda. This chapter investigates the situation of 
Bangladesh in order to fill some of these knowledge gaps.   
 
Discussion is guided by four themes: i. country level for the change in the agenda; ii. 
implementation status of “unfinished business”; iii. international promotion of country level 
activity; iv. policy implementation process. Section 7.2 examines the impact of the change in 
the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh.  Section 7.3 reviews the current implementation 
status of the aid effectiveness agenda. Section 7.4 discusses insignificant country level 
activities but their promotion remains the same in documents and at international forums.  
Section 7.5 examines current policy implementation process in terms of the aid effectiveness 




7.2 Changes in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda and Impact in Bangladesh  
 
Most of interviewees, Government officials, DPs, academics and CSO representatives, 
mentioned international change in the aid effectiveness agenda i.e. the shift from aid to 
development effectiveness, had significantly impacted country level initiatives (Interviewee 
GE1, 2017; P3, 2018; GE6, 2017; D10, 2018). One policymaker stated the shift from time-
bound, indicator-based assessment to a voluntary approach in 2011 at the Busan HLF had 
changed the dynamics and DPs at country level were not showing the commitment they did 
before:  
 “[……..] earlier when we worked together on any global issue like monitoring 
survey, evaluation or OECD activity or mutual accountability survey even in 
our local issues, each DP contributed directly and their commitment was 
there. But this is missing now. I do not know why this is missing. I raised this 
issue in global forum and they talked about manpower shortage in Bangladesh 
but whoever working in Bangladesh I see lack of enthusiasm among them. In 
every issue they like to see how much labour they need to give and other 
issues. It is a global commitment, I understand as a country I have the 
responsibility to implement it and it is also DPs responsibility to support this. I 





He continued by saying that [name of DP remains anonymous] agreed to support the 
Government in results management and mutual accountability. When head office organised 
meetings in Dhaka, their local office was not proactive. Likewise, [name of DP remains 
anonymous] appointed an international organisation to help the Government of Bangladesh 
with geo-coding of the Aid Information Management System (AIMS) but the Government 
did not receive the expected level of co-operation from DP local offices (Interviewee GE1, 
2017). Another interpretation was that under the “Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2012-2016)” project, the Aid Effectiveness Working Group 
(AEWG) undertook all aid effectiveness related activities. So, DPs were not required to 
involve themselves too much in day to day activities, since the AEWG took care of that. 
However, when the project ended it was expected that DPs themselves would perform aid 
effectiveness activities of their own but this did not happen either. Moreover, DPs were not 
extending their support for the second aid effectiveness project (Interviewee GE1, 2017). 
 
Conversely, some DPs thought their efforts had decreased due to the understanding that the 
aid effectiveness agenda did not work as expected and after reform from aid to development 
effectiveness, they received fewer instructions from head offices to implement “unfinished 
business”. Their understanding was that implementation was not at the top of their priorities 
(Interviewee D10, 2018; Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee D5, 2018; Interviewee D8, 
2018). Therefore, their head office efforts were reduced:  
 
 “There was a wave ten years ago and we really pushed hard to implement 
Paris [……..] there is also a kind of resignation that the Paris did not work. 
Now we are not serious. We were over serious. Even the mission came to 
review whether we were really implementing. We need to send reports twice 
a year as Paris Brief [………] I think there is no push to implement Paris. 
We still adhere to the principles, we talk about the principles but that drive 
to follow through has gone. It did not work.” (Interviewee D10, 2018).  
 
 
Another DP interviewee admitted she previously saw some activities to implement the aid 
agenda but currently did not see any (Interviewee D12, 2018). However, the interpretation of 
another DP about the lack of enthusiasm was that aid effectiveness principles and indicators 
were myths and thus, they lost interest in driving the agenda (Interviewee D11, 2018). Some 
DP interviewees felt the idea and objectives of the GPEDC were not clear to most DP local 
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officers. They might receive emails from head office but as head office were not giving as 
much importance to GPEDC‟s country level activities as they did previously, local offices did 
not take it seriously (Interviewee D11, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018). At the time of interview, 
a DP representative said that she was posted in Dhaka for two years and did not hear any 
discussion about aid effectiveness in her office (Interviewee D5, 2018).  
 
Another interviewee‟s interpretation was that as DPs did not ask their local officers to attend 
international aid and development effectiveness events and only head office staff attended, 
the whole idea was not effectively transformed to the local office as it could be if they 
physically attended those events. He continued that instructions came to the local office in the 
form of email or office orders to take action on aid effectiveness related issues. However, the 
current GPEDC discourse was not straight forward because it mostly talked about 
development effectiveness, which was a broad concept and also included aid effectiveness 
principles as “unfinished business”. Although it had an assessment framework, a combination 
of aid effectiveness and development effectiveness made it very complex. He also added that 
as head office did not give the same importance to development effectiveness that they did in 
the case of implementing the Paris principles. They did not provide any clear guidelines to 
their local office about implementation of the development effectiveness agenda as well as 
the “unfinished business” of aid effectiveness (Interviewee P5, 2018).   
 
Interviewees opined the Paris Framework was assessed with serious, country level 
engagement of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and continuous 
monitoring to oversee the implementation process at the country level. However, the GPEDC 
framework had given responsibility to recipient countries to assess themselves, including the 
implementation assessment of “unfinished business” (Kim and Lee, 2013). Previous studies 
have also pointed out this issue (Abdel-Malek, 2015). Interviewees believed due to this new 
country-led assessment arrangement of the progress of the GPEDC framework, the 
importance of the assessment was lost and there was a likelihood of bias in the process due to 
the possibility of a “a tick-mark” exercise (Interviewee P3, 2018).  
 
In the Paris Monitoring Survey, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) was 
directly involved in country level evaluation, involving Government, DPs and reports were 
collectively prepared by both. Thus, Government and DPs understood the reality of their  
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efforts and outlined future actions. However, in the GPEDC monitoring process, respective 
countries provide data in consultation with stakeholders and the Joint Support teams of the 
OECD and UNDP compile reports (GPEDC, 2018). This process undercuts equal 
participation of Government and DPs and impacts the ownership of the process. Moreover, 
there are views that as a consequence of overly focusing on SDG achievement, GPEDC 
attention focused less on the accomplishment of indicators included in the GPEDC 
framework and the “unfinished business” of aid effectiveness. One Government aid 
management consultant involved in the implementation process from the very beginning, in 
fact after the Rome Declaration of 2003, said:  
 
 “[…….] The focus of effectiveness agenda at the global level has been 
shifted from country-specific mandate to global mandate into the framework 
of Sustainable Development Goals. So the goal concept and the principle 
concept seem to be really different [……..] The current monitoring 
framework became a voluntary agenda of the development cooperation but 
during the Paris regime it was not as voluntary as it is now. It was almost a 
mandate to achieve the agenda of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, 
accountability and results. […..] When 12 PD monitoring indicators were 
developed that is being effectively monitored. And then what happened after 
Busan, indicators were there but it had been reduced to 10 indicators within 
that 10 indicators there was huge diversification and there was no 
coordinated effort […….] from Paris to Accra to Busan the shift has not 
been very uniformed, has not been very well thought of in the sense that 
Paris Task Force was actively involved and most importantly the dedicated 
team was there to achieve the outcomes […….] Working Party was very 
dedicated with responsibilities and reporting in terms of achievement of 
these outcomes.” (Interviewee P3, 2018). 
  
 
Unfortunately, the current GPEDC framework does not include any element of harmonisation 
and ownership (Cameron and Low, 2012) although result management, alignment and mutual 
accountability are included. It can be said that it is embedded as “unfinished business” but as 
result management, alignment and mutual accountability are included in the main framework 
of the GPEDC, there is no harm to include two indicators on ownership and harmonisation. 
An argument can be made that as these two principles are difficult for DPs to implement and 
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it goes against their own political agendas and systems, they have intentionally and wisely 
excluded „ownership‟ and „harmonisation‟ principle related indicators from GPEDC‟s main 
framework so that they face less pressure or challenge from recipients. An interviewee 
opined:  
 “In that perspective the whole spirit of the PD demands to enforce 
ownership, enhancing ownership and establishing ownership. In order to do 
this, it has created four other principles like the ownership will be effective if 
it is aligned with country‟s expectation, if it can be harmonised with 
countries rules and procedures and if it is being directed to achieve results 
in an accountable manner. So that was the critical area where it had lost its 
importance after Busan.” (Interviewee P3, 2018). 
 
 
A number of initiatives were taken as part of the implementation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda but due to the transformation at Busan, most were either stopped or did not progress 
as well as expected. The approach of the GPEDC is totally different from Paris and the way 
the GPEDC is structured, it is very difficult to have the same level of impact especially in 
relation to aid effectiveness. The Paris framework was developed giving complete focus to 
country level implementation, results and assessment (Booth, 2011). Recipient countries were 
focused on achieving the target which ultimately helped improve the system and enhance aid 
effectiveness. However, the GPEDC has broadened the horizon of vision giving more focus 
to goals than principles (Busan Statement, 2011; Bracho, 2017; Interviewee P3, 2018). 
 
A Government policymaker even expressed concern about aid recipient country interests as 
members, the structure and existence of the GPEDC. He said that aid recipient countries liked 
to see the GPEDC pay more attention and develop a concrete action plan to address 
“unfinished business” along with SDG focused activities. He mentioned two secretariats, one 
in the OECD and another in the UNDP, were a serious problem. It was understandable that in 
doing so, the donor community was trying to ensure UN affiliation and recognition for 
GPEDC‟s greater acceptance and image. However, it caused a serious operational and 
direction problems for the organisation. Moreover, he stated that four co-chairs and many 
members of the Steering Committee created operational problems and it was understood that 
the structure reflected an “accommodate all philosophy” of the GPEDC, which itself was the 




He continued that GPEDC was proactive in implementing SDGs and therefore it monitored 
progress through its monitoring framework but the UN had its own organisation, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the High-level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development, which was responsible for the progress, monitoring and 
implementation of SDGs. On the one hand, the GPEDC was giving less effort to drive 
“unfinished business” and on the other, it was giving more emphasis to the implementation of 
SDGs where ECOSOC was leading the agenda. This policymaker also said that they worked 
closely with UN organisations including ECOSOC on implementation and monitoring of 
SDGs. Thus, if the GPEDC only undertook similar activities without focusing on “unfinished 
business”, aid recipient members would lose interest. He expressed concern about the future 
of GPEDC (Interviewee GE1, 2019). Another interviewee stated: 
  
 “The whole perspective of relationship in the GPEDC has become a 
convenience shopping; participating in global agenda, participating in 
global dissemination, seminars, symposium and other things […….].” 
(Interviewee P3, 2018).  
  
 
The international event focused country level activities of the aid effectiveness agenda have 
been extensively discussed in Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of Chapter 6. It appears that both 
Government and DPs became active, either before or after an international event in preparing 
evaluation or progress reports, setting-up organisations and committees and holding meetings 
or country level events. Perhaps before international events, they worked on the commitments 
and issues they were supposed to address so that they could showcase these and appear active 
and committed to implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. Similarly, country level 
activities increased immediately after an international event as different decisions were made 
and certain actions were agreed for implementation instantly. Although the GPEDC holds 
High-Level Forums, Steering Committee meetings, promotes “unfinished business” after the 
Busan HLF and the dissolution of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, a number of 
international events and other undertakings related to the aid effectiveness agenda have 
reduced significantly. This reduction contributed to fewer country level activities in relation 
to the aid effectiveness agenda.   
 
Furthermore, it is also evident from the discussion in chapters 5 and 6 that most aid 
effectiveness-related activities were undertaken with financial support from “Strengthening 
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Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2011-16)”. For example, the Aid Information 
Management System (AIMS), the Development Finance Assessment (DFA), Capacity 
Assessment Reports of the Economic Relations Division (ERD) and five line ministries, a 
draft national policy on development co-operation and support to the Local Consultative 
Group (LCG) and the Working Group (LCG-WG) and organising the Bangladesh 
Development Forum (BDF). However, after the end of the “Strengthening Capacity for Aid 
Effectiveness in Bangladesh” project in 2016, the Economic Relations Division (ERD) did 
not take any project dedicated to the aid effectiveness agenda or “unfinished business”. 
Though it is expected that the Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW) of the ERD might 
undertake activities related to aid effectiveness, it‟s activities diverted to routine activities 
such as participation in GPEDC events and desk-work for GPEDC monitoring surveys. The 
DEW is also supposed to provide secretarial support to the LCG and the LCG-WG but both 
of these mechanisms are currently inactive. Sharing her experience, one development partner 
interviewee said:  
 
 “Government did not talk to DP about GPEDC objectives and ask for DPs‟ 
support […….] Most of the DPs do not know 10 priorities of GPEDC.” 
(Interviewee D4, 2018).  
 
 
7.3 Current Implementation Status of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda  
 
The positive intent of both the Government of Bangladesh and its development partners to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda was reflected in the signing of the Joint Co-operation 
Strategy (JCS) in 2010 and ensuring implementation through “Strengthening Capacity for 
Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2011-2016)”. As mentioned in the JCS document, the goal 
of the JCS was to introduce different mechanisms to implement aid effectiveness and the 
main objective of the project was to develop an effective, transparent and accountable aid 
management system that ensured aid effectiveness (AEU, 2010b; ERD/UNDP, 2011). It was 
understood from both Government and DP interviews that signing of the JCS and funding 
support from “Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness” would help to establish a 
permanent, organisational set-up to deal with aid and development effectiveness issues. 
However, the discussion in chapters 5 and 6 suggests the organisational set-up and 
mechanism were not successfully implemented. Mechanisms which were introduced, did not 
function as expected. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Development Effectiveness 
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Wing (DEW) in the Economic Relations Division (ERD), a dedicated wing to undertake all 
activities related to aid and development effectiveness on behalf of the Government, was a 
notable success and it was expected that the DEW would take initiatives to implement aid 
effectiveness. However, the function of the DEW over the period became diverse. 
Organisational focus shifted along with implementation. The following is a brief description 
about DEW‟s branch and sections, to give some idea about diversification of activities and 
engagements (ERD, 2017).   
 
DEW comprises three branches and six sections. The branches are External Economic Policy 
(EEP) with sections EEP-1 and EEP-2, Development Partnership Management and AIMS 
with Development Partnership Management-LCG and Development Co-operation 
Information Management-AIMS sections and Innovative/Climate Financing and Research 
with Innovative/CC Financing and Research on Development Co-operation sections. The 
activities of each branch and section are briefly discussed as follows. The main functions of 
the EEP branch foreign assistance related policy formulation and implementation, collection 
of information on the international economy, international economic relations, co-ordination 
and communication with international organisations, representing ERD‟s membership 
internationally, research on economic and development policy and ERD‟s documentation and 
Library (ERDOC) management. Section one of the EEP is assigned for policy formulation 
related to development co-operation, matters related to the ECOSOC second committee-
UNGA, least developed countries (LDCs), the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA), the UN 
ESCAP and world economic outlook. Section two looks after matters related to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, the Colombo Plan, NAM and SAARC, and prepares briefings for 
the Finance Minister and other Senior Finance Officials (ERD, 2017).  
 
The Development Partnership Management and AIMS branch is responsible for the effective 
use of foreign aid, co-ordination with GPEDC, the Asia-Pacific Development Effectiveness 
Facility (AP-DEF), the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), the South-South 
Institute and related organisations, the Local Consultative Group (LCG) secretariat, the Aid 
Effectiveness Working Group (AEWG), the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), AIMS 
related activities and the Annual Performance Agreement (APA). Sections three and four of 
the wing are under this branch. Section three represents the ERD at all national meetings in 
relation to development effectiveness, co-ordination of all development and aid effectiveness 
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related organisations such as the GPEDC, IATA and AP-DEF, the secretarial service to the 
LCG, communicates decisions taken at international forums about aid or development 
effectiveness to concerned ministries and agencies and co-ordinates national plans related to 
aid effectiveness, for example the Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS). Section three deals with 
all activities related to AIMS, aid-related report preparation and analysis, AIMS related 
meetings with stakeholders and works with the IATI (ERD, 2017).  
 
Branch three, Innovative/Climate Financing and Research, is expected to undertake research 
on aid and development co-operation, publish research reports, help other ERD wings with 
research input, organise training and awareness programme on effectiveness, give input to the 
Five Year Plan, provide secretarial support for the Climate Fund, deal with SDGs and South-
South Co-operation. Functions of the branch are undertaken by sections five and six of the 
wing. Section five deals with emerging assistance other than ODA such as the SSC, the 
Resource Center (TrC) , Other Official Flows (OOF), CC Financing, the Agricultural Fast 
Track (AFT) Fund and activities related to Climate Finance and SDG related initiatives. 
Section six is assigned to research on aid and development effectiveness and publishes 
reports, supports other wings with research, organises training and workshops on aid and 
development effectiveness, provides policy input to the FYP and works on internal surveys 
for development effectiveness (ERD, 2017).  
 
This brief description and also the discussion in section 5.4.1.2 show that currently, the DEW 
is more focused on international issues and events than a country level implementation of 
“unfinished business”. The Economic Relations Division‟s (ERD) annual report provides a 
description of the activities of every wing. The following table is prepared from the 
Development Effectiveness Wing‟s (DEW) 2015-16 and 2018-19 activities and shows recent 









An examination of the table shows that in the year 2015-16, most DEW activities were 
focused on implementing “unfinished business” such as draft preparation of the National 
Policy on Development Co-operation (NPDC), line ministries‟ Capacity Assessment Reports, 
the Bangladesh Development Forum, Joint Co-operation Strategy draft preparation and 
consultation, dialogue on the use and strengthening of the country system, the Aid 
Information Management System and the strengthening and integration with international 
Aid Transparency Initiatives (IATI). However, a close scrutiny of the activities of 2018-19 
suggests most of the 2015-16 activities related to implementation were repeated without 
much progress and no new initiatives related to implementation were reported, except 
participation in the GPEDC events. Moreover, DEW activities expanded in many areas of 
development co-operation, for example, SDG implementation and triangular co-operation.  
 
It appears from document analysis and interviews that in terms of aid and development 
effectiveness activities, DEW‟s initiative is limited to participation in GPEDC initiatives. The 
only country level activity of DEW related to aid and development effectiveness is to prepare 
a report for the GPEDC monitoring round every two years. Among international activities, 
DEW participates in GPED HLM and steering committee meetings and presents reports at 
GPEDC organised events. Moreover, the JCS has already expired, mechanisms such as Local 
Consultative Group (LCG) plenary and the LCG sector working groups are mostly inactive 
and the LCG webpage is inactive as well. The Bangladesh Development Forum is 
intermittently taking place but the Government is organising it without consultation with DPs 
who are only invited to the event. Previously, they were consulted and an agenda set under a 
consultation process. After some time, in March 2019, the Government called an LCG 
plenary meeting to discuss different issues and exchange views with DPs. The latter felt the 
meeting was called because the Government was about to introduce the 8
th
 Five Year Plan 
and sought to build a rapport. The Government also changed the structure of the LCG. 
Earlier, Government and DP representatives co-chaired the LCG but now the Government is 
Chair and a DP representative the co-chair. However, the Government did not consult with 
DPs about this (Interviewee GE1, 2019; AEU, 2010b; Interviewee D4, 2019).   
  
As pointed out from interviews of Government policymakers, they were introducing the 
second Joint Co-operation Strategy (JSC) with a leadership approach and DP support, but 
DPs were not co-operating (Interviewee GE1, 2017):  
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 “DPs strongly supported the 1
st
 Joint Cooperation Strategy (JCS) because of 
our collective (DP-GoB) visibility in the Accra High-Level Forum in 2008, 
and we were successful in showcasing JCS in Accra and in subsequent 
forums. However, at the time of last Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF), 
2018 we said to DPs that we need 2
nd
 JCS but they said „why did you need 
2
nd
 JCS? Give us rational‟. We said „why did you jointly introduce 1
st
 JCS in 
2010?‟ and „Why do you not want to do it now?‟ Without JCS division of 
labour and mutual accountability is not possible.” (Interviewee GE1, 2017). 
 
 
However, DPs did not think the Government genuinely sought to sign the second JCS and 
that it sometimes brought the issue forward without much effort to finalise it (Interviewee 
D4, 2018). Nevertheless, document analysis shows the Government organised a meeting of 
the JCS task force draft team in January 2019 to prepare the second JCS document. Different 
Government organisations, DPs and CSOs were present. The UNDP Seoul Policy Centre was 
requested to submit a draft soon but no further update was made on that request (DEW, 
2016). However, several DPs engaged in discussion with the Government as the LCG 
mechanisms are currently inactive:  
 
 “But DPs now realise that there needs to have a platform for Development 
Effectiveness and to strengthen LCG. They feel that at the moment there is no 
interaction between DPs and GoB, which is frustrating for them. DPs are 
discussing among themselves and leaving in distance with the Government. 
They feel why GoB is not having in our discussion. It is a serious 
frustration.” (Interviewee D4, 2018) 
 
 
Nonetheless, academics and aid professionals note that considering the activities of the 
Government, they understood “unfinished business” was not the priority. However, Paris was 
very crucial for Bangladesh, particularly to have ownership over development. Therefore, it 
should remain a priority of the Government (Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee P9, 2018) 
because attempts have been made to eradicate historically detrimental core issues such as 
donor proliferation, fragmentation, lack of using a country system, tying aid, predictability of 
disbursement, alignment, disclosure of aid information and accountability through 
implementation of the principles of aid effectiveness. However, the discussion in chapters 
seven and eight suggests most issues still exist in the aid management practice of the 
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Government of Bangladesh, whereas the country still depends on foreign aid to implement 
almost 30% of its development budget. Moreover, to achieve the SDGs, Bangladesh‟s need 
for foreign aid and effective use of foreign aid remains crucial. The importance of 
implementing “unfinished business” has also been emphasised by the Bangladesh Finance 
Minister in the last two BDFs. The proceedings of the 2015 BDF include a summary of the 
Finance Minister‟s speech:  
 
 “(i) continued proliferation of stand-alone projects and heavy aid 
fragmentation, (ii) less vibrant coordination in sector-level working groups 
resulting in less alignment with sectoral plan, (iii) low harmonization and 
low use of country systems, and (iv) capacity deficits and implementation 
lag.‟ (ERD, 2015f; p.7).  
 
 
The Finance Minister in his speech at the 2018 BDF again addressed those issues that impede 
aid effectiveness:  
 
 “There are a few critical areas in mobilization and realization of foreign 
assistance which require immediate attention at both ends, i.e., Government 
and DPs. Those are: (i) thinking of adaptation of multi-stakeholder and 
multi-sectoral approaches for selected priority areas of the economy likely to 
have strategic impact on Bangladesh Development rather than stand-alone 
projects; (ii) using of country system both for procurement and financial 
management; (iii) strengthening capacity and plugging in implementation 
lags.” (BDF, 2018; p. 9). 
 
 
It appears from document analysis that perhaps understanding the importance and relevance 
of “unfinished business”, Bangladesh has recently taken two major initiatives. Firstly, 
Bangladesh and Nepal jointly organised a side event at the time of the Senior-Level Meeting 
of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) held in New 
York on July 2019. The title of the event was “Taking Stock of Effectiveness Principles at 
Country Level: Bringing Evidence from Asia-Pacific to the GPEDC Senior Level Meeting”. 
The event stressed that GPEDC should take a more proactive approach to implement core aid 
effectiveness related issues such as ownership and the use of a country system as principles 
which are still very relevant at country level. The event also suggested that GPEDC should 
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establish clear targets and action plans to implement aid effectiveness principles (MoF, 
Nepal, 2019). Secondly, Bangladesh has facilitated an evaluation of the Local Consultative 
Group (LCG) working group initiated by USAID and the report is in progress (USAID, 
2019). 
 
However, a number of interviewees believed the aid effectiveness agenda, specifically the PD 
framework included in development effectiveness as “unfinished business”, was a great 
achievement by recipient countries as well as a success for the aid community to manage aid 
effectively. They added that the Paris Declaration framework was the outcome of the aid 
effectiveness agenda that had evolved over decades. Therefore, they believed that if the aid 
community failed to accomplish “unfinished business”, it would be marked as an “absolute 
fiasco” in the history of aid and development co-operation (Interviewee P3, 2018; 
Interviewee GE1, 2019; Interviewee 15, 2018; Interviewee GE6, 2017). 
 
7.4 Promotion of Country Level Activities 
 
Although it appears from the above discussion that insignificant efforts are currently made to 
implement “unfinished business”, both Government and DPs are publishing documents and 
promoting their efforts at international forums suggesting all mechanisms are still performing 
well. This issue is identified as the visibility tendency of donors and recipients (Vollmer, 
2014).   
 
The Country Partnership Framework (2016-2020) of the World Bank in Annex 6, page-92 
states, “International donors in Bangladesh co-ordinate their activities through the Local 
Consultative Group (LCG), which has served as a catalyst for result-oriented partnerships, 
better alignment and harmonisation”. The LCG is composed of 32 bilateral and multilateral 
donors and the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of Finance. Under the LCG, 
there are 18 sector working groups to co-ordinate donor interventions in specific 
development areas. The LCG is co-chaired by the Government and a development partner 
(on a rotating basis). The Bank is an active member of the LCG Executive Committee, the 
LCG plenary, and multiple working groups. To further strengthen aid co-ordination and help 
the country to track and manage its aid flows, the Economic Relations Division has also 
launched an online aid portal, the Bangladesh Aid Information Management System 
(Bangladesh AIMS)‟ (World Bank, 2016). The Asian Development Bank in its country 
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strategy paper (2016-2020) mentions that “A vibrant Local Consultative Group, comprising 
the government and development partners, provides the overall framework for development 
partner cooperation”. It currently co-chairs the Local Consultative Group energy and 
education working groups, and has been active in working groups on transport, agriculture, 
water resources management and urban services (Asian Development Bank, 2016; p.5). 
 
Similarly, the Government of Bangladesh is also still promoting aid effectiveness related 
activities and mechanisms in such a way that it is committed to implementation and 
mechanisms such as the Local Consultative Group (LCG) or LCG Working Group are active 
and functional whereas the LCG website is not even active. On page 96 of the “Mid-Term 
Review of the Implementation of the Istanbul Programme of Action for the LDCs for the 
Decade 2011-2020: Bangladesh National Report”, it is stated that Bangladesh has a dialogue 
mechanism with DPs in place in the form of a Local Consultative Group (LCG). However, it 
is mentioned that the mechanism has failed to reach its full potential (ERD, 2016). Section 
2.10: Development Effectiveness Wing of the ERD Annual Report, 2018-2019, states that 
Bangladesh has successfully launched the Aid Information Management System (AIMS) and 
it is fully functional (ERD, 2018b). However, discussion in section 5.4.4.3 of this thesis 
suggests AIMS is not fully functional and the ERD is still adjusting and re-adjusting its 
modules and functions. Most DPs do not provide data for AIMS.  
 
The annual reports of the ERD also mention the drafting process of the National Policy on 
Development Co-operation and its Bangla translation. Nevertheless, in section 5.4.1.4, this 
process has been going on for almost ten years and it is not yet finalised. The reports 
furthermore refer to the second Joint Co-operation Strategy, discussion of which has been 
going on for the last four years without real development (ERD, 2018b). The 41
st
 issue of the 
Flow of External Resources, published by the Foreign Aid Budget and Accounts Wing of the 
ERD, in section 7.4 indicates that AIMS and LCG are functional and contributing to aid 
effectiveness (ERD, 2019).  
 
Remarkably, the 2019 Monitoring Report of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (GPEDC) presents some interesting findings on Bangladesh. The 
report shows that overall use of the country system by development partners is 73% including 
components such as budget execution, financial reporting, auditing and procurement 
(GPEDC, 2019). However, discussion in section 5.4.2 of this thesis reveals the use of the 
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country system by DPs is very limited given their concerns of fiduciary risk, corruption and 
flaws in the legal system, rules and regulations. The report suggests reporting of development 
partners through one or more systems is 100% whereas section 5.4.4.3 of the thesis suggests 
reporting of DPs to the Aid Information Management System (AIMS) is very limited, in fact, 
not yet fully functional. However, the report mentions the Debt Management System (DMS) 
and other Excel-based systems where DPs do not provide data themselves. Rather the Foreign 
Aid Budget and Accounts Wing collects data from DPs and gives input to the systems.  
 
The GPEDC monitoring report also draws a positive picture of the mutual accountability 
mechanism in terms of a comprehensive policy framework for development co-operation, 
country level targets for Government and development partners, regular joint assessment of 
progress, inclusive assessment, non-state actors, timely and publicly available. Conversely, 
discussion in section 5.4.1.4 suggests that although the Government has different rules, 
regulations and office orders, the country is trying to formulate a comprehensive policy in the 
form of a National Policy on Development Co-operation (NPDC) which is still in the draft 
stage. Joint assessment and progress of development initiatives is very limited and 
involvement of non-state actors is insignificant. Section 5.4.4.3 also concludes that disclosure 
of aid information to the public by the DPs is still insignificant. However, the GPEDC 
monitoring report is prepared on the basis of the information provided by the Government 
and compiled by the Joint Support Team of the UNDP and OECD (GPEDC, 2018).  
 
7. 5 Policy Implementation Process 
 
The Economic Relations Division (ERD) is still the central organisation to implement policy 
in relation to foreign aid. In terms of aid or development effectiveness policy or 
implementation rated maters Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW) of ERD undertakes 
the responsibility. However, no desk is created in line ministers or even no line ministry 
officer is assigned to oversee aid effectiveness agenda implementation related activities. 
Therefore, the situation still remains the same as discussed in Section 5.5 and 6.5 of this 








The discussion of this chapter responds to the third research question: the current 
implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh and reasons of unwilling 
of donors and the Government to implement the agenda further. It addresses the gaps in the 
literature in terms of present implementation status and issues associated with the 
implementation. This chapter suggests the aid effectiveness agenda has emerged over almost 
twenty five years and lost its momentum due to the shift from aid to development 
effectiveness in the Busan High-Level Forum where a voluntary approach was adopted 
instead of time-bound indicator-based commitments. Moreover, continuous changes in the 
agenda since the Paris Declaration and the dissolution of the WP-EFF have also contributed 
to slow progress.  
 
The understanding of Government officials is that because of the voluntary commitment, 
development partners do not show the level of commitment they did earlier. However, 
country level DPs feel aid effectiveness principles did not work as expected and this is now 
“myth rather than reality”. They feel “unfinished business” is not their priority and do not 
receive as much instruction or assignments as previously. Furthermore, the objectives and 
overall functions of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
(GPEDC) are not quite clear to country level development partners because their head offices 
did not educate them properly. Moreover, the GPEDC framework is not as clear and concise 
as the Paris Declaration framework because it focuses on goals rather than principles or 
indicators. 
 
Although all Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation High-Level Forums 
and Meetings and UNFDCs continuously stress the importance of implementing “unfinished 
business”, the reality of Bangladesh tells a different story. Overall activities of the 
Government of Bangladesh and its development partners related to implementation have 
significantly reduced in recent years. For instance, the first JCS ended in 2015 but the 
Government and development partners did not take any serious initiative for the second JCS. 
Furthermore, this study finds that aid effectiveness related activities in Bangladesh are project 
dependent but neither the Government nor development partners undertake any project after 




This chapter argues that country level activities related to the aid effectiveness agenda are 
international events and assignment centred. If international activities increase, country level 
activities increase and if international activities decrease, country level activities also 
decrease.  Another finding of this chapter is that both the Government of Bangladesh and DPs 
promote aid effectiveness mechanisms such as the JCS, LCG and LCG-WG in their 
documents in a way that the mechanisms are very much functional. This finding reflects the 
visibility tendency of both donors and recipients (Vollmer, 2012; Cameron and Low, 2012). 
Moreover, the impact of this promotion is also reflected in the 2019 Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) monitoring report where the progress of core 
aid effectiveness indicators has been presented positively. Furthermore, although according to 
the GPEDC guidelines the monitoring report is supposed to be prepared in consultation with 
development partners, it is now solely prepared by the Government. Therefore, perhaps an 
apparent bias exists in reporting because of “tick-mark exercises” rather than actual facts. 
 
Questions have also been raised by respondents about the interests of aid recipient member 
countries for GPEDC as an organisation. They like to see GPEDC as proactive in 
implementing “unfinished business”. They believe that they are working closely with UN 
organisations for implementation and monitoring of SDGs, therefore, they need not do the 
same exercise with GPEDC. Moreover, respondents believe that the relationship between 
GPEDC and its members has become a form of “convenience shopping”. However, due to a 
lack of an action plan from GPEDC as well as fewer actions by recipient countries, if 








8.1 Overview  
 
This study investigated the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh, a 
leading aid recipient country. Three research questions were outlined to achieve the research 
objectives; 1: What policy initiatives has the Government of Bangladesh developed with 
regard to the aid effectiveness agenda, how effective have they been and why have they often 
disappointed?; 2: What are the collaborative efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda, how effective have they 
been and why have they often disappointed?; and 3: What is the current implementation 
status of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh and why do the Government and 
development partners appear unwilling to implement it further? To answer these questions, 
the study adopts a qualitative research methodology, a critical realism philosophy, an 
abductive approach and a case study strategy. Sixty six in-depth interviews and numerous 
documents have been analysed using a thematic data analysis technique. The conceptual 
framework of the study is developed applying a top-down policy implementation approach. 
The study has discussed Government policy initiatives at length, collective efforts with 
development partners and the current implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
In relation to research question one, it appears the Government of Bangladesh has taken 
numerous policy initiatives in regard to all of the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
For instance, reform of the planning process and country system, introduction of a 
Development Results Framework (DRF), an Aid Information Management System (AIMS) 
and Aid Policy. However, execution of most policy initiatives has been disappointing. The 
DRF has neither been properly used by the Government nor by development partners. AIMS 
has not been fully functional and Aid Policy has not yet been introduced. The reasons for this 
are manifold but the key factors include: project-based initiatives, an absent institutionalised 
approach, capacity constraints, poor policy implementation strategy, weak leadership and a 
lack of awareness and understanding about the aid effectiveness agenda. In terms of research 
question two, collaborative efforts of Government and development partners such as the 
Sector Working Group or the Joint Action Plan have remained disappointing. More focus on 
international visibility than actual outcomes of initiatives, project-based approaches, donor 
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interests, dominating attitudes, a reluctance to change systems and procedures, fear of losing 
funds of the Government, weak institutions and leadership. With regard to third research 
question, it seems both the Government and development partners are not endeavouring to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. The main reasons are: transformation of the agenda 
from aid to development effectiveness, fewer aid effectiveness agenda-related activities at the 
international level and the demotivation of Government and development partners.   
 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
 
To the best of the researcher‟s understanding, this research makes the following findings:  
i. Bangladesh is able to make some achievements because of its policy initiatives to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. For example, streaming the planning 
process and improvement of the country system. However, most initiatives remain 
unsuccessful.   
ii. The initiatives of the Government of Bangladesh as well as its collaborative 
efforts with development partners are project-based and have not yet been 
institutionalised.  
iii. Neither the Government of Bangladesh nor development partners have shown 
high degrees of commitment to implement the principles of the aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
iv. Awareness and importance of the aid effectiveness agenda among Government 
officials poor. The concept is still very much confined to the Economic Relations 
Division (ERD) and especially, limited to the Development Effectiveness Wing 
(DEW). However, an understanding and importance of the agenda for the 
Planning Commission and implementing ministries, agencies, officials and project 
directors are poor or unknown. 
v. Country level initiatives of the aid effectiveness agenda have been international 
events centred. Activities have increased just before or immediately after an 
international event. For example, the Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) was 
drafted before the Paris High-level Forum and signed immediately after. As the 
core aid effectiveness activities have been reduced internationally due to a shift 




vi. At the same time, both the Government of Bangladesh and its development 
partners have shown visibility tendency at international forums or events related 
to the aid effectiveness agenda. They have preferred to showcase their activities 
related to the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in international 
forums rather than effective implementation and outcomes at the country level.  
vii. Development partners are happy to finance recipient activities and like to see 
recipients undertaking initiatives for the implementation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. However, when it comes to changing policies, systems and procedures, 
they are reluctant to do so. For example, the use of a country system or execution 
of division of labour.   
viii. The shift from aid to development effectiveness has negatively impacted in 
country level initiatives perhaps because of the voluntary nature and absence of 
the harmonisation principle in the main agenda.  
ix. Currently, implementation of “unfinished business” of the aid effectiveness 
agenda in Bangladesh is in limbo. 
x. A top-down policy implementation approach by the Government of Bangladesh 
and its development partners has remained relatively unsuccessful.  
 
8.3 Discussion of Findings  
 
This section critiques the findings of this study. The first finding is that Bangladesh has been 
able to make a few achievements as a result of policy decisions to implement the principles of 
the aid effectiveness agenda. However, most of the initiatives remain unsuccessful. This 
answers the first research question. This finding answers the first research question,   which is 
outlined to understand policy initiatives of the Government in relation to the aid effectiveness 
agenda. At the same time, this finding fills in the research gap in terms of the impact of the 
implementation agenda in Bangladesh. Examination of the two action plans formulated to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda and analysis of interviews helps to draw a clear 
picture about effectiveness and ineffectiveness of Government initiatives (AEU, 2010b; 
AEU, 2011a). The country historically has had a planned economy, guided by the five year 
plans and an annual development plan. However, implementation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda as well as donor desire has worked as a catalyst to streamline the planning process. 
The country now has a ten year perspective plan, addressed by five year plans embedded into 
the development results framework. The five year plan is implemented through a medium 
253 
 
term-strategy and an annual development plan. The medium-term strategy in turn is 
underpinned by the medium-term budgetary framework, which was developed with the 
support of development partners. The country system has somewhat improved because of 
public finance reforms, enactment of procurement law, establishment of a central 
procurement unit, introduction of e-procurement and special audits for foreign-aided projects. 
Nonetheless, OECD surveys and some of the existing literature, also report success of other 
aid recipient countries in relation to long-term plans and reforms in country systems (OECD, 
2011c; Wood et al., 2011).  
 
It appears that the Government of Bangladesh now intends to include people and 
development partners in the planning process through discussion and disclosure of aid 
information, which has improved from the past. Moreover, the country has established a 
Development Effectiveness Unit (DEW) to undertake aid and development effectiveness 
related activities at home and abroad. A number of interviews have highlighted Government 
initiatives to establish a DEW (Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018). Furthermore, 
Bangladesh has recently been able to establish relatively better leadership over development 
than it did in the past and has also been able to establish itself as one of the major actors 
among aid recipient countries in the domain of aid and development effectiveness (ERD, 
2016c; Amin, 2019; Interviewee G1, 2018; Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee P3, 2018). 
Currently, Bangladesh co-chairs the GPEDC, chairs the Asia Pacific Development 
Effectiveness Facility (AP-DEF) and is a member of a number of international and regional 
forums (ERD, 2018c; Amin, 2019).     
 
However, Bangladesh has been unsuccessful at implementing a number of initiatives 
appropriately, non-functional with others or failed to create an impact as expected. Therefore, 
progress of aid effectiveness principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation and mutual 
accountability is insignificant (OECD, 2011c; Dristy, 2016). Major initiatives to implement 
ownership include integration between the ten year perspective plan and the five year plan, 
the five year plan to the medium-term budgetary framework and the medium-term budgetary 
framework to annual development programme (ADP). Nevertheless, these plans are yet to 
align and a number of projects are included in the ADP, which does not have a link with 
planning documents. Interviews have raised concern about this implementation gap in the 
planning process and some studies have also highlighted this issue (Interviewee P3, 2018; 
Interviewee GE6, 2017; Bjornestad et al., 2016). Analysis of the ERD‟s annual reports and 
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interview information suggest the Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW) was established 
to work on aid and development effectiveness but its focus shifted to other things. ERD and 
five line ministry capacity assessment reports were prepared to implement aid effectiveness 
but no recommendation was implemented. A development finance assessment (DFA) was 
completed but not followed as a guiding document for financial options (Interviewee GE1, 
2017; Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee GE6, 2017).  
 
Moreover, aid is not well aligned with country priorities or five year plan objectives. It 
generally falls under the wider requirement of Government (Ahmed, 2017, Interviewee P3, 
2018). A number of initiatives have been taken to strengthen the country system, for 
example, public finance management reform, the procurement law and Foreign Aided Project 
Audit Directorate (FAPAD). However, DPs rarely use the Government procurement or audit 
system due to amendments in the law and fiduciary risk, whilst the Government believes DPs 
do not use the country system due to their internal rules and procedures (Interviewee GE1, 
2017; Interviewee D2, 2018).  
 
To implement the managing for results principle, the Development Results Framework 
(DRF) has been included in the six and seventh five year plans. However, the Government 
does not assess the impact of aid using a development results framework - DPs use their own 
framework for assessment (World Bank, 2016; Asian Development Bank, 2016; Interviewee 
G9, 2018; Interviewee G16, 2018; Interviewee D1, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018). Aid 
information management is still poor; effective aid data management may help to achieve a 
mutual accountability principle but the Aid Information Management System (AIMS) 
introduced with the financial support of the “Strengthening Aid Effectiveness Project” is not 
fully functional (ERD, 2016c; ERD, 2018c; Interviewee D1, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018).  
 
Moreover, there is no central aid data management system and aid is managed through four 
different systems: the Aid Information Management System (AIMS), the Foreign Aid Budget 
and Accounts (FABA), Bangladesh Bank, the Finance Division and the Bureau of Statistics. 
Furthermore, DP aid information disclosure is still limited to a website and press releases that 
only include the number of a project or project cost (USAID, 2014). This research reveals 
several issues that have contributed to the ineffective implementation or non-functionality of 
initiatives taken by the Government. For example, weak institutions, capacity constraints of 
Government officials, poor leadership, fear of losing funds, personal interests, a lack of 
255 
 
motivation amongst Government staff, continuous change in the aid effectiveness agenda, a 
shift from aid to development effectiveness, inadequate authority of DP local offices, DP‟s 
dominating attitudes and the legally non-binding nature of aid effectiveness principles and 
framework.   
 
The second finding of this study is that almost all fundamental activities of Government as 
well as its collaborative efforts with development partners to implement aid effectiveness are 
project-centred and have not been institutionalised. Therefore, the sustainability of initiatives 
and efforts remain a matter of concern. This finding corresponds to both research question 
one and two. Research Question-1 is outlined to examine Bangladesh Government‟s 
initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda and Research Question-2 is to assess 
Government‟s collaborative effort with development partners in implementing the agenda. 
The finding addresses the gap in the literature in relation to joint effort of recipient and 
donors to implement the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. It appears from document 
analysis, that the Bangladesh Government and its development partners undertook two 
projects. First, “Support to Enhance Programme Co-ordination”, based on the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which was implemented from 2009 to 2010 (Nadoll, 2010). 
Second, “Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh”, executed from 2012 
to 2016. Most activities were conducted under the second project. For example, 
institutionalisation of the Aid Effectiveness Unit later renamed the Development 
Effectiveness Wing (DEW), capacity assessment reports of the ERD and line ministries, 
development finance assessment, a draft of the aid policy, execution of the OECD-DAC aid 
effectiveness surveys and establishment of the Aid Information Management System 
(AIMS). Furthermore, strengthening and restructuring of collaborative mechanisms such as 
the Local Consultative Group (LCG) and the LCG Sector Working Group (LCG-WG) was 
also a component of the second project (ERD/UNDP, 2011).  
 
However, no initiative has been institutionalised. The DEW has been established but its 
activities have diverged to other things and the focus has shifted to issues other than core aid 
effectiveness (Interviewee P4, 2018). Collaborative mechanisms including the Aid 
Effectiveness Working Group are virtually inactive and recommendations of capacity 
assessment reports are not implemented. Furthermore, collaborative platforms such as the 
LCG and LCG-WG are mostly inactive (GoB/UNDP, 2012; GoB/UNDP, 2014; Interviewee 
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P3, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018). Nobody is assigned to deal with aid effectiveness related 
issues in the planning commission, line ministries or executing agencies.  
 
The situation raises a question about ownership, intent, leadership and political commitment 
of the Government of Bangladesh to implement the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
Nonetheless, there is an understanding that bureaucrats or Government officials received an 
honorarium from projects in addition to their regular salaries. As a result, when projects 
ended, they remained less motivated due to a lack of incentives (Interviewee GE6, 2017, 
Interviewee GE7, 2017).  
 
 
The third finding is that awareness and understanding of the importance of the aid 
effectiveness agenda is very much confined to the Economic Relations Division (ERD) and 
mainly in the Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW). This finding is one of the answers to 
research question one and contributes to the gap in the literature in terms of impact of the 
Government initiatives on the aid management administration.  Interestingly, the DEW is a 
policy wing and other wings of the ERD deal directly with line ministries and development 
partners. Therefore, their awareness and understanding about the agenda is fundamental. 
Moreover, line ministries and agencies design and implement aid projects, deal with 
development partners and a project is implemented under the leadership of a project director. 
However, this study finds that awareness about the aid effectiveness agenda, its significance 
and understanding of its benefits are trivial or totally unknown to line ministry and agency 
officials and project directors. Therefore, several interviewees claim that due to a poor 
awareness amongst Government officials, the country is losing the benefits of the aid 
effectiveness agenda (Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee D10, 2018; Interviewee P5, 2018).  
 
The fourth finding is related to donor behaviour and is drawn from chapter six, which 
responds research question two. This finding addresses the gap in the literature in relation to 
donors‟ response to the implementation initiatives of the recipient. Although donors make 
promises at international forums, they are reluctant to change their ways of aid practice, 
including the execution of division of labour and the use of a country system. This finding 
has been reported in several existing studies which examine recipient country experiences 
(Monye et al., 2010; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; Habraken et. al., 2017; Dornan, 2017). 
However, Bangladesh exhibits a new trend; DPs are willing to fund aid effectiveness 
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implementation activities, they have shown interest in making action plans, introducing 
mechanisms, platforms, visibility in international events and forums. Moreover, they are 
enthusiastic to see recipient Governments implement the agenda seriously. However, when it 
comes to implementation of vital issues such as the division of labour or the use of a country 
system, this is confined to policy papers and action plans without any real execution. For 
example, in 2011 the Government of Bangladesh outlined a concept paper on the “Division 
of Labour and Donor Complementarity” in line with guidelines of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The paper suggested a donor should only work in three economic sectors and 
provided funds in the budget support scheme of the Government or participate in a sector-
wise approach if they wished to work in more than three. With the exception of EU donors, 
all others said that they could not implement this as they preferred to work in many sectors 
including those that suited their country interests and policies (Interviewee G12, 2018; AEU, 
2011a). The Government of Bangladesh believed that they failed to enforce a division of 
labour due to a “fear of losing funds” and also for the legally non-binding nature of the aid 
effectiveness agenda (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee G12). However, fragmented aid 
and donor and project proliferation are serious problems for Bangladesh (Ahemd, 2017; 
ERD, 2016a; Rahman and Khan, 2010).  
 
The fifth finding is that activities related to implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda of 
Bangladesh and its development partners were linked to international events. This means 
most initiatives were undertaken before or after international events. For example, the 
Harmonisation Action Plan (HAP) was drafted before the Paris High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness and signed after the Paris Declaration. The Statement of Intent to formulate the 
Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) was signed before the Accra High-Level Forum and the 
JSC was signed in June 2010 (ERD, 2006; AEU, 2010b). However, activities were started 
before the Busan High-Level Forum in November 2011 when the “Strengthening Capacity 
for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh (2011-2016)” project was launched. Moreover, country 
level activities were also centred on Paris Declaration surveys and report preparation for 
international events. This finding is summarised from the discussion in chapters six and 
seven. It provides answers to research question one and two and addresses the gap in the 
literature with regard to recipient‟s initiatives and joint efforts of donors and recipient to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda.  This trend of activities can be defined as a visibility 
tendency of both the Government and DPs. A policymaker‟s statement confirmed this as, 
“DPs strongly supported the first Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) because of our collective 
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(DP-Government) visibility at the Accra High-Level Forum in 2008 and we were successful 
in showcasing the JCS in Accra and in subsequent forums.” (Interviewee GE1, 2017).  
 
This visibility tendency of recipients and donors after the emergence of the aid effectiveness 
agenda, especially, after the Paris Declaration has been identified as a positive lever to the aid 
effectiveness agenda (Vollmer, 2014). However, concern has also been raised about the 
adverse impact of visibility tendency (Vollmer, 2012). Bangladesh can be an example of 
adverse visibility as the Government as well as DPs showed more interest in being visible at 
international events than the actual outcomes of these initiatives.  
 
The sixth finding is about the present implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda.  
Currently, implementation of aid effectiveness principles in Bangladesh is at limbo. This 
finding responds to the Research Question-3 that is outlined to evaluate the current 
implementation status of the aid effectiveness agenda in Bangladesh. It contributes to the gap 
of the literature in terms of the present implementation status of the agenda.  The following 
discussion has been summarised from chapter seven. The Joint Co-operation Strategy (JCS) 
expired in 2015 and it appears the Government has no real intent to sign the second JSC and 
that development partners are also not concerned about it (AEU, 2010b; Interviewee GE1, 
2017; Interviewee D4, 2018). Mechanisms such as the Local Consultative Group (LCG) 
plenary and the LCG Sector Working Group (LCG-WG) are virtually inactive (GoB/UNDP, 
2014; Interviewee, P3, 2018; Interviewee D4, Interviewee D2, 2018) and the LCG plenary 
meeting is occasionally called by Government when considered necessary, rather than to 
discuss aid effectiveness or Government interest issues (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee 
D4, 2018).  
 
Moreover, the Government has changed the structure of the LCG without consultation with 
development partners. Earlier, Government and development partner representatives were co-
chairs of the LCG. Now, Government is chair and development partner representative is co-
chair (Interviewee GE1, 2017). The Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) is not taking 
place each year and again Government is organising it when considers necessary, without 
consulting development partners or agreeing the forum agenda (Interviewee D8, 2018). With 
the exception of health and education, LCG-WGs which have a SWAP, all other working 
groups are inactive, including the Aid Effectiveness Working Group (Government/UNDP, 
2014; Interviewee GE6, 2018). However, the Government and development partners are 
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promoting these mechanisms and forums in their publications and at international meetings as 
if they are still active and contributing to aid effectiveness (World Bank, 2016; Asian 
Development Bank, 2016; ERD, 2016; ERD, 2019). Nevertheless, it was expected that the 
Development Effectiveness Wing (DEW) of the Economic Relations Division (ERD) would 
undertake and co-ordinate activities related to the implementation of the aid effectiveness 
agenda nationally and internationally. However, it appears the DEW‟s focus has shifted to 
areas other than implementation of aid effectiveness (ERD, 2016b; ERD, 2017; ERD, 2018c). 
In terms of development effectiveness and “unfinished business”, the DEW only participates 
in Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) organised events 
and locally prepares GPEDC monitoring survey related reports (ERD, 2018c; Interviewee P3, 
2018).  
 
Nonetheless, this thesis has identified a number of issues contributing to these circumstances. 
Two issues have already been discussed; project and international event centred activities. 
Currently, as there is no project to implement aid effectiveness and international activities 
related to aid effectiveness have been reduced because of the shift from aid to development 
effectiveness, country level activities have also been decreased significantly. Donors are not 
showing the level of seriousness they did previously. For example, funding for aid 
effectiveness projects or missions to monitor country level activities related to 
implementation (Interviewee, D10, 2018; Interviewee D2, 2018, Interviewee D8, 2018). On 
the other hand, the Government is not undertaking initiatives to implement the agenda either 
(Interviewee GE1, 2017; ERD, 2016b; ERD, 2018c).  
 
In fact, the voluntary nature of GPEDC development effectiveness rather than the indicator-
based, time-bound commitment of the aid effectiveness agenda has significantly contributed 
to this situation (Interviewee GE1, Interviewee G12, 2018; Interviewee P5, 2018). This 
finding responds to Research Question 1 and minimises knowledge gap in relation to impact 
of continuous change in the aid agenda.  A number of existing studies reach similar findings 
(Abdel-Malek, 2015; Davis and Pickering, 2015; Prizzon, 2016). The absence of a dedicated 
organisation such as the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) has also contributed 
to the reduction of activities. Nevertheless, ownership is included as a principle in the 
development effectiveness agenda but no indicator exists in the framework to assess 
ownership. Similarly, the harmonisation principle is not included as a principle and no 
indicator exists in the framework to assess harmonisation - a great concern for recipient 
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countries. Aid recipients were vocal at both the GPEDC High-Level Meetings in Mexico City 
and in Nairobi in 2014 and 2016 respectively, regarding the voluntary nature of development 
effectiveness but remained unsuccessful ( Interviewee, GE1, 2017; Interviewee P3, 2018; 
Fues and Klingebiel, 2014; GPEDC, 2016). Nevertheless, in the Senior-Level Meeting of the 
GPEDC held in July 2019 in New York, it was decided to formulate an action plan to address 
“unfinished business” to be discussed at the next High-Level Meeting (GPEDC, 2019a).   
 
It appears from the information of the respondents that the Government expected the LCG, 
the LEG-WG and the BDF to help resolve core problems related to aid effectiveness. For 
instance, the division of labour, fragmentation of aid, use of a country system and alignment. 
However, they found donors reluctant to change their systems, procedures, rules and 
regulations. Moreover, DPs did not accept leadership from recipients, preferring to dominate. 
As the country had a dependence on aid and was afraid of losing funds, the Government 
could not take a strong position. Therefore, they were less motivated in taking initiatives for 
aid effectiveness (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee G12, 2018). On the other hand, 
development partner interviewees believed the Government system including audit, accounts 
and procurement were weak and fiduciary risk and corruption were high. They admitted it 
was difficult for them to use Government systems completely because of their internal rules, 
regulations and procedures. They also confessed to their own strategies, priorities and 
policies in choosing aid sectors and modalities, thus they could not entirely execute a division 
of labour system (Interviewee D8, 2018; Interviewee D1, 2018; Interviewee D10, 2018; 
Interviewee D11, 2018). However, the “foul play” of big donors in many sectors was also a 
problem in executing the division of labour (Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee D12, 2018). 
This finding answers Research Question 2 and addresses the gap in the literation in terms of 
donors‟ response to the implementation initiatives of the recipient.   
 
Some issues contributed to the non-functionality of collaborative mechanisms, such as an 
absence of standard operating procedures, weak co-ordination among mechanisms and 
systems, Government unwillingness to face DPs for accountability and a shift from aid to 
development effectiveness. Some interviewees believed implementation of the principles of 
the aid effectiveness agenda was not at the top of their head office priorities, principles were 
difficult to apply and these were “myths not reality” (Interviewee D8, 2018; Interviewee D11, 
2018; Interviewee D8, 2018). Although aid effectiveness is included in the development 
effectiveness agenda as “unfinished business”, and emphasis has been given in GPEDC 
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meetings and forums to implement it, the Bangladesh country context shows that the 
Government and its development partners are not endeavouring to finish “unfinished 
business”.  
 
The seventh finding relates to the absence of an aid policy. It is one of the answers of the 
Research Question 1 and fills in the gap in the literature about the policy formulation and the 
implementation process of the recipient government in relation to the aid effectiveness 
agenda.  Bangladesh does not have a consolidated policy for aid management. Aid is 
managed by a disjointed policy approach consisting of circulars, directives, office orders and 
terms of agreements (ERD, 2011; AEU, 2011). This finding is one of the outcomes of the 
first research question. All seventeen economic sectors of Bangladesh have aid dependency. 
Recent studies have revealed that the country still has a number of problems that impede aid 
effectiveness, for example, fragmentation and proliferation, absence of harmonisation and 
division of labour and relatively weak public finance management or country systems 
(Ahmed, 2017; Hossen, 2015; Rahaman and Khan, 2010). Overall effectiveness of aid is still 
a matter of concern (Murshed and Khanaum, 2014). Therefore, the principles of the aid 
effectiveness agenda are quite relevant to Bangladesh.  
 
It seems the Government is trying to introduce an aid policy in the form of a National Policy 
on Development Co-operation (NPDC). Perhaps, the main objective is to formulate an aid 
policy to address those issues which impede aid effectiveness and to implement the principles 
of aid effectiveness. However, due to differences of opinion between Government and 
development partners on issues such as appointment of local consultants, consultancy costs, 
minimum project costs and use of a country system, the policy has remained in draft stage for 
almost eight years (ERD, 2016b; Interviewee P3, 2018; Interviewee D4, 2018; Interviewee 
D7, 2018). Development partners feel the Government prefers control over the introduction 
of aid policy. Government on the other hand, because of weak political leadership and a fear 
of losing funds, did not take bold steps to enact policy (Interviewee G12, 2018; Interviewee 
P4, 2018). Countries with aid policy make more progress in terms of implementation, for 
instance, Rwanda and Colombia (Hayman, 2009; McGee & Heredia, 2012). 
 
The eighth finding is about the misuse of aid money. The wastage or ineffective use of aid 
money is noted widely (Easterly, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2012; Nourou, 
2014; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). However, it is interesting to note here that aid money 
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to implement aid effectiveness is used ineffectively and has failed to help achieve outcomes 
as expected. This finding originates from the discussion of both fifth and sixth chapter 
respond the first and second research questions. The finding addresses the gap in the 
literature in terms of the impact of the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda.   The 
“Strengthening Capacity for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh” project was worth 3.20 million 
US dollars, funded by DFID, DANIDA and AusAid and implemented by the UNDP. There 
were four components of the project. Under component one, an Aid Information Management 
System (AIMS) was introduced though it was not fully functional (ERD, 2018c; Interviewee 
D2, 2018). The Development Finance Assessment (DFA) was completed and the ERD‟s 
capacity assessment report prepared under component two. However, the Government does 
not consider the DFA for fund mobilisation and no recommendations from the ERD capacity 
assessment report were implemented (Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee GE6, 2017). 
Under component three, Government-DP collaborative mechanisms, the Local Consultative 
Group and the Sector Working Group tried to re-organise and strengthen but their 
mechanisms were almost non-functional (GoB/UNDP, 2014; Interviewee D4, 2018). The 
capacity assessment report of five line ministries was prepared to improve aid effectiveness 
as outlined in component four but no recommendations were implemented (Interviewee G12, 
2018; Interviewee GE1, 2017; Interviewee P6, 2018).  
 
The ninth finding is that most Government initiatives and collaborative efforts with 
development partners remain unsuccessful due to a number of reasons associated with both 
parties. These include capacity constraints, weak institutions, lack of political commitment, 
poor leadership, fear of losing funds, project dependency to implement the agenda and poor 
policy implementation i.e. a top-down policy implementation approach not supported by the 
action plan. Crucial issues associated with development partners include political agendas 
and interests, inclination to own policies and procedures, lack of authority of local offices, 
bureaucracy, legally non-binding nature of principles, lack of respect towards Government 
leadership and dominating attitudes. These reasons have been identified from the discussion 
of all three research questions.  
 
Several reasons have been identified in the literature review for the slow progress of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. However, six reasons have been appeared repeatedly: 1) policy, 
institution, governance and capacity of recipient countries, 2) weak leadership of recipient 
countries 3) lack of political commitment of donors, 4) donor self-interests and agenda, 5) 
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internal bureaucracy or administration of donor aid agencies, and 6) donor co-ordination.  A 
conceptual framework was developed to examine whether these reasons alone impede 
implementation or if other reasons exist. This study confirms four more reasons which have 
created problems for implementation and these are, the project-based approach of 
implementation, international event dependency of country level activities, visibility 
tendency and a shift from aid to development effectiveness.  
 
The final finding is about the policy implementation process of the Government. This finding 
minimises know about the top-down policy implementation approach.  It appears the 
Government of Bangladesh has applied a top-down policy implementation approach to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda in line with the top-down, upstream approach of the 
agenda itself. It is noteworthy that by convention, the Government applies a top-down 
approach in implementing policies (GED, 2015). The Economic Relations Division (ERD) of 
the Ministry of Finance as the responsible organisation of Government for aid related matters 
has taken policy decisions to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. The ERD tried to 
execute policy by communicating to relevant line ministries and agencies through office 
orders, gazettes, circulars and notices. However, an examination of policy implementation 
suggests policy implementation was not supported by strong command or supervision and 
responsibilities were not allocated properly among organisations and people. Few training 
sessions were organised and little instruction or guidelines were given to line ministries for 
the execution of policy. Policies also failed to receive political support from line ministry 
policymakers for implementation.  
 
Though all economic sectors in Bangladesh are aid dependent, the Government does not have 
a designated person or section to deal with aid effectiveness issues in any sector or ministry. 
However, strong command, supervision (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Parsons, 1995), 
political and organisational factors (Elmore, 1979) are very important for the top-down 
approach of policy implementation. Moreover, a well-developed plan supported by stage-
wise control helps to implement a top-down approach (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) but 
ERD activities were limited to circulars and office orders to implementing agencies.  
 
An examination of the implementation process exhibits a poor link with policy and a weak 
link between command and co-ordination. Nevertheless, a top-down policy implementation 
approach cannot be successful without links between policy and implementation, a strong 
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chain of command, co-ordination and control (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Parsons, 1995; Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1983, 1984). It seems the ERD placed more focus on formulation than 
effective implementation or execution of policy and this contributed to the ineffectiveness of 
policies which Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Dunsire (1978) defined as an implementation 
gap. Moreover, Parsons (1995) emphasises a strong participation at organisational and 
bureaucratic levels but in the case of implementation, the ERD failed to motivate line 
ministries to work effectively.  
 
Furthermore, the ERD took a policy decision to introduce an economic sector-wise working 
group where development partners and respective ministry officials worked together to 
ensure aid effectiveness. However, it was found that Government officials and development 
partners interpreted the objectives of the working group differently. Government officials 
thought that it was a platform to discuss and address core aid effectiveness issues such as 
division of labour or fragmentation of aid but development partners considered it a platform 
for policy discussion and results management (Government/UNDP, 2014; Interviewee P3, 
2018). This means the ERD failed to provide a clear understanding of the objectives of 
policy. Development partners and Government officials interacted with each other at a formal 
platform. Nevertheless, the ERD neither provided guidelines nor translated any terms of 
reference for the working groups outlined in the Joint Co-operation Strategy. The above 
discussion shows the Government‟s top-down policy implementation approach remains 
unsuccessful. Therefore, poor policy implementation has also contributed to the overall 
ineffectiveness of Government policy decisions as well as its collaborative efforts with 
development partners to implement the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
8.4 Contribution to the Literature 
 
This thesis has sought to make a number of contributions to existing knowledge and 
understanding of the aid effectiveness literature. Firstly, to the best of the researcher‟s 
knowledge, this is the first work examining Government initiatives in Bangladesh, a leading 
aid recipient country with more than 30% of its development budget dependent on aid, to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. It explores the aid effectiveness agenda and aims to 
minimise the knowledge gap in terms of public policy implementation. Very few studies, for 
instance Rahaman and Khan (2010), investigate donor harmonisation from the perspective of 
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aid effectiveness. Welle et al. (2009) examine the progress of aid effectiveness in three 
specific sectors: water, health and education. However, primary research on Bangladesh‟s 
overall experience of implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda or progress of principles 
is quite sparse in comparison to the literature investigating the aid and growth relationship in 
Bangladesh.  
 
Secondly, with a significant amount of high-level policymaker interviews and a number of 
Government documents not yet publicly accessed by existing studies, this thesis reveals a 
number of facts and issues, which provide first-hand knowledge and insight about the 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Moreover, a detailed examination of policy 
decisions, action plans and initiatives enhances the knowledge base around foreign aid 
management in Bangladesh. The existing literature provides little information about policy 
implementation by the Bangladesh Government in relation to the aid agenda and aid 
management.   
 
Thirdly, the aid agenda embraces a partnership approach to ensure the effectiveness of aid. 
This study evaluates the collective efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and its 
development partners in implementing aid effectiveness. The existing literature does not 
provide sufficient evidence on this. Because of access to documents seemingly not used in 
previous studies and key personnel interviews including ministers, secretaries and senior 
officials of donor organisations, this study has been able to identify core issues relating to the 
partnership between donors and Bangladesh as recipient.   
 
Fourthly, the existing literature provides limited information about the implementation status 
of “unfinished business”, which this study examines comprehensively for Bangladesh.  
 
Fifthly, this thesis also contributes to the literature on policy implementation with special 
reference to the top-down policy implementation approach. It reiterates that careful 
implementation design, a strong link between policy and implementation, connection 
between organisations involved in the implementation process as well as bureaucratic levels, 
a good chain of command, stage-wise control and supervision are important to make the top-
down policy implementation approach a success. The study also identifies flaws in the 
implementation process of the aid effectiveness agenda under the top-down public policy 




Finally, beyond Bangladesh, this thesis makes very specific contributions to the existing 
literature in relation to aid and development effectiveness. It provides understanding about 
the implementation exercise of the aid effectiveness agenda and issues associated with the 
implementation. Partnership approach remains at the core of the aid effectiveness framework.  
This study unveils the challenges of partnership approach in executing principles of the aid 
effectiveness framework. It also provides insights about the attitude of the donors in changing 
their policy and procedures to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. Furthermore, this 
research minimises the knowledge gap about the impact of the contentious change in the aid 
effectiveness agenda and current implementation status of the development effectiveness 
agenda. The aid effectiveness agenda upholds top-down policy implementation approach to 
implement the framework. The study identifies a number of flaws in implementing the aid 
effectiveness framework adopting a top-down policy implementation model.          
 
8.5 Policy Recommendations  
 
8.5.1 Recommendations Related to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda 
 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development (GPEDC) could prioritise a time-bound 
framework for the implementation of “unfinished business”. The present and previous studies 
have also highlighted this fact (Mawdsley et al., 2014; Abdel-Malek, 2015). It is also 
important to include harmonisation in the development agenda as a main principle and not 
only in “unfinished business”. Assessment indicators for both harmonisation and ownership 
principles need to be incorporated into the development effectiveness framework.  
 
8.5.2 Recommendations for Recipients 
 
Recipients need to take sustainable initiatives to reduce project dependency in implementing 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Institutionalisation of initiatives can provide a long-term 
dividend. This study argues the project-based approach fails to produce outcomes as 
expected; it offers advantages to bureaucrats in the form of financial benefits and perks. 
Therefore, bureaucrats need to be motivated to remain equally active after project completion 
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and they themselves should consider the greater interest of Bangladesh rather than their own 
interests. Moreover, enactment and execution of laws is important.  
 
Furthermore, a strong political will and leadership are essential for effective implementation 
of the aid agenda. A comprehensive aid policy can help to increase ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, mutual accountability and results management. Strong leadership is required 
to overcome the threat of “losing funds” in the short-run for long-term benefits in introducing 
an aid policy. This study reveals that due to poor leadership and a fear of losing funds, the 
Government of Bangladesh failed to execute policy initiatives, particularly in relation to the 
harmonisation principle. Capacity enhancement of the recipient Government is also necessary 
to execute the policy and implement the principles of the agenda. Capacity issues of 
recipients and poor leadership are major predicaments to effective implementation and 
repeatedly appear in the existing literature (Monye et al., 2010; Owa, 2011; Chandy, 2011; 
Wood et al., 2011; Habraken et. al., 2017). Although donors are behind in implementing 
principles, recipients should continue their efforts and not become demotivated by slow 
progress.  
 
Creation of awareness and understanding of benefits arising from the aid effectiveness 
agenda at all levels across ministries and implementing agencies are important. Poor 
awareness or understanding of the importance of the aid effectiveness agenda seriously 
impacts effective execution of initiatives. Moreover, rather than having a central body or 
organisation, a desk or officer in charge at ministry-level to undertake and supervise aid 
effectiveness related activities can be helpful. The main task of that desk or officer would be 
to ensure alignment, division of labour, mutual accountability and development results 
management.   
 
8.5.3 Recommendations for Donors 
 
It is important to implement international commitments at country level, particularly in 
relation to harmonisation and use of country systems to reduce fragmentation, project 
proliferation and transaction costs. To uphold leadership and ensure ownership by recipients, 
donors should provide aid in the form of programmes not projects in the form of sector-wide 
approaches or budget support. This study and others in the existing literature also identify 
these factors (Khatun, 2008; Killen, 2011; Lawson, 2013). A familiarisation by donor, 
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country level staff with international decisions or changes in relation to aid effectiveness is 
crucial as is delegation of power to country offices. This study and others also stress such 
issues (Dijkstra & Komives, 2011; Habraken et al., 2017). Further, a dominating attitude 
among donors needs to change because it exacerbates recipient fears of losing funds, 
demotivating them to take implementation initiatives. Donors could not only provide funds to 
recipients for implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda but also endeavour to 
implement principles in changing their traditional ways of aid management. The findings in 
this study suggest donors still dominate recipients, are interested in financing recipient 
initiatives but reluctant to change their own systems.  
 
8.5.4 Recommendations for Recipients and Donors 
 
Continuous discussion and engagement of  the recipient Government and development 
partners are important in implementing the principles of aid effectiveness. In other words, 
donor-recipient joint or collaborative platforms need to be functional. Mutually agreed action 
plans help implementation and therefore, action plans could be developed through 
consultation and agreement to enhance aid effectiveness.  
 
This study has argued visibility tendency and international event centred, country level 
activities impede implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. Visibility of Government 
and donors needs to be controlled and real commitment is required for the implementation of 
the agenda. This visibility involves drawing international attention through presentations or 
reports on country level initiatives at internal forums, to suggest much is being done to 
implement the agenda. Additionally, country level activities should not be international event 
centred, rather activities should be undertaken with a true spirit of promoting aid 
effectiveness. The use of different development result frameworks (DRF) by recipient and 
donors impedes any real measurement of effectiveness and therefore to ensure the use of 
single DRF, it could be designed and executed jointly. Aid recipient countries need to 
improve the overall quality of their country systems, including corruption control and 
fiduciary risk elimination mechanisms. Donors on the other hand, could amend their internal 
rules and regulations so that they can use recipient systems. (Wood et al., 2011; Dijkstra and 





8.6 Limitations of the Study  
 
This thesis has comprehensively discussed the policy decisions of the Government of 
Bangladesh as well as its collaborative efforts with development partners to implement the 
aid effectiveness agenda. However, it has not examined economic impacts or the political 
economy of implementing the aid effectiveness agenda, particularly the impact of initiatives 
for poverty reduction and economic growth. Moreover, this study focuses on DAC or 
traditional donors and excludes non-traditional donors or Southern donors. It has not 
conducted a very specific examination in terms of the impact of Government and 
development partner initiatives to implement the aid effectiveness agenda in terms of the 
SDGs. Also it has not investigated Government or development partner initiatives to 
implement the development effectiveness agenda in detail.  
 
8.7 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
Discussion and findings in this thesis create a few options for future research. Further 
research can be undertaken to investigate the reasons for Bangladesh‟s de-motivation in 
taking necessary steps for the sustainability of policy decisions, collaborative efforts or 
initiatives carried out in implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. The modus operandi of 
new donors or Southern donors in Bangladesh can also be examined. Research can also be 
conducted in other aid recipient countries to develop a clearer understanding about the shift 
from aid to development effectiveness and the current implementation status of “unfinished 
business”. The harmonisation principle is not included in the development effectiveness 
agenda but donor co-ordination is still a serious problem in recipient countries. Thus, it would 
be a good idea to conduct research to examine the impact of exclusion of the harmonisation 
principle in aid recipient countries. This thesis also suggests new research on the economic 
impact of the failure of Bangladesh and its development partner initiatives in implementing 
aid effectiveness or the economic gains from implementation. The aid effectiveness agenda 
emphasises the management aspect of aid and achieving goals but research can also be 
conducted to assess the impact of the aid effectiveness principle on poverty reduction and 
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